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This book is the result of many years’ experience of teaching fisheries economics and 
management, also called bioeconomics, for undergraduate and graduate students in 
interdisciplinary programs, both in Norway and abroad. These students often have a 
limited background in economics and mathematics and the challenge has been to be 
analytical without being unnecessary mathematical. I have found that with the 
exercises at the end of some of the chapters students are quite capable looking at 
fisheries economics and management from an analytic perspective. Exercises and 
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1.  Introduction 
 
As long as people have been living on the earth they have utilised fish and other 
renewable marine resources for food, clothes and other necessities. The species caught 
have varied across regions and time. For example, the Nordic countries have a several 
thousand-year history of utilisation of living marine resources. Fish species like cod, 
herring and salmon, as well as several species of seals and whales, have always been 
important elements in the diet of coastal people and as goods for trade. Historically, 
local people have had free access to these resources in the sense that no authority 
above the fishing village or tribal level decided how fishing could take place and the 
intensity of these activities. Natural short run and long run fluctuations in the size of 
fish stocks, fish migration, species composition and weather and climate, as well as 
seasonal variations in the availability of different species, represented the main 
challenge for the fishers. However, in particular during the twentieth century, several 
fisheries around the world have experienced more and more restrictions on the 
freedom of individual fishers to establish and conduct their business. In addition, 
technological change and the transformation of local supply fisheries to fisheries 
based on national and global markets have had an immense effect on the way fishers 
perform their profession. 
 
The objective of these materials is to give a thorough introduction to and 
review of the theory of fisheries economics and management, illustrated by actual and 
stylised examples, such that the student may understand better why it could be 
beneficial for society at large to organise people’s access to fishing, and how this may 
be done. Hopefully, this will contribute to the long-term improvement of fisheries 
management and fishing industry performance.  
 
In economics, we study how human beings utilise scarce resources for the 
production and distribution of goods and services that have alternative uses. Scarce 
resources include labour, capital and natural resources. The relative emphasis on each 
of these resources varies across the sub-fields of economics. Historically the main 
emphases seem to have changed according to the perception of economists, and 
people in general, of which resource is the most scarce. In particular, over the last 
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couple of decades environmental and resource economics have gained more and more 
ground within economic discourse and theory. This has probably been affected by the 
increase in industrial production, transport and population growth, and the 
implications of this for local communities and countries all over the world. Some 
global problems, such as climate change, may be the result of millions of decisions at 
the household, business and national level. For each of the economic agents pursuing 
their own private interests their emission of CO2 as individuals might seem 
insignificant, but the total is huge and is expected to have serious long-term effects. 
Another example is biological and economic overfishing. Each fisher’s catch might 
seem insignificant compared with the wide ocean and the size of the ecosystem. 
However, the total catches of many fish stocks around the world have contributed to 
biological and economic overfishing. This has at some points in time been the case, 
for example, for cod in Canadian, Icelandic and Norwegian waters, despite the 
relatively small catch of each fisher and vessel. 
 
In this text, fisheries economic theory is partly used as a synonym for 
bioeconomic theory and partly for something wider, including the application of 
microeconomic theory to fishing industry issues. A distinctive feature of bioeconomic 
theory is that it aims at analysing and modelling the main interactions between fishers 
(economic agents) and fishstocks (resources that might sustain harvest), as well as 
studying how such interactions are affected by the managers (principals of the 
society). However, we admit that the analysis is limited to major economic and 
biological issues, excluding most post-harvesting issues, as well as social and legal 
issues. Some basic elements from biological modelling will be used, but we do not 
intend to go into any detail of biological modelling and analyses. There are several 
similarities between the methods used by economists and biologists. Within both 
disciplines, core elements are theories, models and statistical methods to test 
hypotheses and give predictions. Predicting economic growth and the growth of fish 
stocks is not that different from a methodological point of view.  
 
The economic world is extremely complex and difficult to grasp, not just for 
lay people, but also for trained economists. Even within smaller economies, such as 
Norway, Namibia and New Zealand, not to mention major economies like China, the 
European Union, Japan and the United States of America, millions of transactions 
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between firms, and between firms and consumers, are taking place every day. To gain 
an overview of the functioning of these economies it would not be sufficient to start 
collecting data and other empirical information from these markets. We also need 
theories and models to explain connections between important economic variables. 
From consumer theory we recognise concepts like budget constraint, utility and 
individual demand, and from the theory of the firm, or production theory, the concepts 
of marginal cost, average cost and supply curve are well known. Market theory 
integrates elements from the theories of consumers and firms and concepts such as 
total demand, market price and equilibrium are well known. Based on theories, the 
functioning of complex markets may be described in a sufficiently simple way to give 
students and other interested parties an understanding of how markets work, and 
researchers may derive hypotheses to be tested against economic data. This does not 
necessarily mean that theory has to come before empirical investigation. Sometimes 
empirical data may give the researcher ideas for further investigation of interesting 
economic relationships and create the foundation for developing theories and models.  
 
A theory or a model is not necessarily better the more detailed and complex it 
is. More important is that it includes, in a simple way, those economic variables of 
most importance for the issues at stake, and that it contributes to our knowledge of the 
functioning of the economy. Regarding the application of economic theory, a model 
that simplifies and summarises the theory in a coherent way is often useful. We may 
say, there is nothing as practical as an excellent theory, with the exception of an 
excellent model. Fisheries economic theory is in its most condensed form applied 
welfare theory, with elements from consumer, production and market theory. 
Fisheries economic models have something in common with macro economic models 
with the focus on aggregated economic variables. In fisheries economics the focus is 
often on the aggregated effects of all fishers’ actions, to allow comparison of, for 
instance, the total catch of all fishers and the natural growth of the fish stock(s).  
 
Markets and ecosystems are often fluctuating and the development of key 
variables such as prices of fish, catches and fish stocks is uncertain. Risk and 
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uncertainty are, however, not included in the analyses presented in this book. Focus is 
on deterministic theory to keep the discussion as simple as possible.1 
 
Fisheries economic theory includes positive as well as normative elements: 
positive since it may explain why some fish stocks are over-fished, others under-
utilised or not used commercially at all. On the other hand, like parts of welfare theory, 
fisheries economic theory is also normative since it may give guidance as to how 
intensively fish resources should be used and how the fishing industry could be 
managed. This text includes both positive and normative theories and models.2 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Andersen (1981) for a bioeconomic analysis of price uncertainty and Flaaten et al. (1998) for 
analyses of several types of uncertainty in fisheries. 
2 For alternative texts and further reading see Anderson (1986), Clark (1990) and Hannesson (1993). 
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2.  Population dynamics and fishing 
 
This chapter shows the basic features of fish stock dynamics and how the stock is 
affected by fishing. The sustainable yield curve, yield as a function of fishing effort, is 
derived. This curve is an important bridge between the work of biologists and 
economists, and it will be used extensively throughout these materials. 
 
2.1  Growth of fish stocks 
 
A fish species that lives and is able to reproduce itself within a given geographical 
area is called a stock or a population. In fisheries science and management literature, 
the term “stock” is most common, whereas in the ecology literature “population” is 
generally preferred. Some authors use stock as a synonym for an exploited population, 
but in this text the term stock will be used for any population, whether exploited or 
not. Ecologically speaking a population is “a group with unimpeded gene flow”. An 
example of the relationship between species and stocks is the North Atlantic species 
cod (Gadus morhua) which consists of several stocks, including the Canadian-
Newfoundlandic, the Icelandic and the Arcto-Norwegian cod. In principle, stocks are 
self-contained entities, even though there might be some migrational exchange 
between them. Each stock has its own particular characteristics that may be genetic, a 
result of differing environments, or usually a mixture of both.1  
 
Fish stock change depends on recruitment, natural mortality, individual growth 
and harvesting. This may be summarised as follows: 
 
 Stock change  =  Recruitment + Individual growth - Natural mortality - Harvest 
         = Natural growth - Harvest 
Note that the stock change can be positive or negative if recruitment and individual 
growth together is greater or smaller, respectively, than natural mortality and harvest. 
Empirical research and theoretical reasoning have concluded that natural growth of 
fish stocks may be illustrated as bell-shaped growth curves as shown in figure 2.1. 
Growth curves could also be called yield curves since the natural growth of fish 
                                                 
1 Pitcher and Hart (1992) give a thorough review of fisheries biology and fisheries biological models as 
well as a review of fish stocks globally. Hamre (1986) and Pedersen (2002) give reviews of fish stocks 
in the North Sea and Norwegian waters. 
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stocks might be harvested. For most fish species, lower stock levels mean relative 
higher recruitment and individual growth, whereas higher stock levels imply relative 
lower recruitment, lower individual growth and/or higher natural mortality due to 
density-dependent biological processes. Thus, the sum of growth-augmenting and 
growth-impeding factors is a bell-shaped growth curve with the highest growth at an 
intermediate stock level. The maximum natural growth is at stock level XMSY  in figure 
2.1.  If the natural growth of the stock is harvested, the maximum harvest is achieved 
for stock level XMSY  and this harvest is called the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). 
MSY could be, for example, 200 000 tonnes per year for a cod stock. In each case 
shown in figure 2.1 a stable equilibrium of the unharvested stock exists at level K, and 
this level is usually called the environmental carrying capacity of the stock. 
  
 




For growth curve (a) in figure 2.1 the relative natural rate of growth F(X)/X 
increases when the stock level decreases, and we call this effect pure compensation. 
At low stock levels, some stocks have relative growth rates that decrease with reduced 
stock level. The growth of such stocks is said to be depensatory, and two growth 
curves with depensation are shown in panels (b) and (c) in figure 2.1. Growth curve (c) 
has a critical stock level K0  which implies extinction if the stock should be depleted 
below this level for any reason. Depensation may be observed for some prey stocks, 
for example, herring, but not exclusively prey stocks. This feature may be the effect of 
a predator, for instance, seals, that continue to consume its prey even when the prey 
stock declines. Thus, in such a case the prey stock will demonstrate depensatoric 
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growth. In case the predator is in strong need and has the ability to locate and 
consume the last school of prey, the prey stock is vulnerable to critical depensation 
and extinction if fished too hard. 
 
For a thorough discussion of bioeconomic fishery models we shall need some 
simple mathematical tools. The following symbols will be used, where t  indicates 
point in time: 
 
)(tX = Stock level (weight of the stock, for example in thousand tonnes) 
)(tX = dX(t)/dt = Change in stock per unit of time 
)(XF  = Natural growth function. 
 
Unless necessary for the understanding, the symbol for time, t, will be omitted in the 
text and equations. 
 





XdFXF   for          0  )()(' ><<>= . 
 
 
A closer look at figure 2.1 reveals that the growth curves in panels (a) and (b) fulfil 
the requirements of growth function (2.1). However, this is not the case for very low 
stock levels in panel (c). Natural growth, expressed as in figure 2.1 and equation (2.1), 
is the limit to fishers’ harvest. To produce a harvest, fishers need man-made tools and 
fishing effort, in addition to nature’s tool, the fish stock. Without both, there will be 
no harvest. 
 
 Note that the growth curve in Figure 2.1 panel (a) is based on the natural 
growth function )/1()( KXrXXF −= which we shall return to several times. In this 
function K is the carrying capacity of the habitat of this fish stock. Thus K is the 
maximum stock level, to be observed only before harvesting takes place. Further, r is 





Box 2.1 The Zarephath widow’s pot 
 
The importance of the supply of natural resources for people’s survival and welfare 
have been described and discussed in both the secular and religious literature down 
the ages. The Bible, for example, mentions in several places water resources and their 
significance for people living in the area that today is called the Middle East. Issues 
related to the production of food from land and sea are also common themes in the 
Bible. The story of the Zarephath widow’s pot is a case of renewable resource use. In 
fact, it was not just one pot in this story, but two – a jar and a cruse.  
 
In 1Kings 17, the Bible tells how the prophet Elijah had been living from water of the 
stream Cherith, east of Jordan, and of bread and meat that the ravens brought him in 
the mornings and evenings. However, after a while the stream dried up because of 
lack of rain. Then God told Elijah to go to the town of Zarephath to stay with a poor 
and hungry widow. He came upon her at the gate of the city and she willingly shared 
her very last resources with him, using her final meal and oil to make a cake to be 
shared between Elijah, her son and herself. 
 
And Eli'jah said to her, “Fear not; go and do as you have said; but first make me a 
little cake of it and bring it to me, and afterward make for yourself and your son. For 
thus says the LORD the God of Israel, 'The jar of meal shall not be spent, and the 
cruse of oil shall not fail, until the day that the LORD sends rain upon the earth.'" 
And she went and did as Eli'jah said; and she, and he, and her household ate for 
many days. The jar of meal was not spent, neither did the cruse of oil fail, according 
to the word of the LORD which he spoke by Eli'jah. 
1 Kings17, 13-16. 
 
As the pots of the widow sustained her use of meal and oil, so the fish in the sea might 
sustain mankind’s harvest. As long as harvesters use the resource within its 
production possibilities, the fish stock will give a lasting yield. However, it might go 
wrong if too many take too much from the same pot. A necessary, but not sufficient 
condition to avoid over-fishing is ecological and economic knowledge – that is to say, 
knowledge about interactions between man and nature.  
 
Epilogue. Supply and sharing of resources are hardly as easy as in this story. Could it 
be that future “water wars” would be much harder, with more severe consequences for 
the people involved than some of the fish wars we have seen in recent decades? The 
Middle East area of Elijah and the widow in this story might be a candidate area for 
such wars. However, with co-operation and proper management conflicts may be 






2.2  Effort and production 
 
A fish harvesting firm or a fisher uses several inputs, or factors, to catch fish and to 
land it round, gutted or processed. Inputs used include fuel, bait, gear and labour. In 
this respect a harvesting firm is not much different from any other firm – a set of 
inputs is used to produce an output. However, the direct contribution from the natural 
resource, the fish stock, constitutes a significant difference compared with a 
manufacturing firm that can use as much as it wants of all the required inputs. A fisher 
can vary the amount of inputs, but not the size of the stock.  
 
In actual fishing we usually find that for a given set of inputs the amount of 
output for the fishing firm varies with the stock level and the availability of the fish. 
Fish migration for spawning and feeding makes most stocks in certain areas more 
available for the fishers at some times of the year than in others. Such seasonal 
variations in the distribution of fish stocks and year classes are the basis for many 
seasonal fisheries around the world. However, to start with, we shall simplify the 
analysis by disregarding seasonal variations and assume that the fish stock is 
homogeneously distributed across area and time. The focus is on the size of the stock 
and the importance of this for the catch.  
 
For analytical and practical purposes it is useful to let fishers encounter the 
stock with what is called fishing effort, or just effort. Examples of effort are hours of 
trawling, number of gillnets and number of long-line hooks. Effort is produced by 
optimal use of inputs and is expressed in the production function 
 
(2.2) ),...,( 1 nvvE Ψ= ,  
 
where E is effort and vi is factor i. In one way, this is a regular production function 
recognisable from the theory of the firm. However, the great difference is that E is not 
a final product to be sold, like the products of most firms, but an intermediate good 
produced to encounter the fish stock. 
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Catch, the product of fish harvesting firms, is a function of effort and stock 
and this can be expressed in the harvest function 
 
(2.3) ),( XEfH = .  
 
Harvest function (2.3) is a short-run production function in the sense that it is valid for 
a given stock level at any point in time, without any feedback from effort to stock. 
Figure 2.2 gives an example of how catch varies with effort for two stock levels; H: 
high and L: low. Note that the catch is non-increasing in effort – that is, more effort 
implies higher catch, but not necessarily proportional to the increase in effort. 
 
Figure 2.2. Short-run variations in harvest as a function of effort. 
 
If effort is measured, for example, in trawl hours, catch could be measured in 
kg or tonnes. Effort and catch should both be related to the same unit of time, which 
could be a day or a week. 
 
Thus, there is a dichotomy in the analysis of fish production that is not found 
in the traditional theory of the firm. This way of analysing fisheries has the advantage 
that it treats the inputs controlled by the firm, such as fuel, bait and gear, differently 
from the major input, fish stocks. The latter is a necessary factor of production 
affected by the actions of numerous fishers (see the next section), but not controlled 





2.3  Yield and stock effects of fishing 
 
Fish stock levels are affected by fishing if the total effort is sufficiently high over 
some period of time. How much depends on the growth potential of the stock and the 
total harvest. Change in the stock is expressed by the growth equation 
 
 
(2.4) .)( HXFX −=   
 
From this equation follows 
 
 
(2.5) (X)HX        if     0  >
<
<
> .  
 
To ensure positive growth of the stock, the harvest must be lower than the natural 
growth. Biological equilibrium is by definition achieved when 0=X , and in this case 
equations (2.3) and (2.4) give  
 
(2.6) ).(),( XFXEf =   
 
Since this is one equation with two variables, X and E, the stock is implicitly given as 
a function of effort E. This means that at equilibrium the stock level is a function of 
effort, and from equation  (2.3) it now follows that the equilibrium harvest is also a 
function of effort. This equilibrium harvest is often called sustainable yield since it 
can be sustained by the stock for a given level of effort.  
 
We have seen that, knowing the growth function F(X) and the short-run 
harvest function (2.3), the sustainable yield may be derived from equation (2.6). This 
can also be done graphically as shown in figure 2.3. To simplify the analysis we now 
assume that the short-run harvest function is linear in effort and stock level: 
 
(2.7) .qEXH =   
 
Equation (2.7) is called the Schaefer harvest function (Schaefer, 1957). The parameter 
q is a constant called the availability parameter. This parameter expresses how 
effective the effort is in relation to the stock level. If effort is measured in, for 
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example, gill net days, q expresses the ratio between catch per gill net day, H/E, and 
stock level, X. Thus, the value of q is directly linked to the scaling of E. In some 
fisheries the combined harvest technology and fish behaviour is such that catch per 
unit of effort, H/E, is nearly independent of the stock size (see Bjørndal, 1987). In 
other fisheries catch per unit effort increases with the stock level, but not 
proportionally as in the Schaefer function (see Eide et al., 2003). 
 
Panel (a) of figure 2.3 shows short-run harvest as straight lines for five 
different effort levels. For the smallest effort E1 the harvest curve crosses the growth 
curve for stock level X1 and harvest H1. Thus, a small effort – over a sufficiently long 
time to let the stock reach equilibrium – gives a high stock level and a relatively small 
catch. A somewhat higher effort level E2 gives a lower stock level X2 but a higher 
sustainable catch, H2. However, an even higher effort like E4 gives stock level X4 that 
is significantly lower than X2, even though the sustainable catch H4 is equal to H2. 
Similarly, E5 gives a catch H5 equal to E1, even though the stock level X5 is much 
smaller than X1. In Figure 2.3 the highest possible harvest is reached for effort level 
E3 and this harvest is called the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). 
 
Figure 2.3. The sustainable yield curve shows harvest as a function of effort and is  
 derived from the natural growth curve and the harvest curve. 
 
The natural-growth stock-level curve in panel (a) has been transformed into a 
sustainable-harvest effort curve in panel (b). The H(E) curve is also called the 
sustainable yield curve and it connects the long-run harvest potential to fishing effort. 
This harvest-effort curve has the same form as the growth curve in this case since the 
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Schaefer short-run harvest function is linear in both effort and stock. It is important to 
note the difference between the short-run harvest function H = f (E,X) in (2.3), 
depicted as straight lines in panel (a) of figure 2.3, and the sustainable yield curve 
H(E), in panel (b). The former is valid for any combination of effort, E, and stock, X, 
at any time, whereas the latter is the long-run equilibrium harvest for given levels of 
effort. The sustainable yield curve is conditional on equilibrium harvest. 
 
The main purpose of figure 2.3 is to derive the equilibrium harvest-effort 
curve shown in panel (b). Let us now use this to discuss what happens over time if 
fishing takes place outside equilibrium. Suppose fishers use effort E1 to harvest a 
virgin stock at the carrying capacity level K. To start with, the harvest will be 
significantly greater than H1 since the stock level K is bigger than X1, and this implies 
that the stock level will decrease. When the stock decreases, the harvest will also 
decrease until it reaches such a level that, according to the short-run harvest curve 
designated qE1X in panel (a) of figure 2.3, harvest equals the natural growth of the 
stock. The decrease in harvest will continue until stock level X1 has been reached. At 
this point in time, harvest equals natural growth, and another equilibrium has been 
established. On the other hand, if fishers use effort E1 to fish at a stock level lower 
than X1 the stock will grow since natural growth is greater than harvest. The length of 
the transition period between, for example, the virgin stock level K and level X1 
depends on the biological production potential of the stock. Growth curves and 
sustainable yield curves, as shown in figure 2.3, may be used to compare different 
equilibria but cannot be used to tell how long a time the transition from one 
equilibrium to another will take.  
 
So far in this chapter we have analysed the effects of fishing on a stock with growth 
compensation (see figure 2.1). However, if the growth process exhibits depensation or 
critical depensation, the sustainable yield curve proves to become very different from 
the case of compensation. This is demonstrated in figures 2.4 and 2.5. The former is 
for the case of depensation and the latter is for the case of critical depensation of 
growth. In figure 2.4 panel (a), ED is the effort that makes the Schaefer harvest curve 






Figure 2.4.  The natural growth curve and sustainable yield as a function of effort in  




Figure 2.5.  The natural growth curve and sustainable yield as a function of effort in  








= .  
  
The left-hand side (lhs) of this equation is the slope of the Schaefer harvest curve, and 
the right hand side (rhs) is the slope of the growth curve.  
 
To ensure a sustainable harvest there is an upper limit on effort which cannot 
be exceeded, and this effort level is designated EMAX in figures 2.4 and 2.5. If effort 
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levels above EMAX  are maintained for a sufficiently long time the stock will be 
biologically over-fished and finally will become extinct. In case of extinction, panel 
(b) of figures 2.4 and 2.5 shows that the yield is zero for effort higher than EMAX . 
 
Figure 2.4 panel (b) shows that the harvest curve is double, with an upper and 
a lower branch for each value of effort between ED and EMAX . This is due to the 
existence of two intersection points between each of the linear harvest curves and the 
growth curve, as shown in panel (a). There is, however, a significant difference 
between the two branches of the yield curve. The upper part constitutes stable points 
of harvesting whereas the lower part constitutes unstable harvesting. An example will 
explain the stability problem. The harvest curve for effort E1 intersects with the 
growth curve for two stock levels, the low one X1L and the high one X1H in panel (a) 
of figure 2.4. For stock levels lower than X1L the harvest curve is above the growth 
curve and the natural growth is too small to compensate for the harvest. This implies 
that the stock will decrease from X1L to zero if effort E1 is maintained over a 
sufficiently long period of time, indicated in panel (a) by an arrow pointing to the left. 
Thus, X1L  is an unstable equilibrium for the stock harvested by effort E1. This would 
also be the case for all other left-hand side intersections between the harvest curve and 
the growth curve for effort levels between ED and EMAX . On the other hand, if the 
stock level is just above X1L natural growth is larger than harvest for effort E1 and the 
stock will increase. An arrow pointing to the right indicates this. Therefore, in this 
case the stock will in the long run increase towards X1H , which is a stable equilibrium. 
The lower part of the yield curve in figure 2.4 panel (b) is dashed to mark that this 
part represents unstable harvest. Figure 2.5 shows that, in case of growth with critical 
depensation, the harvest curve is double for all levels of E between zero and EMAX. 




Assume that the harvest function is H(E,X)=qEX, where q is the catchability 
coefficient and E is fishing effort. The catchability coefficient for a particular fishery 
is q=0.00067, and the stock level is X=3.0 million tonnes.  
 
a) What is the catch per unit of effort (CPUE) in this case?  
 24 
 
b) What could the unit of measurement of effort be if the fish stock is for example 











XrXXF 1)(  describes the annual natural growth of a 
fish stock. X represents the stock biomass at the start of the year. K is the 
environmental carrying capacity in stock biomass terms and r is the intrinsic growth 
rate.  
a) Show that the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) can be expressed by the two 
parameters r and K, so that 
4
rKMSY = . 
b) Draw a picture of F(X) for r=0.4 and K=8.0 million tonnes. 
 
Assume that the harvest function is H(E,X)=qEX, where q is the catchability 
coefficient and E is fishing effort measured in number of vessel year.  
 
c) Show how the sustainable yield curve (the long-run catch function) H(E) can be 
found. Tip: find it graphically like in figure 2.3, or by use of H(E,X)=F(X) 
where you eliminate X by using the harvest function. 
 
d) Add to your picture of F(X) the harvest function H(E,X)=qEX for q=0.00067 
and E equal to 100, 200, 400 and 500 vessel year. What is the sustainable yield 




3.  A basic bioeconomic model 
 
In this chapter we shall use the sustainable yield curve derived in figure 2.3 to analyse 
economic and biological effects of fishing under open access and managed fisheries. 
The concept of resource rent is defined and discussed, and we demonstrate how 
important this concept is for the analysis of managed fisheries. 
 
 
3.1  Open access bioeconomic equilibrium 
 
Let us start by asking the following question: if fishers have open and free access to a 
fishery, is there an effort level that may give rise to an economic equilibrium in the 
fish harvesting industry in the sense that effort is stable over time? If the answer to 
this question is affirmative, then one might ask how economic factors like effort costs 
and fish prices affect effort and stock at equilibrium. 
 
The gross revenue of a fishery, for example, per season or year, equals 
quantity harvested multiplied by the price of fish. The price of fish from a particular 
stock is hardly affected by quantity fished if the fish is sold in a competitive market 
with many sellers and buyers and in competition with similar types of fish from other 
stocks. In the following analysis we shall assume that the price of fish, p, is constant 
across time and quantity.  
 
Based on the sustainable yield curve (see H(E) in figure 2.3) the total revenue 
of fishing can be represented as 
 
(3.1) ).()( EHpETR ⋅=   
 
The total revenue curve will simply have the same shape as the sustainable yield 
curve, scaled up or down depending on the actual price. It is important to notice that 
the total revenue function and curve are both in terms of effort. In micro-economics, 




From the total revenue function in equation (3.1) we derive the average 
revenue and the marginal revenue functions. The average revenue per unit of effort is 
 
(3.2) ,/)()( EETREAR =   
 
and the marginal revenue of sustainable fishing is 
 
(3.2’) ./)()( dEEdTREMR =   
 
The distinction between the concepts of average and marginal revenue is very 
important in fisheries economics. Average revenue is the total revenue divided by 
total effort, whereas marginal revenue shows the change in total revenue as a result of 
a small change in effort. When we know the sustainable yield harvest, H(E) and the 
price of fish, p, we can also find TR(E), AR(E) and MR(E). Figure 3.1 panel (a) shows 
the total revenue curve based on the sustainable yield curve in figure 2.3 and a  
 
Figure 3.1.  The maximum economic yield level of fishing effort is significantly 




constant price of fish. The corresponding average revenue of effort AR(E) and 
marginal revenue of effort MR(E) curves are shown in panel (b). In this case the form 
of the TR curve is such that the AR and MR curves are almost straight lines. Whether 
they really are straight lines or curved is not of importance for this analysis. Note that 
for sufficiently high effort costs, or low price, the open access effort level in Figure 
3.1 may be lower than the maximum sustainable yield effort, implying that the stock 
will be higher than its MSY level (also see Figure 2.3). 
 
The total cost of a fishery depends on the costs and efficiency of each fishing 
vessel and its crew. However, at this stage we shall not go into a detailed discussion 
of the cost structure of the vessels. In the long run, actual effort expands by the 
addition of new vessels and the subtraction of old ones, as well as by varying the 
effort and efficiency of each vessel. To simplify the analysis, we shall assume that the 
total cost of a fishery can be expressed in a simple function of effort. In general, the 
connection between average cost of effort, AC(E), and marginal cost of effort, MC(E), 
on the one hand, and total cost, TC(E), on the other is 
 




(3.4) .0/)(     ,/)()( ≥= dEEdMCdEEdTCEMC   
 
If dMC/dE > 0 each additional unit of effort would be more costly than the previous 
ones, whereas dMC/dE = 0 means that effort can be added to the fishery at constant 
marginal costs. Increasing marginal cost means that the vessels are different from a 
cost and efficiency perspective. In this case we organise vessels along the effort axis 
with the most cost effective one to the left and the least cost effective ones towards 
the right (more on this in chapters 6.1 and 7.1). Constant marginal cost of effort 
implies that there is an infinitely elastic supply of effort – in other words, the supply 
curve is horizontal. In this case one could think of homogenous vessels that are added 
to the fishery at the same cost as the previous one. Homogenous vessels are, from a 
cost point of view, equally equipped and crewed and the marginal and the average 
cost of effort are the same for all vessels. Costs, including capital, labour and 
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operating costs, per unit of effort could be denominated, for example, as $ per vessel 
year, vessel day, trawl hour or gill net day. In figure 3.1 panel (a) the total cost curve, 
TC(E), is shown as an upward-sloping straight line. In other words, the cost function 
is linear in effort at a constant cost, a, per unit of effort. 
 
(3.5) aEETC =)( .  
 
Since effort in this analysis is homogenous from a cost point of view we shall 
also assume that vessels are homogenous from an efficiency point of view. This 
implies that they all catch the same amount of fish per unit of effort and that the 
average revenue is the same for all vessels. Under open access, vessels will enter the 
fishery if revenue per unit of effort is greater than cost per unit, and exit the fishery if 
cost per unit is higher than revenue. When average revenue of effort equals marginal 
cost of effort there will be an economic equilibrium with neither an incentive to leave 
nor an incentive to enter the fishery. Thus, we have now arrived at the following 
criterion for open access economic equilibrium in the fish harvesting industry 
 
(3.6) ).()( EAREMC =   
 
Recall that the revenue curves in figure 3.1 are based on biological equilibria (
.
X = 0) 
and that this is also the case for criterion (3.6). In other words, there are simultaneous 
biological and economic equilibria when (3.6) is fulfilled. This is called the open 
access bioeconomic equilibrium, or just bionomic equilibrium. 
 
For homogenous vessels, as in the analysis of this chapter, effort and harvest 
are the same for all vessels. Thus, the catch efficiency is the same for all vessels. 
What factors determine this efficiency at bioeconomic equilibrium? Are biological or 
economic factors most important? Let us try to answer these questions by using the 
bioeconomic model analysed above. By taking the derivative of (3.5) with respect to 
E we have 
 
(3.7) ,)( aEMC =   
 





Box 3.1 Denomination of fishing variables 
 
H and E in the harvest function (2.3) have to be related to the same time period, for 
example one day, month or year. The unit of measurement of effort, E, can be, for 
example, one hour of trawling in demersal trawl fisheries, one gill net day in coastal 
gill net fishing, or 100 hooks in long line fisheries. Using ∆t as symbol for the unit of 
time, one hour of trawling as the unit of effort and metric tonne as the unit of harvest 
and stock, the denominations of the variables would be 
 
 E: Trawl hours/∆t 
 H: Tonnes/∆t 
 X: Tonnes 
 
The unit of time used for measuring TR and TC has to be the same as for measuring H 
and E. The denomination of the cost per unit of effort, a, would be $ per trawl hour, 
$ per gill net day or $ per 100 fishing hooks, respectively, using the above examples. 
The denominations in $ terms will be 
 
 a: $/trawl hour 
 TC = aE: $/∆t 
 TR = pH: $/∆t 
 
If one vessel produces s units of effort during ∆t, Z vessels will produce the total 
effort  
 E = s Z ∆t 
 
If we know the total effort and the number of vessels, the average effort per vessel is 
found by dividing trawl hours with the number of vessels times the unit of time 
 







EpHEAR =  
 
 
Substituting for MC(E) from (3.7) and for AR(E) from (3.8) into (3.6) and re-













The left-hand side of (3.9) is called catch per unit of effort (CPUE), and this is equal 
to the ratio of cost per unit of effort to price of fish. It may seem strange that only 
economic factors, and not biological, affect CPUE at the open access bioeconomic 
equilibrium. How is this possible? Firstly, note that E and a are closely related. If E is 
measured, for example, in trawl hours, a will be in $ per trawl hour, and if E is 
measured in trawler year, a will be in $ per trawler year. CPUE will be tonnes per 
trawl hour or tonnes per trawler year, correspondingly. At bionomic equilibrium, 
CPUE will be greater the greater cost of effort and the lower price of fish is.  
Biological conditions do not affect the productivity of fishing, according to (3.9). The 
reason for this is that the open access stock level is an endogenous variable 
determined together with the sustainable catch, effort and CPUE by the exogenous 
variables; effort cost and fish price (see also Ch. 5.2). The ratio of cost of effort-price 
of fish affects fishing and thereby the size of the stock and the CPUE; low effort cost 
and high fish price imply a low equilibrium stock level under open access harvesting.  
 
In actual fisheries, prices, costs, efficiency and fish stocks fluctuate over time 
and economic and biological equilibria are only rarely observed. Nevertheless, the 
open access model has proved a useful point of reference in fisheries economics, just 
as the model of perfect competition is a useful reference model for understanding 
economics in general. 
 
 
3.2  Maximising resource rent 
 
Economic rent is, generally speaking, a payment to a factor of production in excess of 
what is necessary for its present employment. For example, if a fisher makes $20 000 
in his present occupation as a participant in an open-access fishery and his second best 
alternative, as a builder, pays $18 000, the economic rent is $2000. If his neighbour is 
a less efficient fisher who makes only $18 000, which is just above his opportunity 
cost in the labour market, this fisher does not earn any rent. The kind of rent earned by 
the former fisher is called intra-marginal rent (more on this in Ch. 7.1), which is 
closely related to rent from land discussed by classical economists like Ricardo. In 
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Ricardo’s context, rent is payment for the use of land: “the uses of the original and 
indestructible powers of the soil” (Ricardo, 1821, p.33).  
 
In present day economies, firms in some industries have monopoly power, 
which is the ability to influence the market price of the goods or services they sell. If 
such a firm generates revenue exceeding all its opportunity costs, including normal 
profit, super-normal profit is generated. Normal profit is the necessary payment to 
attract and keep capital in an industry. This may vary since risk and uncertainty vary 
between industries. Super-normal profit in this context is also called monopoly rent. 
Monopoly rent is related to the downward-sloping demand curve for the goods 
produced by a firm, whereas the intra-marginal rent noted above is related to the 
upward-sloping marginal cost curve of an industry. In the latter case the intra-
marginal producers are more efficient than the marginal one that just breaks even. 
 
In fisheries, there is a possibility of generating another type of rent related to 
the common pool characteristics of fish as a natural resource. This rent, called 
resource rent, is the industry earnings in excess of all costs and normal profit, and this 
may exist independently of any monopoly or intra-marginal rent. We shall see this 
more clearly when there is a horizontal marginal cost curve (no intra-marginal rent) 
and a horizontal demand curve (no monopoly rent) at the industry level.  Using the 
previous symbols, resource rent is defined, within the sustainable harvest model, by 
 
(3.10) ).()()( ETCETRE −=π   
 
The resource rent equals the revenue in excess of all costs, and this will vary with 
fishing effort. Assuming that the objective of fisheries management is to maximise the 
resource rent, let us now derive the effort level that can realise this objective. Note 
that alternatively we could have used harvest, H, as the management instrument 
instead of effort, E. Whether we use harvest or effort is mainly a matter of 
convenience and tradition. For a given effort the corresponding equilibrium harvest 
follows from the sustainable yield curve derived in chapter 2. To find the optimal 
level of effort, we may think of a sole owner that has total control of the fishery, 
including the control of effort and exclusive right to use the resource; Gordon (1954) 
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and Scott (1955) are early proponents of this approach. A necessary condition for 
maximisation of π (E) in (3.10) is  
 
(3.11) ,0)()(/)( =−= EMCEMRdEEdπ   
 
where MR(E) = dTR(E)/dE is the marginal revenue of effort for sustainable fishing 
and MC(E), the marginal cost of effort, is defined in (3.4). The second order condition 
for maximisation of π (E) is 
 
(3.12) .0/)(/)(/)( 22 <−= dEEdMCdEEdMRdEEd π   
 
From the necessary condition (3.11) we derive the following condition for maximum 
resource rent 
 
(3.13) ).()( EMREMC =   
 
The optimality rule in (3.13) is a very important economic reference point for 
fisheries management. Note the difference between this rule and the open access rule 
in (3.6). In both cases the left-hand side is the same, the marginal cost of effort MC(E), 
whereas the right-hand side differs. Under open access the effort expands and the 
stock decreases until the average revenue, AR(E), is reduced and equals marginal cost 
of effort at the bionomic equilibrium. In order to maximise resource rent, effort has to 
be reduced to such a level that the marginal revenue MR(E) equals marginal cost, as 
shown in (3.13).  
 
Maximum resource rent is also called maximum economic yield, with the 
acronym MEY. Effort and stock level corresponding to maximum economic yield are 
therefore given the subscript MEY as shown above in figure 3.1. This figure shows 
that EMEY is significantly lower than EMSY. The reduction of effort compared with the 
open access effort level saves costs and/or enlarges fishery revenues. Figure 3.1 has 
been designed such that revenue is about the same under open-access and MEY 
fishing and this is also the case for quantity harvested since price per kg of fish, p, is 
constant – independent of quantity harvested. But how is it possible to harvest the 
same quantity of fish with two such different effort levels as under open access and 
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MEY fishing? Recall that to harvest fish we need two major inputs, effort and stock, as 
expressed in the harvest function (2.3). To harvest a certain quantity of fish one may 
choose a large fishing effort and a small fish stock, or a small effort and a large stock. 
From an analytical point of view we compare two different equilibria without taking 
into account the time needed to change from one stock level to another. The 
sustainable yield curve (shown in figure 2.3) and the above analysis allows for 
comparison of different biological and economic equilibria, without paying regard to 
the time dimension (time and investment will be studied in Ch. 4).  It is pretty obvious 
that to maximise resource rent within the above analysis it pays to use the small 
effort-large stock combination, instead of large effort-small stock.  
 
Under the open access regime each fisher does not have an incentive to save 
fish in the sea to let it grow and to let it spawn new recruits for later periods of fishing. 
If fisher Mary wanted to pursue such goals it is very likely that Peter, Paul or another 
fisher, or all of them, would take such an opportunity to catch what Mary left. This 
leaves Mary without any other choice than to behave selfishly and maximise her own 
goal at any time. Thus, under open access the fish in the sea has zero opportunity cost 
for each fisher, resulting in the large-effort small-stock equilibrium.  
 
Under MEY management the resource has a positive opportunity cost due to 
the spawning and growth capacity of fish that can be used for harvesting and to 
maintain a larger stock than the open access provides. A larger stock gives lower unit 
cost of harvest ($ per tonne) than a small stock. This cost saving effect of increased 
stock level, called stock effect, is utilised to generate resource rent under the MEY 
regime. 
 
The analysis in this text is based on the assumption that effort, which 
combines inputs like vessel, gear, fuel, and labour, has an alternative value in the 
society’s production. This is a reasonable assumption for the long-term adaptation 
analysed within a bioeconomic framework. It takes time for stocks to adjust to 
changes in effort and other exogenous factors. Factors of production used to produce 
vessels and gear could alternatively have been used for the production of other goods 




When a society’s resources and outputs are allocated in such a way that no 
feasible change can improve anyone’s welfare without reducing the welfare of at least 
one other person, then a Pareto optimum exists (named after Vilfredo Pareto, Italian 
economist and mathematician, 1848–1923). A reallocation that makes one person 
better off without making anyone else worse off is called a Pareto improvement. From 
our analysis it should be clear that open access harvesting is not Pareto optimal. By 
reducing effort from E∞ to EMEY, as shown in figure 3.1, society saves on some factors 
of production that can be used in other sectors of the economy. This saving of 
resources should make it possible for the society to realise a Pareto improvement. 
Note that this criterion is rather strict, requiring that the improvement should take 
place “without making anyone else worse off”. However, economic development 
often takes place with net gains for someone, but losses for others. Even if total gains 
are larger than total losses in monetary terms, such a change is not a Pareto 
improvement because of the losses for someone. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion says that 
if a change in the economy is such that the gainers could compensate the loosers and 
still be better off, this change is beneficial for the society as a whole (J. R. Hicks and 
N. Kaldor published their work in 1939 in the Economic Journal). Compensation is 
hypothetical and this criterion suggests that the change is preferable even if 
compensation does not actually take place. 
 
 
3.3  Effort and harvest taxes 
 
In the previous section we have seen that a fishery can provide an economic surplus, 
resource rent, if effort is reduced below the open access level. We also derived the 
effort level EMEY that maximises resource rent. Using the sustainable yield curve, H(E) 
in figure 2.3, what the rent maximising harvest, HMEY, is follows immediately. The 
analysis so far does not tell how the reduction in E could take place. In many 
countries regulation traditionally plays a key role in managing fishing capacity and 
effort. We may think of capacity in numbers and size of vessels whereas effort is 
related to use of vessels in fishing. Examples of management instruments for capacity 
and effort reductions include vessel and fisher licences, effort quotas, length and 
weight limits for hull and fitted vessels, as well as engine power limitations. Such 
regulations are called input regulations. Output regulations related to the harvest of 
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fish are called quotas – be it total harvest quotas or harvest quotas per enterprise, 
vessel or fisher. In addition, input and output regulations may be combined with 
technical regulations, which include minimum mesh size of gear, minimum size of 
fish, and closed areas and seasons. Some of the regulatory instruments may be 
transformed into market instruments, such as tradeable licences and quotas (more on 
this in the next section).  
 
Indirect management instruments include taxes, fees and subsidies. The latter, 
for example a fuel subsidy, would encourage an expansion of effort and can be 
disregarded as an instrument to reduce effort in the direction of EMEY. In other parts of 
the economy corrective taxes are used to discourage the use of some goods and 
services, for example, motor vehicle fuel and tobacco, and to finance government 
budgets. Corrective taxes can in theory bring marginal private costs into alignment 
with marginal social costs. Such instruments are called Pigouvian taxes (after the 
British economist A. C. Pigou, 1877–1959). In principle, these could be used in 
fisheries, even though in practical fisheries policy they are hardly the regulatory 
means of primary choice among major fishing nations (see, for example, OECD, 
1997). Nevertheless, studying the effects of Pigouvian taxes on fishing effort, as well 
as on resources, is an excellent point of departure for studies in fisheries management 
– and to gain a basic grasp on how economic instruments work. Therefore, let us have 
a closer look at the effects of taxes on effort and harvest.  
 
We have seen in sections 3.1 and 3.2 that a renewable resource like fish is 
economically overexploited under an open access regime, provided the market price is 
high enough and the harvest cost low enough to make it a commercial resource. 
Another interpretation is that the bioeconomic model predicts that open access 
fisheries, in the long run, will not generate resource rent. Figure 3.1 shows that the 
average revenue per unit effort, AR(E), is greater than the marginal cost of effort, 
MC(E) if total participation in the fishery, measured by E, is less than E∞. The 
existence of a super-normal profit for the participants attracts new fishers with the 
result that total effort increases. This will take place as long as E is less than E∞. On 
the other hand, if effort at the point of departure for our analysis is greater than E∞ 
fishers will have higher costs than revenues and some of them will leave this fishery. 
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Thus, E∞ is the open access equilibrium level for effort as long as prices and costs are 
constant, and to this effort corresponds an open access equilibrium level of the fish 
stock.  
 
In public discourse “the tragedy of the commons” seems to have several 
meanings, including that effort is higher than the maximum sustainable yield effort, 
effort is higher than the maximum economic yield effort, stock level is lower than the 
maximum sustainable yield stock and that sustainable yield is lower than maximum 
sustainable yield. It is, however, important to distinguish between “tragedies” related 
to biological concepts and to economic concepts. A fish stock that is economically 
over-fished, as is always the case at open access equilibrium, is not necessarily 
biologically over-fished. If fishing costs are high and/or fish price is low, open access 
does not necessarily attract enough effort to cause biological over-fishing. The 
equilibrium effort has to be higher than the maximum sustainable yield effort to cause 
biological over fishing, and this will not happen unless the effort cost is sufficiently 
low and/or the fish price is high enough.  
 
Based on the analysis above it is now clear that the management board should 
aim at doing something with the prices, costs or institutions that fishermen face. For 
fishermen high fish prices may be good in the short run, but with bad institutions 
(open access) this may in the long run be a threat against fish stocks. Using Pigouvian 
taxes, the manager’s task is to find the tax rate, on either effort or harvest, that adjusts 
effort to the maximum economic yield level EMEY. This requires an extensive 
knowledge about the biological and economic characteristics of the fishery, expressed 
in the H(E), TR(E) and TC(E) functions. However, any tax rate lower than the optimal 
one will move the fishery in the right direction, from E∞ towards EMEY. Let us now 
assume that the manager has all the necessary information freely available so that we 
do not have to include information and management costs in the analysis. Panel (a) of 
figure 3.2 shows total revenues and costs, whereas panel (b) shows average and 
marginal figures.  
 




 tE = tax per unit effort (for example, $ per trawl hour or trawler year) 
 tH = tax per unit harvest (for example, $ per kg or tonne of fish landed). 
 
With an effort tax the total cost for the fishers is 
 
(3.14) ,)()( EtaETC EP +=   
 
Figure 3.2. Use of corrective (Pigouvian) taxes on effort and harvest can equate 
 social and private costs and social and private revenues. 
 
where E and a are effort and cost per unit of effort, respectively. The use of subscript 
p for TC underlines that this is the total private cost of the fishers, including what they  
have to pay in effort taxes to the government. Note that for any value of E total 
private cost TCp is greater than the total cost, TC, since fishers have to include the 
effort tax in their costs. The effect of an effort tax can be analysed equivalent to a shift 
in the cost per unit effort, thus increasing the slope of the total cost curve for the 
industry. This is shown in figure 3.2, where TC(E) is the total cost curve exclusive of 
the effort tax and TCp(E) is the total cost curve including the tax. The effect of the 
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effort tax is to augment total private costs to such a level that the TCp curve intersects 
the total revenue curve for the maximum sustainable yield effort level EMEY. This 
implies that the total revenue, TR(E), is shared between the government, as the tax 
collector, and the fishing industry. The former receives the resource rent, πMEY, and 
the fishers end up with the difference between the total revenue and the resource rent, 
TR(E) minus πMEY . Fishers in total receive TR(E) for their catch, and out of this they 
pay a tax proportionate to their effort. What is left is just enough to cover the costs of 
the fishers. Recall that ordinary remuneration of capital and labour is included in the 
costs. 
 
The total amount of resource rent depends on biological and economic 
characteristics of the fishery, related to the forms of the curves in figure 3.2. In 
general, we could say that low cost fisheries with high priced and/or easy to catch fish 
have the greatest potential for generating resource rent. On the other hand, high cost 
fisheries with low priced and/or hard to catch fish may even make it uneconomical to 
sustain a fishery on a commercial basis. Realising resource rent has a meaning only 
when a fishery generates, or is expected to generate, higher revenues than costs.  
 
With a harvest tax the total private revenue of fishers equals 
 
(3.15) )()()( EHtpETR HP −=   
 
where p and H are the price of fish and of harvest, respectively. Note that TR now has 
the subscript p to underline that the total revenue in (3.15) is what the private industry 
receives net of taxes. The other part, equal to thH(E), is the government’s tax revenue. 
It is easy to see by re-arranging (3.15) that the total revenue of the fishery, pH(E) , 
equals the sum of private and government revenues. Recall that the tax rate th is 
measured in $ per kg or per tonne – in other words we do not use a percentage tax in 
this analysis.  
 
Figure 3.2 panel (b) shows in detail the effects of the two taxes discussed 
above. The MC, AR and MR curves are the before-tax fishery marginal cost, average 
revenue and marginal revenue, respectively. The open access bioeconomic 
equilibrium is at the effort level E∞ where the fishery marginal cost curve intersects 
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the average revenue curve. In this case with a horizontal MC curve the effort tax shifts 
this curve upward to MCp, a distance equal to the size of the tax. If, for example, the 
fishery marginal cost is $100 per trawl hour and the effort tax tE also equals $100 per 
trawl hour, the fishery marginal cost including the tax will be twice the pre-tax level. 
In figure 3.2 panel (b) this is illustrated with a MCp curve at a level twice as high as 
the MC curve. The MCp curve intersects the AR curve for an effort level that gives 
maximum economic yield, EMEY. The industry now faces the effort cost including the 
tax and this will equal average revenue AR at equilibrium. For effort levels lower than 
EMEY  the AR curve is above the MCP curve. This implies that additional effort will 
enter the fishery due to super-normal profit in the industry, and the stock will decline 
to reduce the average revenue along the downward sloping AR curve towards the 
EMEY  level. On the other hand, if effort is above the EMEY  level the effort cost 
including the tax is above the average revenue curve, imposing a loss on the 
participating vessels. This implies that some effort will have to leave the industry, 
resulting in lower catch, increased stock level and increased average revenue when 
moving from the right along the AR curve towards EMEY . In case of an effort tax as 
the only management instrument fishers will face a higher cost of effort, but in all 
other respects their adaptation will be as under open access. 
 
In case of a harvest tax, the average and the marginal revenue curves of the 
sustainable fishery are affected as shown in figure 3.2 panel (b). If the price of fish is 
$2.00 per kg and the harvest tax is $1.00 per kg, the net price of fish received by the 
fishers will be $1.00. Whether fishers receive $2.00 per kg and are charged a tax of 
$1.00 per kg, or they receive the net price of $1.00 does not make any difference to 
their net revenues. In the latter case the $1.00 harvest tax is levied on the buyers who 
collect the tax on behalf of the government. With this example the ARp(E) curve has a 
slope about half as steep as the AR(E) curve in figure 3.2. This is due to the definition 
of average revenue; namely total revenue divided by effort. With a constant price of 
fish the numerator of the average revenue will change in proportion with the harvest 
tax for a given level of effort. The right-hand side end point of the average revenue 
curve on the effort axis will not be affected by the harvest tax; thus the intersection is 




In figure 3.2 the level of the effort tax is such that the linear TCp curve 
intersects the total revenue curve for EMEY. This implies that the total tax revenue 
equals the resource rent:  
 
(3.16) .MEYEMEY Et=π   
 
 
In the case of a harvest tax in figure 3.2 the level of this tax has been set such that the 
TRp curve intersects the total cost curve for EMEY. The resource rent in this case is 
exactly of the same amount as the tax revenue: 
 
(3.16) MEYHMEY Ht=π .  
 
By use of taxes on effort or harvest, the profit maximising behaviour of fishers results 
in lower effort than under open access, and those who stay in the industry earn a 
normal remuneration. Open access fisheries give, as we have seen, too many fishers in 
the industry, but resource taxes on effort or harvest could positively alter this. Thus, a 
tax on harvest contributes to decreasing the total revenue of the industry whereas a tax 
on effort contributes to increasing the industry costs. Resource taxes levied on effort 
or harvest would change the private cost or private revenue, respectively, to 
discourage participation in the fishery. The tax authority, traditionally the central 
government, collects the resource rent generated. This tax revenue may be used to 
reduce other taxes or to augment the government’s expenditures. From a policy point 
of view resource rent can be re-distributed, for example, to fishing communities or 
regions, without any efficiency loss. The question of how the resource rent is spent or 
re-distributed should be seen independently of the problem of generating the rent. 
That is one of the strengths of this analysis. However, in actual commercial fisheries 
resource taxes have not been a common management instrument, like in other 
environmental and natural resource saving relations (for an overview of 
environmentally related taxes in industrialised countries, see OECD, 2001; OECD 
2003; and The Environmental Taxes Database of OECD at http://www.oecd.org/). 
Also see chapter 11 on what may happen to fisheries dependent regions and countries 




Management does not come for free. There are costs of research and assessment 
of fish stocks and markets, as well as costs of obtaining information on costs and 
earnings of fishing vessels. In addition management and enforcement systems are 
necessary institutions which need economic funding. In some cases locally limited 
ecosystems may be governed more efficient and less costly by fishermen and other 
stakeholders themselves (see Ostrom, 1990, which is one of the major works that 
gained professor Elinor Ostrom the 2009 Nobel price in economics). 
 
3.4 Fishing licences and quotas 
 
We have seen in the previous section how effort and harvest taxes could be used to 
reduce effort down to or towards the long run optimum, the rent maximising level. 
How much effort is reduced from the open-access level depends on the size of the tax, 
which in this case acts as a price instrument. In simple cases like this, with a single 
resource and no distinction between year classes, with one-dimensional effort (no 
substitution between inputs), no management costs and no uncertainty, the manager 
may choose freely between indirect price instruments (taxes) and direct instruments, 
such as effort and harvest quotas. Price management (taxes) and quantity management 
(quotas) have equivalent effects on overall industry production and economic 
performance, therefore they are called dual instruments. However, to ensure that the 
expected results are lasting, the effort quotas and harvest quotas should be transferable. 
This means that there has to be a quota market to ensure that at any time the most 
cost-effective fishers do the fishing. In a successful MEY-managed fishery resource 
rent per unit effort would be ΠMEY/EMEY and resource rent per unit harvest would be 
ΠMEY/HMEY (recall figure 3.2). These two ratios indicate the equilibrium prices of 
effort and harvest quotas, respectively.  
 
In actual fisheries the initial distribution of the fishing rights, such as vessel 
licences, effort quotas and harvest quotas are often heavily debated. There could be 
several reasons for this, but the main one has to do with the distribution of resource 
rent, which may be significant in well-managed fisheries. Even in a system with non-
transferable harvest and effort quotas, significant resource rent may still be generated, 
in particular, if the initial quotas are given for free to those fishers that are most 
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successful under the open access regime. The question is, however, whether these 
fishers also in the future will be the most efficient ones. 
 
Let us now have a closer look at the effects of using licences and quotas as 
management instruments and compare the results to that of taxes. A vessel licence is a 
permission to register and use a vessel for commercial fishing. The licence may or 
may not specify limits to the vessel characteristics, for example, length (metres), 
weight (gross registered tonnes), hold volume (cubic metres) or engine power (horse 
power or kilowatt), and to the type of gear (for example, trawl, long-line or purse 
seine). A licence usually restricts the fishing capacity of the vessel; in general 
capacity is the amount of fish that can be produced per unit of time, for example, per 
year, with existing vessel, equipment and gear at a given stock level, provided the 
availability of variable factors of production is not restricted.1  While capacity is 
related to the mere existence of the fishing vessel, effort is related to its use, measured 
for example, in hours, days or years. What to use as the unit of effort is mainly a 
question of convenience (see Box 3.1). In what follows we shall focus on effort and 
harvest quotas as management tools without discussing explicitly the use of licences. 
However, there is a close connection between the licence value and the quota value, 
depending on the amount of harvest quotas or effort quotas a licence holder is given 
or allowed to acquire.  
 
Figure 3.3 is derived from figure 3.2 and shows effort along the horizontal axis 
and market price of effort along the vertical axis. Effort and its market price are both 
related to the same unit of measurement. For example, if effort is measured in trawl 
hours the effort quota price is in $ per hour trawling, and if effort is measured in 
whole-year operated trawlers, the price is in $ per trawler year. Resource rent per unit 
effort is the difference between the average revenue per unit effort, AR(E), and the 
marginal cost of effort, MC(E) (see figure 3.2). In a perfect market, disregarding 
uncertainty, the effort quota price reflects the expected resource rent per unit effort 
and the harvest quota price reflects the expected resource rent per unit harvest. The 
licence price in figure 3.3 has its maximum for just one unit of effort, recalling that 
                                                 
1 A common definition of capacity often used in productivity studies is that of Johansen (1968): “The 
maximum amount that can be produced per unit of time with existing plant and equipment, provided 
the availability of variable factors of production is not restricted”. 
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the highest average resource rent is gained if only one unit of effort participates in the 
fishery. At the other end of the effort price curve is the zero price for the open access 
case. The quota price is zero if the number of effort quotas equals the amount of effort 
that would establish itself under open access. In an open access fishery the market 
price of quotas is zero because no resource rent is generated. The total value of the 
quotas is, as usual, the product of price and quantity. In this case the maximum total 
value of the effort quotas, which is the product mMEYEMEY shown in figure 3.3, is 
equal to the maximum resource rent, ΠMEY, shown in figure 3.2. Note that this 
analysis relates to long run equilibrium harvesting where the manager has adapted the 
number of effort quotas to maximise resource rent. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Effort quota price as a function of sustainable effort. 
 
So far in this chapter we have studied some long-run aspects of fisheries, in 
particular the cases of open-access and MEY management, assuming that the supply 
of homogenous effort is plentiful at a constant marginal cost of effort, previously 
denoted a. However, from the theory of the firm we recall that increasing marginal 
cost is necessary to avoid corner solutions with “all” or “nothing” production. In 
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fisheries economics the declining stock as a function of effort helps avoid corner 
solutions, as shown in figure 3.2.2  
 
Let us now assume that in the short run there is increasing marginal cost of 
effort at the firm level (more on this in chapter 6). This means that if there is a market  
 
 
Figure 3.4.  Two firms’ demand for quotas as a function of quota price.  
 “Effort/harvest” means effort quota or harvest quota.  
 
for effort quotas the firm wants to buy more quotas the cheaper they are; the firm may 
be a multi-vessel company, a single vessel company or an owner-operated vessel. The 
downward sloping demand curve corresponds fully to the regular firm’s demand for 
any variable input that can be bought in the market. Figure 3.4 shows the equilibrium 
in a quota market with two competitive firms. The quota price is shown on the vertical 
axis. On the horizontal axis the distance CD measures the managers’ total supply of 
effort quotas or harvest quotas. If effort quotas are used, the total supply CD has to be 
less than the open access effort level to ensure demand and a positive price. If there is 
a positive price for effort quotas this also ensures a positive price for harvest quotas, 
and vice versa. In figure 3.4 quotas in firm A are measured off to the right from C and 
quotas in firm B are measured off to the left from D. The AA curve expresses the 
                                                 
2 However, one corner solution in figure 3.2 would be zero effort and the virgin fish stock, in the case 
where effort cost is too high for there to be an intersection between the MC(E) and the AR(E) curves. 
Another corner solution would be for zero effort cost, implying extinction of the stock and zero effort 
after the “extinction process” is finished. 
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value of the marginal quota in firm A and the BB curve measures the value of the 
marginal quota in firm B. Thus the AA and the BB curves are the demand curves for 
quotas for firms A and B respectively. Each of these demand curves depends upon 
three things. First, the harvest technology for producing effort from capital, labour and 
other inputs. Second, the price of fish; an increase in the price shifts the demand for 
quota upwards. Third, the amount of vessel specific capital, which may be different 
for the two firms. In this case depicted in figure 3.4 there is more vessel capital in firm 
B than in firm A since the quota demand for any price m is higher in firm B than in 
firm A. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows that the quota price m* is the equilibrium price. For this 
price the total quota, equal to the distance CD, is allocated between the two 
competitive firms according to the profit maximising criterion.3 If the initial quota 
distribution is CG for firm A and DG for firm B, both firms will gain from a quota 
trade. Firm A will sell quota FG to firm B, and the market equilibrium is established 
at F with the quota price m*. In general, if the manager distributes for free the initial 
total quota CD equally between several firms, which are allowed to trade quotas, a 
competitive quota market ensures that the most efficient firms conduct the actual 
harvest. This is also the case for any other initial free distribution of the total quota. 
When quotas are distributed for free to the fish harvesting firms these firms reap the 
benefits of a successful management regime. Alternatively the manager could auction 
the quotas, and with a competitive market the equilibrium price is m*, as shown in 
figure 3.4. The main difference between an auction and initially free quotas is in the 
distribution of the resource rent. With an auction the auctioneer collects the resource 
rent, whereas the rent benefits the recipients when quotas are distributed for free. This 





A fish stock with its distribution area limited to a bay is managed locally. Assume that 
the following function describes the annual growth of the stock: 
                                                 
3 Our use of only two firms is of course to make the model and the discussion as simple as possible, 
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where X is the stock level at the beginning of the year, r is the intrinsic growth rate 
and K is the carrying capacity.  
 
When fishing takes place harvest per unit of effort is proportional to the stock level, 
implying the following catch function: 
  
 XEqH ⋅⋅= ,  
 
where H is catch, q is the catchability coefficient and E is fishing effort measured as 
number of vessel years. The unit cost of effort is a and p is the price of fish. 
 
The parameter values are: 
 
 r = 0.25 per year 
 K = 1000 tonnes 
 q = 0.05 tonnes per vessel year 
 p = 1.00 $ per kg 
 a = 10 000 $ per vessel year 
 
Find (and explain how) equilibrium effort, catch, revenues and costs for each of the 
following management objectives: 
 
a) Maximise employment in fish harvesting, 
b) Maximise harvest to be processed onshore, 
c) Maximise resource rent of the fishery.  
 
How could you as the manager of this fishery realise objective c given that objective a 






Two firms, A and B, are profit maximisers and act as if they are price takers in a 
competitive quota market (it could be either harvest quota or effort quota).  
 
 M = quota price ($ per tonne or per trawl day) 
 X = quota (tonnes or trawl days) 
 
The demand functions for quotas differ between the two firms, and are: 
 
 mA = 1000 – 0.015XA 
 mB = 1200 – 0.010XB 
 
1. What is the marginal value of quota for each firm (mA and mB) if the total 
quota X = 50 000 is distributed between A and B, with XA = 20000 and XB = 
30000? 
 
2. What is the competitive equilibrium quota price (m* = mA = mB ) and the 
corresponding quota for each firm (XA and XB ), assuming that quotas are fully 
utilised? 
 
3. What is the traded quota (the difference between the initial distribution and the 
competitive equilibrium) for each firm? 
 
4. Draw a picture of what you have derived in question 1–4 based on the 
information above (tip: see figure 3.4) and mark on the axis the numbers you 
have found. 
 









2)( bEaEEH −=  
 
a,b positive constants, E is fishing effort. Total cost is 
 
 cEETC =)( , with c=unit cost of effort and  
Total revenue is )()( EpHETR = , with p = constant price of fish. 
 
a)  Find the open-access equilibrium values of effort and harvest, E∞ and H∞, 
respectively. 
 
b)  Find the fishing effort that maximizes resource rent, EMEY, and the 
corresponding harvest, HMEY. What happens to EMEY and HMEY if p increases? 
 
c)  Find the fishing effort that maximizes sustainable yield (harvest), EMSY. 
 
d)  With the parameters a = 30, b = 0.02, c = 100 and p = 10, calculate E∞, EMSY 
and EMEY. Does this imply biological overfishing or not? 
 
e)  The fisheries management board levy a tax per unit fishing effort, tE = 100. 
What will the fishing effort be in this case? Does this imply biological 




4.  Investment analysis 
 
To fish down or to build up a fish stock takes time, and time is money for enterprises 
and consumers. In this chapter we introduce the concept of discounting and analyse 
how a positive discount rate affects the optimal long-run harvest and stock level, as 




4.1  Discounting 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed resource rent in an open access and in a 
maximum economic yield fishery, and showed that open access implies dissipation of 
the potential resource rent due to excessive effort and too low stock level. To change 
from open access to maximum economic yield fishing necessitates reduced effort and 
increased stock level. However, rebuilding a fish stock takes time since the resource 
itself has a limited reproductive and growth capacity. Rebuilding can only take place 
if harvesting is reduced or stopped for some time since harvest has to be less than 
natural growth to generate growth in the stock. At any point in time the resource 
manager has the choice between depletion, rebuilding and equilibrium harvesting of 
the fish stock. Depletion means that harvest is greater than natural growth, and 
revenue is high in the short run. However, this harvest strategy is not viable in the 
long run and will have to be changed after some while to avoid economic losses.  
 
Rebuilding a fish stock means investing the foregone harvest, thus, revenue is 
reduced in the short run with the aim of getting more in return at a later stage. In this 
case a part of the potential net revenue is invested in the fish stock, the natural 
resource capital, to save for future purposes. For the resource owner, usually the 
society, the question at any point in time is whether to consume or invest. For an 
investment in the stock to be profitable, the return on this investment should be just as 
good or better than for other investment projects. A sum of money to be received in 
the future is not of the same value as the same sum of money received today, since 
money could be deposited in the bank at a positive interest rate. Thus, the interest rate 
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plays an important role in the evaluation of investment projects as well as in 
comparison of the value of money at different points in time.  
 
Before we proceed to study capital management of the resource stock, let us 
recapitulate the main connections between present value and interest rate in a discrete 
and a continuous time context. (Now you should have a quick look at this sub-chapter. 
If you already knows this you may go directly to chapter 4.2). 
 
When investing A0 dollars, for example as a bank deposit, at an annual interest 
of i per cent, your capital will after one year have grown to A0(1 + i) and after two 
years the value will be A0(1 + i)2. In general, an investment of A0 dollars on these 




t iAA +=   
 












This shows the connection between the future and the present value of money. At 
dollars in t years is worth A0 at the present, therefore, A0 is called the present value of 
At. It is easy to see from equation (4.2) that the present value of a given amount of 
future money is lower the farther in the future it will be received and the higher the 
interest is. For businesses and people investing their money, i is usually called the 
interest rate or market rate of interest, whereas in economic analysis it is often called 
the social rate of discount. The factor 1/(1 + i)t =  (1 + i)-t of (4.2) is the discount 
factor, which has a value less than one for all positive values of  i and t. For t = 0 the 
discount factor equals one and it decreases for increased values of t. This means that 
money at the investment or loan point in time is not discounted, whereas all future 
money is. Note that the discount factor approaches zero when t goes to infinity. This 
means that money values in the very, very far future hardly have any value today if 
they are discounted. The present value of a stream of future annual profit is the sum of 
the present value of each of them. For example, with an annual interest rate of 5 per 
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cent the present value of a profit of $1000 a year for the next five years, starting one 
year from now, is 0.952 ⋅ $1000 + 0.907 ⋅ $1000 + 0.864 ⋅ $1000 + 0.823 ⋅ $1000 + 
0.784 ⋅ $1000 = $4330. (The author has made a deliberate mistake for one of the 
discount factors – find this by use of your calculator). 
 
Traditionally, discrete time formulas as discussed above are commonly used in 
investment and economic analysis. This is due to the fact that usually interest is 
calculated and firms report economic results to owners and tax authorities on an 
annual basis. However, in principle the period length for interest and present value 
calculations may be arbitrarily chosen as long as the interest rate is adjusted 
accordingly. For use in population dynamics and natural resource economics it is 
often useful to calculate growth and decay on a continuous time basis using the 
instantaneous annual rate of discount, δ. The relationship between the discrete time 
annual interest rate and the instantaneous rate of interest is  
 




Figure 4.1. Discount factors for discrete (bars) and continuous (curve) time, with 
 i = 0.10 and δ = 0.093. 
 52 
 
where e = 2.71828 is the base of the natural system of logarithms. Figure 4.1 shows 
the connection between discount factors for i = 0.1 and δ = 0.0953 using discrete and  
instantaneous time, respectively, on an annual basis. From (4.3) we derive, by taking 
the natural logarithm of both sides,  
 
(4.4) .)1ln( δ=+ i   
 
For i = 0.1 we derive δ = 0.0953 by using (4.4). For bank deposits, using the annual 
rate of interest i, compound interest is usually calculated at the end of each year. 
However, using the instantaneous rate of interest δ  implies that interest on interest is 
calculated on a continuous basis throughout the year. That is why δ  is less than i – the 
continuous calculated interest on interest compensates for the lower value of the 
proper interest rate (δ compared to i). Note that this discussion is based on a time step 
of one year in the case of discrete time. If, however, we use a shorter time step, the 
difference between i and δ, according to equation (4.4), will be smaller. In the 
extreme case when the time step approaches zero, the discrete time rate of interest, i, 
will approach the continuous time rate of interest, δ. 
 
As noted above, formula (4.2) is for the discrete time case. Using continuous 
time in the corresponding formula for computation of the present value A0 of the 
future value at time t, A(t), we get 
 
(4.5) . )(  0
tetAA δ−=   
 
Whether one should use discrete or continuous time approach in economic 
analysis of investment is primarily a question of convenience. The formulas (4.2) and 
(4.5) give the same result as long as i and δ are in accordance with (4.4). In theoretical 
analysis it seems that the continuous time approach is the preferred one, whereas in 
empirical work discrete time calculations are the most common. The fact that most 
fish stocks are assessed at regular time intervals is a practical argument for using 
discrete time models in studies of applied fisheries biology and fisheries economics. 
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4.2  Fish stocks as capital 
 
At any point in time the resource manager has a choice between depleting, rebuilding 
and equilibrium harvesting of the fish stock. These options imply that the harvest has 
to be either above, below or equal to the natural growth of the stock. Globally many 
fish stocks are overexploited and the policy objective is to rebuild them (FAO, 2010). 
Such rebuilding means an investment in the natural capital. To assure profitability of 
an investment in a fish stock the present value of postponing the harvest has to be 
greater than the value of immediate harvest. In case of actual management the options 
are usually “greater” or “smaller” harvest now compared with “smaller” or “greater” 
future harvest, or change in harvest. However, to simplify the analysis let us start by 
comparing two distinct options, A and B. For option A there is an equilibrium harvest 
in all periods, with a constant harvest equal to the natural growth of the stock in the 
initial period. For option B there is no harvest in the initial period, period 0, and the 
natural growth of this period is invested in the stock with the aim of increasing the 
potential harvest in all succeeding periods. Therefore, for option B equilibrium fishing 
takes place such that natural growth is harvested from including period 1. With H 
denoting harvest and X fish stock, the two options are  
 
Option A: )( 0210
AAAA XFHHH ====   , and 
Option B: )(  ,0 1210
BBBB XFHHH ====  , 
 
where superscript denotes harvest option and subscript denotes harvest period. To 
compare the economic results of the two alternatives, the net economic result of each 
harvest period is discounted to the starting point, period 0. The fish price, p, is given 
at the world market whereas the unit cost of harvesting, c, depends on the stock size in 
the following way 
 
(4.6) .0)(''     ,0)('     ),( ><= XcXcXcc   
 
In other words, the unit cost of harvest, for example $ per kg, diminishes with 
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The two sets of resource rent we are going to compare are 
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Note for option B the zero harvest and zero resource rent of the commencement 
period. Compared with option A, this will increase the stock level and the harvest 
potential for all subsequent periods. Now the question is: when is option B to be 
preferred to option A? To answer this let us try to derive a criterion, or rule, for when 
to invest in the stock. The analysis will conclude with the investment rule in (4.12).  
 
The difference in resource rent between options B and A from and including period 1 
is 
 
(4.8) [ ). ,1     , ∞∈−=−=∆ tABAtBt πππππ   
 
Recall that π0A  = π A, whereas π0B = 0. Assuming that the period length is one year, i 
designates the annual rate of discount. It is of course possible to use any period length 
as long as the interest rate i is adjusted accordingly. Nevertheless, we shall in this 
section think of one year as the period length. The present value of the future n-period 




















Since a fish stock has the potential of living eternally we need the infinite horizon 
equivalent of (4.9). This is easily derived by letting n approach ∞ in formula (4.9), 
thus the right-hand side changes to an infinite horizon geometric series.  According to 
the formula for an infinite geometric series, we have a + ak + ak2 +……+ akn-1 = a/(1 
- k), when k < 1 and n → ∞ (see, for example, Berck and Sydsæter, 1991). Defining  
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(the student should check that this is correct). We have now found, in (4.10), that by 
not harvesting during the starting period, thus investing the value π0A in the stock, the 
additional present value of future harvests equals the additional annual value divided 
by the annual rate of discount. The important question now is: is this a profitable 
investment for the resource owner? According to the standard investment criterion, 
the investment is profitable if there is a positive difference between present value of 
future profit due to the investment and the initial investment. Therefore, in our case 









Rearranging (4.11) , we derive the following investment rule: 
 









This investment rule says that the resource owner should invest in the stock as long as 
the relative profitability of the fish stock capital is greater than that of alternative 
investments expressed by the annual rate of discount, i. This result also implies that 
the optimal stock level is established when the left-hand side expression of (4.12) 
equals the annual rate of discount. Thus, the long-run optimal stock level may be 











At the optimum the relative profitability of the fishery, based on the notion of 
resource rent, should equal the annual rate of discount. Further investment in the 
resource will reduce the unit cost of harvesting, according to (4.6). However, 
sustainable yield and revenue will become relatively smaller and smaller due to the 
shape of the growth function, F(X) (see figure 2.1). The resource rent on the left-hand 
side of (4.13) consists of both revenue and cost elements, which may vary differently 
with a change in the fish stock according to whether the stock level is lower or higher 
than the MSY level. The different elements of the resource rent and the effects of 
changes in the discount rate warrant further investigations.  
 
 
4.3  Long-run optimal stock levels 
 
For the discrete time analysis in section 4.2 the interest rate i was used, measuring the 
rate of interest per year. In section 4.1 the instantaneous rate of interest, δ, was 
explained and compared with the discrete time rate of interest i. The former measures 
compound interest, that is, interest on the accrued interest as well as on the principal, 
on a continuous time basis. To see the implications for the long-run optimal stock 
level of the interest rate, fish price, density dependent harvest cost and natural growth, 
we shall now use continuous time to analyse the investment issue. Instead of asking 
how much harvest to postpone from one period of time to the next, for example, from 
one year to the next, we ask how much should possibly be postponed from one 
moment in time to the next moment, marginally later than the first.  
 
We shall now assume that the management objective of the resource owner is 
to maximise his wealth. This is somewhat different from maximising resource rent 
(which was discussed in section 3.2). Resource rent is a flow concept, denoted for 
example by $/year, whereas wealth is a stock concept, denoted for example by $. 
Economic flows are related to time periods, for example periods of one year, whereas 
wealth is related to a specific point in time, for instance 1 January in a particular year. 
(Note that stock in this connection means a capital stock in general and not a fish 
stock.)  There is, however, a clear link between flows and stocks, since wealth is the 
present value of the net revenue for all successive periods. To see this more clearly, 
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let A(t) denote the net revenue per period of time at time t, δ  the rate of discount, and 







  )( dtetAV tδ . 
 
 
As noted above, the resource manager has a choice among various income streams. In 
making this choice the manager is basically determining an investment strategy. In a 
perfectly certain world, which is the kind of world we are considering, the investment 
decision will be affected by the opportunity cost of capital, expressed by the discount 
rate δ, and the ecological and economic characteristics of the fishery. A necessary 
condition for maximising the resource owner’s wealth, expressed in (*), is that he 
includes the opportunity cost of capital when considering what long-run level of the 
fish stock he shall aim at. (This opportunity cost of capital was deliberately excluded 
when we discussed the MEY management objective in section 3.2.)  
 
We shall see that the long-run optimal stock level is implicitly given by 
equation (4.18) and that this may be presented graphically as in figure 4.2. We shall 
see that equation (4.19), called the Clark-Munro rule, is the continuous time 
equivalent to the discrete time investment rule of equation (4.13).  
 
Recall equation (4.13), which implicitly yields the discrete time long-run 
optimal stock level, and think of how it may look when we use continuous time and 
very small changes in the variables. As noted above, at any point in time the resource 
manager has the choice between depleting, rebuilding and equilibrium harvesting of 
the fish stock. In all three cases harvesting may be possible, but of a different 
magnitude. Harvesting a quantity H at any point in time creates revenues for and 
imposes costs on the industry. Current resource rent per unit harvest depends on the 
price of fish and the cost of harvesting. As in the previous analysis we shall assume a 
constant price of fish, p, independent of the level of harvest, and a unit cost of harvest, 
c(X), that depends on the stock level only (see equation 4.6). Investing the proceeds at 
the instantaneous rate of discount, δ, implies that the sustainable interest from this 




(4.14) HXcpXHR ))(();( −= δ .  
 
Thus, the proceeds from the fishery, (p-c(X))H, becomes the principal of the resource 
owner’s financial investment. Equation (4.14) expresses the sustainable net income 
per period of time from an instantaneous harvest H that has been converted into a 
perpetual investment. Note that on the left-hand side of (4.14), X is placed after the 
semicolon. This means that X is kept constant – thus H is the independent variable in 
this case.  
 
The sustainable interest is altered by a marginal change in the instantaneous 







−= δ . 
 
 
This marginal sustainable interest is the marginal opportunity cost of resource capital, 
emanating from an incremental investment in the stock since the alternative to 
harvesting H is to leave it in the sea as an investment in the stock. Figure 4.2 panel (b) 
shows dR/dH as the upward sloping curve, equal to zero at the open access stock level. 
The open access stock level generates zero resource rent and we see from (4.14) that 
this is the case when p = c(X∞); recalling that X∞ is the open-access equilibrium stock 
level. If the current harvest generates zero rent there is no surplus to invest and 
sustainable interest on this zero value “investment” will of course also be zero. The 
unit cost of harvesting is lower the higher the stock level – thus the unit resource rent, 
(p-c(X)), is higher the higher the stock level. Harvesting H now with the objective of 
investing the proceeds in the bank means that the initial bank deposit, the principal, is 
higher the higher the stock level at the moment of harvesting. With a constant rate of 
interest, δ, this means that the marginal sustainable interest, expressed by dR/dH in 
equation (4.15), portrays an upward sloping curve in figure 4.2 panel (b).  
 
The alternative to current harvest (option A) is to leave the fish in the sea 
(option B), which is to invest in the stock with the purpose of harvesting at a later 
point in time. Such an investment may augment the natural growth of the stock and 
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decrease the unit cost of harvesting to yield a future net gain from these two effects 
combined. Sustainable harvesting is when the natural growth is being harvested, that 
is H ≡ F(X). In this case the sustainable resource rent at stock level X is 
 
(4.16) )(     when , )())(()( XFHXFXcpX ≡−=π ,  
 
where we have substituted natural growth, F(X), for harvest, H. Recall that H ≡ F(X) 
is by definition the equilibrium harvest, also called sustainable harvest, for a given 
 
Figure 4.2. Graphical determination of the long-run optimal stock level X*  
 (panel (b) adapted from Clark, 1976). 
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level of the fish stock, X. The sustainable resource rent, π(X), is portrayed in figure 
4.2 panel (a). This rent has its maximum for stock level XMEY, or to put it the other 
way around, the stock level that gives maximum economic yield is called the 
maximum economic yield level, XMEY. 
 
Future gain comes via two components, lowering the unit cost of harvesting 
and possibly increasing the sustainable yield. Let us have a closer look at these two 










This is the marginal sustainable resource rent, portrayed in figure 4.2 panel (b) as the 
downward sloping curve. This may be interpreted as the “revenue” side of the 
investment budget – the net revenue resulting from a marginal investment in the fish 
stock. It is not obvious from equation (4.17) why dXd /π is downward sloping. 
However, note that dπ /dX is the slope of the sustainable resource rent π (X), defined 
in equation (4.16) and depicted in figure 4.2 panel (a). This panel shows that the slope 
of the π (X)-curve, the marginal sustainable resource rent, is positive but decreasing 
with increasing stock level between the open-access level, X∞ and the maximum 
economic yield level, XMEY. Therefore, investing one tonne of fish in the stock, that is, 
to increase the stock level by one tonne, gives a higher economic return for stock 
levels closer to X∞ than close to XMEY. 
 
The marginal sustainable resource rent consists of two terms (on the right-
hand side of equation 4.17). The first term is the instantaneous marginal product of 
the stock, F’(X), evaluated at the net price, or resource rent per unit of harvest, [p - 
c(X)]. This term expresses the partial net gain for the fishery due to a change in the 
sustainable yield from a marginal increase in the stock level. Recall that F’(X) may be 
positive or negative, for stock levels below or above, respectively, the MSY level (see 
equation 2.1). The second term of the right hand side of (4.17) is related to the cost 
saving effect of increasing the stock level. Note that this is always positive due to the 




From an investment point of view there has to be a balance between the 
profitability of investing (proceeds from the harvest) in the bank and abstaining from 
harvesting to invest in “fish in the sea” (to increase the fish stock level). Thus, the 
marginal profitability of these two types of investment has to be equal to ensure a 
balanced portfolio. Equating equation (4.15) and (4.17) gives 
 
(4.18) *))((*)(*)('*)('*))(( XcpXFXcXFXcp −=−− δ .  
 
where X* denotes the long-run optimal stock level, implicitly given by this equation. 
In our case equation (4.18) has a unique solution for X = X*, the optimal equilibrium 
stock level, shown in figure 4.2. We have discussed above the economic significance 
of each of the two sides of equation (4.18). It is easy to see from figure 4.2 that an 
increase in the discount rate, δ, will reduce the optimal stock level. Such an increase 
will turn the upward sloping curve anti-clockwise around X∞, thus moving the 
intersection point towards the left. Increased δ means that the opportunity cost of 
investments rises, making it more costly to keep a large capital stock, the fish stock, in 
the sea. If δ goes towards infinity, which implicitly is to say that the manager sets a 
zero value on future revenues, the optimal stock level goes towards the open-access 
level X∞. This is precisely what fishers in an open-access fishery are confronted with. 
For each fisher the opportunity cost of investing in the stock by abstaining from 
harvest is infinitely high. What Peter possibly saves in the sea for his future use will 
be harvested by his competitors, including Paul and Mary, to yield zero return on his 
savings. This is why Peter, and each of the other fishers, is forced by the open-access 
regime to behave in a myopic way to catch as much as possible at any point in time. 
 
Having discussed the effect of an infinitely high discount rate we now turn to 
the other extreme, a discount rate equal to zero. Figure 4.2 panel (b) shows that the 
upward sloping curve, showing the marginal sustainable opportunity cost of 
investment, will turn clockwise around X∞ when δ decreases. This moves the optimal 
stock level X* towards the maximum economic yield level, XMEY. Thus if future 
revenues are not discounted relative to current revenue, which is the meaning of  
δ → 0, the capital theoretic approach to management reduces to that of maximising 
the resource rent. In this case a sacrifice of current harvest for future gains causes less 
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“pain” since future gains last forever without being discounted. One $ next year, or in 
20 years, is just as good as one $ today. 
 
Our analysis of the effect of discounting on the long-run optimal stock level is 
a simplified approach to capital-theoretic analysis of fisheries management. The 
development around 1970 of the mathematical tool of optimal control theory, an 
extension of the standard calculus of variations, made it possible to analyse dynamic 
economic issues in a more thorough way than had previously been done. Control 
theory was applied to analysis of economic growth, capital investment, natural 
resource management and other issues that included evaluation of income across time. 
Several studies of capital theoretic analysis of fisheries appeared in the early 1970s 
(for a review, see for example, Munro and Scott, 1985). In 1975 two Canadian 
researchers, a mathematician, Colin W. Clark, and an economist, Gordon R. Munro, 
published one of the most quoted fisheries economics papers ever (Clark and Munro, 
1975) which led to the investment rule in equation (4.19). Note that if we divide with 
the resource rent per unit of harvest, [p - c(X)], on both sides of equation (4.18) we 














Equation (4.19) is the continuous time equivalent to the discrete time equation (4.13) 
for computation of the long-run optimal fish stock level in steady state. The left-hand 
side of (4.19) is the fish stock’s own rate of interest, and this equals the social rate of 
discount (which may or may not be equal to the market rate of interest) on the right-
hand side. The stock’s own rate of interest consists of two parts, first, the 
instantaneous marginal product of the resource, F’(X), which can be positive, negative 
or zero. Second, it includes what has been termed the marginal stock effect,  
-c’(X)F(X)/(p - c(X)), which is always positive since c’(X) is negative. The marginal 
stock effect has a positive effect on the optimal long-run stock size. If the unit cost of 
harvesting, c(X), is high this implies a higher optimal stock level. The same result 
applies if the absolute value of the marginal unit cost of harvesting, c’(X), is large. 
In some cases it may be that the marginal stock effect is great enough to imply an 
optimal stock level high enough to have F’(X) < 0 (see equation 4.19). This means 
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that the optimal stock level may be above the maximum sustainable yield level, 
despite the use of discounting. It is also seen from equation (4.19) that if the unit cost 
of harvest is completely insensitive to stock changes, that is c’(X) = 0, the Clark-
Munro rule reduces to the simple marginal-productivity rule F’(X) = δ. In this special 
case the fish stock’s instantaneous marginal productivity equals the marginal 
opportunity cost of capital, the social rate of discount, δ. Theoretical reasoning and 
empirical work have shown that the marginal stock effect is weak for schooling 
pelagic species, often fished with purse seine, and stronger for demersal species, often 
fished with bottom trawl or gill-net. Herring (Clupea sp.) and Anchoveta are 
examples of the former, and cod (Gadus morhua) and orange roughy (Hoplostethus 
atlanticus) are examples of the latter. 
 
 
4.4  Transition to long-run optimum 
 
We have seen that the long-run optimal stock level can be derived from equation 
(4.18), which is equivalent to the Clark-Munro rule in (4.19), and that this can be 
depicted graphically as in figure 4.2. The analysis started by comparing two 
investment alternatives, option A, with immediate equilibrium harvest and investment 
of the net proceeds in the “bank”, versus option B, with no harvest during the initial 
period, but with equilibrium harvest from including the next period. Thus in option B 
the natural growth of the initial period is invested in the stock to harvest more later, 
whereas in option A the net proceeds of the initial period harvest are invested in the 
“bank” to yield future interest. To simplify the analysis we have in this approach 
discussed two outliers, the all (option B) or nothing (option A) fish stock investment 
of the initial period. However, in actual management situations there are at any point 
in time a wide range of possible exploitation intensities, from zero harvest, which 
implies investing the total natural growth in the stock, via some harvest or equilibrium 
harvest to different degrees of over-exploitation. The latter implies running down the 
fish stock. In a complete theoretical analysis there is usually a connection between the 
long-run optimum and the optimal path towards equilibrium. Nevertheless, for 
practical and pedagogical reasons we have discussed these two issues separately, as if 




Figure 4.3 shows two possible recovery strategies in case of an overfished 
stock, that is, when the initial stock level is below the optimal level. Path (i) is the 
non-fishing adjustment path, also called the bang-bang approach to fisheries 
adjustment. In this case the fishery is totally closed down (panel b) and the stock 
recovers at its maximum speed (panel a), limited by its natural rate of growth, until 
time t1 when the optimal stock level is reached. From time t1, long run optimal 
harvesting, H*, takes place at stock level X*.  The gradual adjustment path, path (ii) in 
Figure 4.3, which allows some harvesting during the stock recovery period, goes on 
until time t2, with the implication that it takes somewhat longer for the stock to reach 




Figure 4.3. Strategy (ii) implies some fishing during the transition period and a  
 slower rebuilding of the stock than strategy (i), which is the bang-bang  
 strategy with complete closure of the fishery for some time. 
 
 
In figure 4.3 the difference between strategy (i) and (ii), with respect to harvest and 
stock recovery, is found during the adjustment period up to t2. However, from t2 to 
infinity the long-run optimal harvesting takes place regardless of the transition period 
strategy. Therefore, for an evaluation of the costs and gains of the alternative 
rebuilding strategies, it suffices to compare performances of the transition period, that 
is, until t2. Strategy (ii) gives the highest catch in the first part of the period up to t1, 
during which strategy (i) demands total close down of the fishery. In the second part 
of the transition period, between t1 and t2, strategy (i) gives the highest catch, equal to 
the long run optimum, H*. If the price of fish is constant, regardless of quantity 
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harvested, and the unit cost of harvesting depends on stock level only, as given in 
(4.6), the bang-bang strategy is superior to any other strategy (see Clark and Munro, 
1975). This implies that any strategy postponing the moment for equilibrium 
harvesting beyond t1, for example, to t2, is an inferior solution. The present value of 
resource rent from harvesting will be highest with the bang-bang strategy, given the 
two crucial assumptions regarding price of fish and unit cost of harvesting. The reason 
for this is that there are no price and unit cost penalties from reduction of harvest and 
effort, neither from the market in the form of forgone opportunities for gaining a 
higher price with smaller harvest, nor from any effort-dependent unit cost of 
harvesting. (The case of price and cost characteristics that may lead to more gradual 
transition paths than the bang-bang path is discussed below.) 
 
So far we have discussed transition as if path (ii) in figure 4.3 is the only 
alternative to the bang-bang path (i). However, this is just for illustrative purposes. In 
empirical work and actual management it could be that several alternative paths are 
closer to optimum than the bang-bang path. In figure 4.3 panel (b), path (ii) depicts a 
gradual increase in harvest during the transition period, from H0 at the 
commencement of the transition to the equilibrium harvest, H*, at the end. 
Alternatively we may for instance start with a catch somewhat larger than H0 and 
keep this constant until the optimal equilibrium stock level is reached. Another 
alternative is to start with a harvest somewhat lower than H0 and stay below harvest 
path (ii) throughout the transition period. This implies that the stock will grow faster 
than shown for stock path (ii) of figure 4.3 panel (a), and t2 will be moved to the left 
to shorten the time necessary to rebuild the stock to the optimal level X*.  
 
If the price of fish varies with harvest, as is the case with a downward sloping 
demand curve, this may have an effect on the optimal transitional fishery. In this case 
the optimal path is usually a more gradual transition to the long-run equilibrium in 
order to benefit from the high price-low quantity combination. Thus, the bang-bang 
solution with complete closure of the fishery during the transition period is no longer 
optimal. The reason for this is that the positive economic effects of a small harvest at 
a higher average price throughout the transitional period will be beneficial compared 
with the negative effect from delaying the moment of time we reach a fully restored 
fishery. Related to figure 4.3, this means that the point in time when the optimal 
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equilibrium stock level and harvest are reached, t1, is postponed somewhat, for 
example to t2.  
 
If harvest costs are different from what we assumed above (see equation 4.6), 
this also may imply an optimal transition path different from the bang-bang approach 
(i), towards a more gradual transition path illustrated by (ii) in figure 4.3. For instance, 
if the unit cost of harvesting depends not only on the stock level, but also on effort or 
on harvest level, this may switch the optimal transition path from bang-bang to more 
gradual stock recovery. The existence of some high-liners, that is, fishers who are 
significantly more cost-effective than the average, could be an argument for letting 
this type of effort continue harvesting during the rebuilding of the fish stock. In other 
words, if effort is heterogeneous it may be an advantage for the realisation of resource 
rent, in present value terms, to operate a minor fishery with the most cost-effective 
effort rather than closing down the fishery during the transition period. (We shall 
return to the issue of high-liners and intra-marginal rent in chapter 7). 
 
 
4.5  Adjusted transition paths 
 
We have seen above that economically over-fished stocks need reduction or complete 
cession of harvesting to recover and grow to the optimal level. Temporary reduction 
in harvest also requires a reduction in fishing effort. Since effort is composed of, or 
produced from, labour, variable inputs like fuel, bait and gear, as well as vessel capital, 
the reduction of effort will have repercussions on the labour market and the markets 
for other inputs. The consequences of these changes are most severe in areas 
dependent on fishing with few alternative employment opportunities. The same 
applies to the negative effects of reduced quantities of fish as raw materials for the 
fish processing and marketing industries, often called the post-harvesting sector. For 
owners and employees of this sector there may be both economic and social costs 
incurred because of fluctuations in landings of fish, in particular when landings are 
reduced. Therefore, rebuilding of fish stocks is not possible without temporary 
negative effects on employment, the vessel service industry and the post-harvest 
industry. However, the short- and medium-term costs of industries and society should 
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be outweighed by future gains from higher stock levels, otherwise fish stock 
investment is futile.  
 
The objectives of actual fisheries management often include elements other 
than resource rent or net revenue of the industry. For example, such objectives are 
included in the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted in 1995 by the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), shown in Box 4.1. 
 
 
Box 4.1 FAO Management Objectives  
 
Recognising that long-term sustainable use of fisheries resources is the overriding 
objective of conservation and management, States and subregional or regional 
fisheries management organisations and arrangements should, inter alia, adopt 
appropriate measures, based on the best scientific evidence available, which are 
designed to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing maximum 
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, 
including the special requirements of developing countries.  
 
Such measures should provide inter alia that:  
 
     a. excess fishing capacity is avoided and exploitation of the stocks remains  
 economically viable;  
 b. the economic conditions under which fishing industries operate promote  
  responsible fisheries;  
 c. the interests of fishers, including those engaged in subsistence, small-scale and  
  artisanal fisheries, are taken into account;  
 d. biodiversity of aquatic habitats and ecosystems is conserved and endangered  
  species are protected;  
 e. depleted stocks are allowed to recover or, where appropriate, are actively  
  restored;  
 f. adverse environmental impacts on the resources from human activities are  
  assessed and, where appropriate, corrected; and  
 g. pollution, waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, catch of non-target  
  species, both fish and non-fish species, and impacts on associated or dependent  
  species are minimised, through measures including, to the extent practicable,  
  the development and use of selective, environmentally safe and cost-effective  
  fishing gear and techniques.  
 
States should assess the impacts of environmental factors on target stocks and species 
belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target 
stocks, and assess the relationship among the populations in the ecosystem.  
 





The Code, which is voluntary, was developed by FAO and its member 
countries as a response to the economic and ecological failure of several fisheries 
worldwide. Certain parts of it are based on relevant rules of international law, 
including those reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982.  From an economic point of view the main objective of  
“…maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic 
factors…” is a little bit strange. However, instead of further interpretation of this 
agreed FAO text, let us anticipate that the manager, on his own or together with the 
industry and other stakeholders, does the thinking, specifies the management 
objective(s) and in the end arrives at a long-run target level for the fish stock. Let us 
call this level the target stock level, with the corresponding target harvest and effort 
level as well.1  The target stock level may be above, equal to or below the optimal 
stock level discussed above. 
 
The transition costs and benefits depend on the objectives of policy makers 
(for example, economic, biological, social, and administrative) and on the 
characteristics of the instruments (technical measures, input and output controls) that 
are used to achieve their objectives. The objectives pursued by fishery managers, and 
the management measures that are used to achieve these objectives will thus play an 
important role in determining the costs and benefits incurred in a transition to targeted 
fisheries. 
 
Taking the development of the stock towards a long-run target as a guiding 
principle, it is possible to evaluate the benefits and costs associated with this transition. 
If a stock is not realising its production potential because it is too small, then harvest 
opportunities are being forgone. Potential harvest that could be generated by the stock 
is not being realised, due to its depleted state. Figure 4.4 provides a stylised illustration 
of the adjusted transition path. Panel (a) shows the harvests from the fish stock, panel 
(b) shows the effort levels associated with harvesting the stock over time and panel (c)  
                                                 
1 The following part of this section is adapted from OECD (2000) where the target state of fisheries is 







Figure 4.4. Stylised adjusted targets and transition paths for stock level, effort 
 and harvest of a fishery. 
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shows the change in the stock level over time. In comparison with a fishery being 
managed at its target levels, time t0 is characterised by lower harvest, higher effort 
and smaller stock size. If the stock were given a chance to rebuild, a larger harvest 
with lower level of effort could be realised. The line CB in panel (a) shows harvest 
forgone due to the depleted state of the stock. 
 
 Figure 4.4 also illustrates the principle of the transition period’s pains 
discussed above. If managers enact remedial measures to allow fish stocks to rebuild, 
then harvest and effort need to be reduced during the transition period. Instead of 
continuing to harvest AB in panel (a), harvest needs to be reduced to DE. Figure 4.4 
panel (b) illustrates the reduction in effort that is required. Effort needs to fall below 
that associated with the long-run target if the stock is to rebuild. 
 
The movement over time from t1 to t2 illustrates the final stage of the 
transition process. As the size of the fish stock increases towards the target level, 
harvest can increase. Due to the increased abundance of fish, the effort required to 
harvest this level of yield would be relatively lower than that before the transition 
period started. A recovered fishery is characterised by relatively higher catch, larger 
stock and lower effort. 
 
The benefits and costs of a transition to targeted fisheries also depend on the 
resource’s biological characteristics. In the case of short-lived species, stocks that 
have been overfished may rebound to target levels in a relatively short period of time. 
In the case of species with low fertility or that grow slowly, recovery may take a 
significant amount of time, in which case the benefits associated with the transition 
will only be incurred in the more distant future. Indeed it is possible that the 




Two fisheries, A and B, generate annual sustainable resource rent Π1 (million €) as 
shown in the table. By closing the fishery completely for one year the stock is allowed 






 A B 
Π1 11.00 0.90 
Π2 11.50 1.05 
 
 
1. Would you as the manager recommend this one-year closure of the fishery when 
the social rate of discount, at an annual basis, is 7%?  
 
2. What size of the discount rate could make it worthwhile to close both fisheries 




1. Show that the present value, PV, of an eternal constant annual flow of income, A, 
equals 
δ




  . 
2. A resource economic investment project gives eternal net revenue of 10 million 
USD per year. What is the net present value of this project when the annual 







5. The Gordon-Schaefer model  
 
This chapter discusses the Gordon-Schaefer model for analysis of open-access and 
optimally managed fisheries. The main differences between this and the previous 
chapters are derived from the use here of a specific form of the natural growth 
function. This allows us to find exact expressions for equilibrium levels of the fish 
stock, effort, revenues, costs and resource rent. 
 
5.1 The logistic growth model 
 
Most fish stocks are such that natural growth is small for both high and low stock 
levels and largest for some intermediate level. The reasons for this are mainly density- 
dependent biological factors, such as individual growth and natural mortality. In the 
previous chapters we have used a bell-shaped graph for natural growth as a function 
of stock size. Now we are going to use the logistic growth function, which is a 
mathematical representation of biomass growth of an animal stock, and this depicts a 
symmetric bell-shaped natural growth curve.  
 








where F(X) is natural growth and H is catch. The Gordon-Schaefer model, named 
after the works of two Canadian researchers (economist H. Scott Gordon (1954) and 
biologist M. B. Schaefer (1957)), is based on the logistic type natural growth equation  
 
(5.2) )/1()( KXrXXF −=   
 
Equation (5.2) was designed and discussed first by P. F. Verhulst (1838), and later re-
discovered by R. Pearl (1925). Parameter r is the maximum relative growth rate, also 
called the intrinsic growth rate, and K is the carrying capacity, both parameters 
assumed to be fixed. The reader should verify that the relative natural growth is a 
linear function of the stock level and approaches its maximum, equal to r, when the 
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stock level goes to zero, that is F(X)/X approaches r when X approaches zero. 
Parameter r is mainly related to the actual species we are studying while K depends 
on mainly the natural environment of the stock, such as size and biological 
productivity of the habitat. Equation (5.2) is quadratic in X and for low stock levels 
the first part with the positive sign is dominating, whereas for higher levels the second 
part, with the negative sign, is dominating. Natural growth is usually positive, but 
may even be negative if the stock level for any reason is higher than K. However, 
negative natural growth can for obvious reasons not represent biological equilibrium, 
with dX/dt = 0 in (5.1), neither with nor without harvesting. 
 
Natural growth has its maximum for a specific stock level that may be found 
by maximising F(X) with respect to X. This stock level produces the maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY), and the student should verify that this equals 
 
(5.3) .2/KX MSY =   
 
Substituting XMSY for X in equation (5.2) gives 
 
(5.4) .4/)( rKXFMSY MSY ==   
 
Thus the maximum sustainable yield equals a quarter of the product of the two 
parameters. 
 
The Gordon-Schaefer model includes natural growth, according to the law of 
equation (5.2), and harvest according to  
 
(5.5) qEXH =   
 
that we recall from chapter 2. This harvest function has the property of having catch 
per unit of effort proportional to the stock level, with the catchability parameter q as 
the proportional ratio. In Schaefer (1957) catch and effort data were used to estimate 




We are now going to find the connection between harvest and effort at 
equilibrium for this model. Equilibrium harvesting means dX/dt ≡ 0 and H ≡ F(X) in 
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Rearranging equation (5.6) somewhat gives 
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Comparing (5.7) and (5.2), we notice also that the former, the equilibrium harvest 
function, is a quadratic function. It is quadratic in the product qE, whereas the natural 
growth function (5.2) is quadratic in X. You may notice that the product qE has to be 
less than r to have a positive harvest, according to equation (5.7). If qE is kept at or 
above r the stock becomes extinct and this of course gives a zero equilibrium harvest. 
We are now going to use the equilibrium harvest function for an economic analysis of 
open access and optimally managed fisheries. 
 
 
5.2  The open-access fishery 
 
Let us now see if we can find the open-access effort and stock equilibrium levels 
expressed as functions of biological and economic parameters. This way we may 
analyse the equilibrium levels are affected by changes in parameter values. 
 
When harvest is sold in a competitive market with several close substitutes, 
the quay price of fish, p, is hardly dependent on the quantity landed. Let us assume 
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The TR(E) curve and the H(E) curve are shown in Figure 5.1 panel (a) for p > 1. In 
this case the TR curve is above the H curve, but generally the graphical picture 




Figure 5.1. The sustainable harvest and revenue curves, as well as total cost, are 
shown in Panel (a), and the marginal and average revenue and cost curves 
of the Gordon-Schaefer model are shown in Panel (b). 
 
Total harvest costs increase with effort, and the simplest form is when the increase is 
proportional. With a constant unit cost of effort, a, total cost equals 
 




The total cost is shown as a straight line in Figure 5.1 panel (a). In this case MC(E) = 
AC(E) = a, and this is shown in panel (b). We may use equation (5.8) to find the 
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The average revenue curve is a straight, downward sloping line as shown in Figure 
5.1 panel (b). Its maximum is for E close to zero. In this case the equilibrium stock 
level will be close to its carrying capacity, implying the highest AR(E). The average 
revenue approaches zero when effort E approaches r/q. If the fishing effort is kept 
sufficiently large, E > r/q, for a long time the stock becomes extinct. This is why 
AR(E) = 0 for such high effort levels. 
 
Let us now find the open-access effort level for the Gordon-Schaefer model. 
We have seen in Ch. 3, equation (3.6) that at bioeconomic equilibrium under open-
access MC(E) = AR(E). With total cost given in (5.9) the open-access equilibrium 
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Thus the open-access equilibrium level of fishing effort depends on both biological 
and economic parameters. It is proportional with the intrinsic growth rate r, increases 
with fish price and carrying capacity, and decreases with effort cost. In other words, 
fisheries based on biologically highly productive resources with large r and K, may 
sustain a large fishing effort under open-access. In addition, this may be spurred on by 
high fish price and low effort cost. Having found the open-access effort level in (5.11) 
the corresponding equilibrium harvest may be found by substituting E∞ for E in 
equation (5.7). 
 
After discussing the open-access fishing effort, let us now find the open-access 
equilibrium level of the fish stock. For this we will use the unit cost of harvesting and 
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the resource rent per unit harvest. The unit cost of harvest follows by use of equations 
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This demonstrates that the unit cost of harvest decreases with an increase in the stock 
size. We could say that a large stock has a cost-saving effect for the fishery. 
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We notice that in this model the open-access equilibrium stock level is a function of 
economic and harvest technical parameters only. No biological parameters appear in 
(5.15), but they do in (5.11) for the open-access effort level. It is the economic 
parameters, in addition to the catchability parameter, that put a downward limit on the 
stock level in open-access fisheries. The stock level will be small if fish is expensive 
and easy to catch at a low cost. 
 
 
5.3  Economic optimal harvesting 
 
We have seen in Chapter 3 that to maximise the resource rent, π(E) = TR(E) - TC(E), 
of a fishery, it is necessary for marginal cost of effort to equal marginal revenue of 
effort, that is, MC(E) = MR(E). This is also the case for the Gordon-Schaefer model 
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and we shall use this condition to find, first, the effort level that maximises the 
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The graphical picture of (5.16) is a straight, downward sloping line, as shown in 
figure 5.1 panel (b). Comparing this with the average revenue, AR(E) in (5.10), we see 
that the MR(E) curve is exactly twice as steep as the AR(E) curve. Putting MR(E) in 

















The optimal effort level, which maximises the resource rent, depends on the economic, 
biological and harvest efficiency parameters. EMEY, where the subscript acronym 
means maximum economic yield, is large in the case of low effort cost and high fish 
price fisheries, for a given resource and harvest efficiency. The rent maximising effort 
level in (5.17) compared with the open-access effort in (5.11) is 
 
(5.18) ∞= EEMEY 21 .  
 
Thus in the Gordon-Schaefer model the resource rent maximising effort level is just 
half of the open-access level. This implies that the total effort cost at the rent 
maximising equilibrium is just half of the open-access cost, since cost per unit of 
effort is constant, equal to a. 
 
To find the resource rent maximising stock level, we commence by 























Using the expressions found for XMSY in (5.3) and X∞ in (5.15) we can rewrite (5.20) 
to get  
 
(5.21) ∞+= XXX MSYMEY 21 .  
 
The rent maximising stock level is always greater than the maximum sustainable yield 
stock level. In fact, we have to add half of the open-access stock level to the MSY- 
stock level to get the MEY level. This is due to the cost-saving effect of a large fish 
stock. We have seen above, in (5.15), that the open-access stock level is affected 
positively by the cost of effort-price of fish ratio. When this ratio is large, the MEY-
stock level should also be large, to allow the cost-saving effect of the stock to 
compensate for the relatively large effort cost. 
 
We have seen that the total cost is lower at the MEY equilibrium than at open 
access. However, in general we cannot say if the total revenue is highest for the MEY 
or the open-access equilibrium, as seen in figure 5.1. In fact, this depends partly on 
the unit cost of effort, a. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the total cost curve will have a 
moderate slope if a is small, implying higher total revenue for the MEY fishery than 
under open access. In this case, with inexpensive harvest cost, MEY management may 
bring a triple dividend-reduced total cost, increased total revenue and increased stock 
level. 
 
So far we have conducted the economic analysis using fishing effort as the 
independent variable in figure 5.1 and in several equations in this chapter. An 
alternative approach is to use the stock level instead of fishing effort. This has some 
advantages when it comes to the capital theoretic discussion on the optimal stock size. 
In addition, it allows a direct comparison between the open-access effort and stock 
levels on the one hand, and the MEY levels for effort and stock on the other hand. 
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Even if we use the stock level as the independent variable, it has to be controlled, 
directly or indirectly, through harvest. At equilibrium we have H ≡ F(X), which means 
that harvest is kept equal to the natural growth to keep the stock level constant. Thus 
sustainable yield equals natural growth. Combining this with a constant price of fish, 
p, and the natural growth function in equation (5.2), the total revenue as a function of 
stock size is 
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Equation (5.22) shows that the difference between the natural growth curve and the 
total revenue curve is to be found in the price of fish. For p > 1 (p < 1) the total 
revenue curve will be above (below) the natural growth curve, which equals 
sustainable yield. 
 
Total cost as a function of stock size is found by multiplying the unit cost of 
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Equation (5.23) depicts a straight, downward sloping total cost curve as a function of 
the stock, as shown in Figure 5.2.  For each stock level, TC(X) tells how much it costs 
to harvest the sustainable yield produced at this stock level. The downward sloping 
TC(X) curve clearly demonstrates the cost-saving effect of increasing stock size. 
 
We can now find the resource rent as a function of stock size, R(X), based on 
























which may be rearranged, and by substituting for X∞ from (5.15) we have (the student 
should check this): 
 
 











Figure 5.2. Total revenue, total cost and resource rent as functions of the stock. 
 
We notice from equation (5.25) that the resource rent equals zero for X = X∞ 
and for X = K. Thus the open-access stock level is the lower bound and the carrying 
capacity is the upper bound on the stock size for a positive resource rent. The graph of 
the resource rent is presented in figure 5.2 together with the total revenue and total 
cost curves as functions of stock size. The open-access stock level, X∞, may be below, 
equal to or above the maximum sustainable yield stock level, XMSY, whereas the rent 
maximising stock level, XMEY, is always above the MSY level. Figure 5.2 may be 
used to explain what happens to the stock level when economic parameters change. 
For example, if the unit cost of effort, a, decreases, the total cost curve’s intersection 
point at the vertical axis moves downward, as seen from equation (5.23). This reduces 





5.4 Discounting effects 
 
In Chapter 4 we discussed the concepts of discounting and present value in relation to 
the capital approach to resource management. We derived, in equation (4.22), the 
Clark-Munroe rule that implicitly gives the optimal long-term stock level as a 
function of biological and economic parameters, including the discount rate. For the 
Gordon-Schaefer model presented in this chapter we have natural growth and cost 
functions that can be used to find the optimal long-run stock level. This stock level is 
needed to ensure the maximum present value of future resource rent, our wealth, as 
defined in (4.2’). To find the explicit expression for the optimal long-term stock level 
we commence by substituting for F(X) from equation (5.2) and c(X) from (5.13), in 
addition to F’(X) and c’(X), into equation (4.22). Then solve equation (4.22) with 
respect to X, to arrive at a quadratic equation in X (the student should check these 
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To simplify somewhat we substitute the following into (5.26): z = X/K, z∞ = X∞/K = 
a/pqK and γ = δ /r, and find 
 
 
(5.27) [ ] 8)1(1 
4
1 2* γγγ ∞∞∞ +−++−+= zzzz  . 
 
 
z is the normalised stock size, implying stock levels between zero and one. z∞ is the 
normalised open-access stock level, and γ  is the ratio of capital growth to maximum 
stock growth. γ  could be called the bioeconomic growth rate. If γ  > 1 it means that 
“bank” capital yields a higher interest rate than “nature” capital, and the opposite for γ  
< 1. We notice in equation (5.27) that the optimal long-term stock level, on its 
normalised form, depends on just two variables, the normalised open-access stock 
level, z∞, and the bioeconomic growth rate, γ . Table 5.1 shows how z* varies with  z∞ 
and γ . For zero discount rate the optimal stock level, according to equation (5.27), is 
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z* = ½ + z∞/2. Comparing this with the expression for XMEY in equation (5.21) we 
infer that X* = XMEY when γ = δ = 0, since zMSY = ½. Thus, when the discount rate 
goes to zero, the optimal long-term stock level goes to the resource rent maximising 
level. In fact, we have previously seen this through the graphical analysis in Figure 
4.2. We also notice from equation (5.27) that the optimal stock level equals the MSY 
level only for zero effort cost and zero discounting. In this case z* = zMSY = 1/2, since 
z∞ = 0 and γ  = 0. 
 
Table 5.1. Optimal normalised stock level as a function of the open-access stock 
level, z∞, and the bioeconomic growth rate, γ . 
 
        z∞       
 0 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 
 γ       
       
0 0.50 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
0.10 0.45 0.51 0.62 0.73 0.84 0.95 
0.25 0.38 0.45 0.59 0.71 0.83 0.94 
0.50 0.25 0.37 0.54 0.68 0.81 0.94 
1.00 0 0.25 0.47 0.64 0.79 0.93 
2.00 0 0.16 0.40 0.59 0.77 0.92 
5.00 0 0.12 0.34 0.54 0.73 0.91 
∞ 0 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 
       
 
 
From Table 5.1 we see that if the bioeconomic growth rate goes to infinity, γ  =  
δ /r → ∞, the optimal stock level equals the open-access level, since the values in the 
last row equal the z∞-values in the head row. Generally, the optimal stock level 
decreases with the bioeconomic growth rate – that is, when we move down a given 
column in Table 5.1. Also notice that the effect of the discount rate on the optimal 
stock size is greater for low-cost fisheries than for high-cost fisheries. In Table 5.1 
low-cost fisheries are found in the columns to the left, recalling that z∞ = a/pqK. 
“Low-cost” in this connection could also mean high-valued and easy-to-catch since p 
and q appear in the denominator and a in the numerator of z∞. 
 
Table 5.1 demonstrates, in the column of z∞ = 0, that, with costless harvesting, 
the stock owner may want to extinguish the stock when the bioeconomic growth rate 
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is equal to or greater than one. When δ = r (γ  > 1) the fish has higher value in the 
“bank”, at a discount rate of δ, than in the sea, at a maximum growth rate of r. In this 
case, with zero harvest cost, the resource owner would want to transform his capital 
from “fish in the sea” to “money in the bank” to maximise his wealth. In actual 
fisheries, however, effort costs are not zero and harvest efficiency, expressed by q, is 
not infinitely high. Thus the analysis of the effects of an infinitely high discount rate 
may be seen mainly as a modelling exercise, and not as a prediction of what would 
happen if a natural resource is managed by a sole owner. On the other hand, if 
biological, economic and harvest technical conditions are such that open-access 
harvesting would imply extinction of the resource, transferring the resource to a sole 
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Assume that F(X) is the annual natural growth when the size of the stock at the 
beginning of the year is X. 
 
1. Draw the graph based on (1.1) when r = 0.30 and K = 8000. K is measured in 
thousand tonnes. 
 
2. What unit of measure does r have? Discuss the biological parameters r and K 
using the graph in question 1.  
 
3. Assume that no fishing takes place. What is the equilibrium size of the fish stock, 
according to equation (1.1)?  
 
We introduce the following harvest function 
 




where q is the catchability/availability parameter/coefficient and E is fishing effort.  
 
4. Discuss the catchability parameter q. 
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5. Define equilibrium fishing, using function (1.3), and show that the equilibrium 
harvest, H, can be presented as a function of X. Compare this function with 
function (1.1). What characterises equilibrium fishing? 
 
6. Find an expression for the stock level (XMSY) that gives maximum sustainable 
yield HMSY  
 (Hint:  0=
dX
dH  is a necessary condition).  
 
7.  What is the size of XMSY and HMSY, in thousand tonnes and thousand tonnes per 
 year, respectively? 
 
8.  Assume that no fishing has taken place and the fish stock is at its 
 pristine/virgin equilibrium. What is the size of the harvest in year 1 when 







9. Explain why the harvest in year 1 (see question 8) is higher than the maximum 
sustainable harvest/yield you found in question 7. 
 
10. Use equations (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) to find the equilibrium harvest H as a 




11. What is the equilibrium harvest when fishing effort is kept constant at 100 
vessels per year?  
 
 
12. What is the equation for annual total revenue as a function of effort, TR(E), (for 
equilibrium harvesting) when the price of fish is constant?  
 
13. What is the expression for sustainable resource rent when total cost of the 
 fishery is  
 
(1.4) aEETC =)(   
 
14. The economic parameters are p = 1.0 $/kg and a = 1.0 million $/(vessel⋅year). 
What is the size of the equilibrium fish stock in an Open Access fishery? What 
is the total harvest in this case, and how many vessels participate?  
 
15. What are the optimal/MEY fishing effort and the corresponding stock level and 





1. Show that for the Schaefer model the long-run optimal stock level X* is as given 
in equation (5.26). 
 
2 .  Use the parameters from a previous exercise and δ = 10% to find the value of X*. 
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describes the growth of the fish stock. X represents the stock biomass, K is the 
environmental carrying capacity and r is the intrinsic growth rate. 
 
Further we assume that the harvest function is linear in effort (E) and stock level. 
 
qEXH =  
 
where q s a constant catchability coefficient, and E is the total effort (measured in 
number of vessel year). 
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b) Draw a picture of H(E) for the values r = 0.4, K = 8000 (million tonnes) and q = 
0.001. 
 
c) Find the level of effort that gives maximum sustainable yield (EMSY), and the 
sustainable yield for this level of effort (HMSY). 
 
Assume a constant price of fish (per unit of weight), p, and a constant cost per unit of 
effort, a. 
 
d) Calculate the equilibrium effort and harvest in the case of open access (E∞ and 
H∞), when the price and cost values are p = 10 and a = 20 (and the parameter 




e) Calculate the equilibrium effort and harvest in the case of optimal economically 
solution (EMEY) and HMEY) (with the same price, cost and parameter values). 
 
f) Assume that the government introduces a fixed tax per unit of effort. Which 





6.  Fishing vessel economics  
 
In this chapter we apply microeconomic theory to the operation of fish harvesting 
firms, including analysis of small-scale fishers’ decision-making and the effects of 
share arrangements. Stock size and its availability for fishing are exogenous variables 
for each firm. 
 
6.1 Optimal vessel effort  
 
In the previous chapters we assumed that vessels are homogenous with respect to cost 
and catchability, implying that cost per unit of effort, a, is constant and equal for all 
vessels. The reason for this is the long-run perspective where it is reasonable to 
assume that adding homogenous vessels to the fleet can expand effort at a constant 
cost per unit effort. In actual fisheries vessels usually differ with respect to efficiency 
and costs. The latter is also the case for the opportunity cost of labour which may vary 
across geographical areas. For example, fishers living in a small coastal community 
far away from larger towns and cities usually have few alternative employment 
possibilities; thus the opportunity cost of labour will be lower in such a community 
than in larger labour markets. On the other hand, other inputs required for fishing may 
be more costly in small fishing communities than in towns, due to transportation cost 
and less competition between distributors. The price of fuel, for instance, seems to be 
higher in small, remote fishing communities than in larger towns. Thus, differences in 
efficiency of effort, market prices of inputs and opportunity cost of labour may all 
contribute to the existence of heterogeneous effort in the fish harvesting industry.  
 
Before analysing the bioeconomic effects of heterogeneous effort (see chapter 
7) we shall in this chapter study the economic adaptation of fishing vessels. This 
includes the economic objectives of fishing activities, the costs structure and the size 
and availability of the natural resource, the fish stock. The activity level of a vessel is 
measured by its fishing effort, and we reckon that any vessel’s effort can be expressed 
by use of a standardised efficiency measure of fishing effort. The unit of measurement 
of effort at the vessel level, e, could be, for example, one hour of trawling in demersal 
trawl fisheries, one gill net day in coastal gill net fishing or 100 hooks in long line 
fisheries. Vessel effort, e, is in technical terms and it takes labour, fuel, gear etc. to 
 90 
 
produce effort. This may be expressed in the production function e=f(v1,v2,….vn) at 
the vessel level, where the v’s are the inputs. Recall the fishery wide effort function 
with total effort, E, in equation (2.2). Total effort is the aggregate of the effort of all 
vessels in a fishery. This production function has the same characteristics as we are 
used to in the theory of the firm in a microeconomic text. It may have one, two or n 
number of inputs and it may have constant returns to scale or variable returns to scale 
(see Varian, 2003). 
 
We use the following symbols to analyse a vessel’s economic adaptation of fishing 
effort 
 
e = effort of one fishing vessel 
c(e) = total variable cost of effort 
avc(e) = average variable cost of effort 
mc(e) = marginal cost of vessel effort 
 
Sometimes, subscripts i and j will be used to distinguish between or to compare two 
vessels. At this stage we disregard fixed cost, but shall return to this when discussing 
long-run issues in section 6.2. 
 
Average variable cost of vessel effort equals total variable cost divided by 
effort: 
 
avc = avc(e) = c(e)/e. 
 
Marginal cost of vessel effort is the addition to total cost due to the addition of one 
unit to effort: 
 
mc = mc(e) = d c(e)/d e. 
 
If effort is measured in trawl hours, the average variable cost tells how many $ one 
hour of trawling on average costs, whereas marginal cost tells by how many $ total 




Each vessel can vary effort by varying the inputs needed for the generation of 
effort. For example, in the case of trawling, a vessel can vary its speed between 
harbour and fishing ground, allowing more or less time for proper harvest activities on 
the fishing ground. High speed to and from the fishing ground means more time for 
actual fishing. Since engine fuel consumption increases progressively with speed, this 
implies that also marginal cost of vessel effort increases with expansion of effort.  
 
Recalling the theory of the firm, marginal cost may decline with output at low 
level, reaches a minimum, and rises thereafter, due to the form of the production 
function. In the case of fisheries we may think of effort as the (intermediate) product 
of the production process and that this (intermediate) product is produced by regular 
inputs according to a regular production function. 
 
When the catch of a vessel is small in relation to the stock size, the vessel 
operator considers stock as constant in the short-run, not affected by the activity of the 
vessel. This also applies to the market price of fish – seen from a vessel operator’s 
point of view, the market price is considered unaffected by the landings of each vessel. 
Even if there are effects on stock and market price from the total harvest of all vessels, 
the magnitude of this is an empirical question. However, for the analysis of a single 
vessel’s adaptation we shall assume that there are no significant effects on stock level 
and market price. Thus, the vessel operator acts as if his fishing has no effect on the 
stock level or on the market price. 
 
In a given period of time the vessel’s catch is a function of its effort, which it 
can adapt, and the stock level, which is taken as given. For the case of simplicity, let 
us assume that the vessel harvest function equals the Schaefer harvest function: 
 
(6.1) qeXXeh =);( ,  
 
where q is the catchability coefficient. 
 
The operating profit of the vessel is 
 




Using (6.1) and (6.2) the operating profit is  
 
(6.3) )();( ecqeXpXe −⋅=π   
 
We have included the stock level as an argument in functions (6.1) and (6.2), 
but after the semicolon of the functional symbols to stress that the stock level has an 
effect on harvest and that this is outside the control of the vessel operator. However, 
to simplify the notation, this has not been done for the fish price.  
 
Assuming that the vessel operator maximises operating profit given in 
equation (6.3), the first order condition for this is  
 
(6.4) 0)();(' =−= emcpqXXeπ   
 
Equation (6.4) implies the following criterion for the vessel’s adaptation of its effort 
 
(6.5) pqXemc =)( .  
 
Equation (6.5) tells that the marginal cost of vessel effort shall equal the 
marginal revenue of effort. The latter equals the product of fish price, catchability 
coefficient and stock level, and this product is the revenue earned by the addition of 
one unit of effort. Note that in the traditional theory of production, or theory of the 
firm, the right- hand side of the equation, corresponding to (6.5), would include only p, 
whereas in this case both q and X are included in addition to the price.  For a given set 
of p, q and X, the vessel’s optimal effort is implicitly given by equation (6.5).  
 
In studying the theory of production, we usually measure product along the 
horizontal axis whereas in this case we have used fishing effort as the fisher’s 
decision variable. The reason for this is discussed above. An ordinary firm is 
considered to have control of its total production process, including all inputs needed 
and the costs of these. A fish-harvesting firm, however, does not have control of its 
most important input, the fish stock. This is definitely not an input like fuel and bait 
that can be bought in the input market. The fisher knows the cost per unit of effort, for 
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instance, per trawl hour, and we anticipate that he also knows how the catch varies 
with stock level. Thus cost per unit of harvest will depend on both input costs and on 
the stock level and its catchability.  
The average variable cost and the marginal cost curves are shown in figure 6.1. 
Panel (a) of this figure shows that avc first declines, reaches its minimum for effort 
level e∞, and rises thereafter. The mc curve first declines, reaches its minimum for an 
effort level lower than e∞, and rises thereafter. When the avc curve attains its 
minimum, mc equals avc. We recognise the form of these cost curves from the theory 
of the firm, with the important difference that in this case effort is the variable along 
the horizontal axis, whereas the corresponding variable in the theory of the firm is the 
firm’s quantity of output. We may regard vessel effort as an intermediate output of the 
fish-harvesting firm – an output produced by use of regular inputs. However, how  
 
 
Figure 6.1.  Two fishing vessels: short-run adaptation of effort for given cost structure, 
price of fish, catchability and stock level. 
 
 
much of the final output, fish catch, the effort produces depends on the stock size and 
its availability, in addition to the effort. Once we know how much catch is produced 
by effort, cost per unit of harvest can also be calculated. (In chapter 3.1 we introduced 
the cost per unit of effort, a, and in chapter 4.2 the unit cost of harvest was introduced.) 
The distinction between (average and marginal) cost per unit of effort on the one hand 
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and cost per unit of harvest on the other hand is crucial for the understanding of 
fisheries economics. 
 
Figure 6.1 shows graphically the adaptation of effort for two profit 
maximising vessels, vessel i and vessel j. Panel (a) of this figure shows the marginal 
revenue of effort, pqX, for two levels of the fish stock, namely X∞ and X1. The 
optimal effort of vessel i is ei∞ for stock level X∞. This effort is according to the 
optimality criterion in equation (6.5), that is, marginal cost of effort equals marginal 
revenue of effort. In this case vessel i does not make any profit, but just breaks even, 
since the marginal revenue of effort, pqX∞, equals average variable cost. If the stock 
level is lower than X∞ it will be optimal for this vessel to stop fishing since marginal 
revenue will be below the minimum average cost. In this case, without any fixed cost, 
it is better for the vessel to be idle with zero revenue and zero cost, than to operate 
with a negative result. Vessel i is a marginal vessel for stock level X∞ since just a 
small reduction in the stock level will force the vessel out of operation.  
 
Figure 6.1 panel (b) shows that vessel j has its maximal profit for effort ej∞ at 
stock level X∞, and that profit equals the area ABCD in this case. This profit is called 
producer’s surplus or quasi-rent in the theory of the firm and intra-marginal rent in 
fisheries economic theory.1 The latter refers to rent earned by those vessels that are 
more cost efficient than the marginal vessel. In figure 6.1 vessel i is a marginal vessel 
at stock level X∞ whereas vessel j is intra-marginal at this level. Note that vessel j 
would be able to operate with a positive profit even at a stock level somewhat lower 
than X∞.  
 
If the stock level is X1, instead of X∞, by chance or by active management of 
the fishery, figure 6.1 shows that the profit maximising effort will be ei1 and ej1, for 
vessel i and j, respectively. In this case the profit for each of these two vessels will 
equal the single-shaded areas of panel (a) and panel (b). In other words, higher stock 
level means higher marginal revenue of effort, thus encouraging each vessel to 
increase its effort. How much vessel effort increases depends on the steepness of the 
                                                 
1 Sometimes intra-marginal rent refers to rent related to the average total cost curve, shown in figure 
6.2. However, the main point is that intra-marginal rent is a surplus that accrues to those vessels that 
are more cost efficient than the marginal one. 
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marginal cost curve. If this curve is very steep the optimal effort will hardly be 
expanded if stock level increases, as is the case at stock level X1 for vessel i in figure 
6.1 panel (a). 
 
6.2  Vessel behaviour in the long run 
 
Up to this point we have not been specific about short run versus long run. Like any  
firm, a fish harvester may have different criteria for its short-run and its long-run 
adaptation.2 In the short run it suffices to cover operation cost whereas in the long run 
a harvester will have to cover his fixed cost as well. This is illustrated in figure 6.2, 
where marginal and average cost curves are based on the total cost tc(e) = c(e) + k, 
with c(e) as variable cost and k as fixed cost. Marginal effort cost is mc(e), average 
variable cost of effort is avc(e) and average total cost of effort is atc(e).  
 
Figure 6.2.  Short-run and long-run adaptation of fishing effort may vary due to fixed 
costs.  
 
                                                 
2 Ex-ante, before a vessel is designed and built, the owner has a wide range of sizes and technological 
solutions to choose from, but ex-post, after completion, the vessel’s major technical characteristics, 
such as length, weight, hold size and engine power are fixed. Thus we may say that a fishing vessel 
capacity is flexible ex-ante, but not ex-post, whereas fishing effort is flexible also ex-post. Such 
characteristics of production is often called “putty-clay” – can you guess why? (see Johansen, 1972). 
How flexible effort is depends on the technical characteristics built in to the vessel. Effort measured in 




Note that the marginal cost of effort curve intersects from below the two 
average cost curves at their minimum points. For obvious reasons the average total 
cost curve lies above the average variable cost curve at any effort level. However, the 
difference between average total cost and average variable cost narrows when effort 
expands since this allows the fixed cost to be divided by more units of effort. In the 
short run a vessel may operate if marginal revenue of effort is above pqXM, which is 
equal to the minimum of its average variable cost. For given values of p and q this 
implies that the stock level at least has to be above XM for fishing operations to take 
place on a commercial basis. In figure 6.2 X1 is greater than X∞, which is greater than 
XM. In the long run a vessel will also have to cover fixed costs, which implies that the 
stock level has to be at or above X∞ for the vessel to be able to cover its capital cost. 
We have used subscript ∞ to indicate that this is the stock level at which the marginal 
vessel breaks even under an open-access fishing regime. The marginal vessel, 
producing effort e∞, will be able to cover all its costs, including normal capital return, 
but without earning any above normal profit. However, if effective management 
measures have been taken and the stock level is kept at, for example, X1, the vessel 
will earn the gross profit ABEF shown in figure 6.2. This gross profit includes the 
super profit DCEF. In this case the super profit is the vessel’s share of the resource 
rent.  
 
The optimal vessel effort depends on the marginal revenue, denoted pqX in 
figure 6.2, and on the marginal cost of effort curve. For a constant price of fish and a 
constant catchability parameter this implies that the marginal cost curve represents the 
vessel’s supply curve for fishing effort. If the product of price, catchability and stock 
level, pqX,  increases, the vessel’s optimal effort will increase. For example, if a gill-
net vessel experiences higher marginal revenue of effort, it could increase its profit by 
increasing its use of variable inputs, such as fuel necessary to increase the speed 
between the harbour and the fishing ground. A vessel has greater flexibility in varying 
its effort the gentler the marginal cost curve. Traditionally, in many parts of the world, 
fishing vessels have been designed and manned to be flexible to adapt to changing 
markets and resources. This means, in the context of figure 6.2, a moderate sloping 





6.3  Quota price and optimal effort 
 
We shall now analyse how the optimal vessel effort and harvest depend on the harvest 
quota price. In Chapter 3.4 we analysed the market price of effort quotas and harvest 
quotas by use of downward sloping demand curves. Having seen above how the 
marginal cost of effort becomes the vessel’s supply curve for fishing effort, we shall 
now have a closer look at the relationship between this supply curve and the demand 
of effort and harvest quotas. In particular we shall see how the market price of fish, 
harvest costs, technological efficiency and stock level affect a fishing firm’s demand 
for harvest quotas. Let us assume that fish harvesters can buy any amount of harvest 
quota at the price of m $ per tonne. The quota price may be given either in a 
competitive market or as a harvest tax determined by a fishery manager. Disregarding 
uncertainty, a profit maximising firm will adapt fishing effort and harvest as discussed 
above, but with the additional constraint that it has to pay for its quota in proportion to 
its harvest. 
 
To simplify the graphical analysis we assume a linear marginal cost of effort 
curve, shown in figure 6.3 panel (a).3 Based on this we shall derive the downward 
sloping demand curve for harvest quota in panel (c). In figure 6.3 panel (a), fishing 
effort is measured horizontally and marginal cost of effort, average total cost of effort 
and marginal revenue of effort are measured vertically. Since the fishing firm has to 
pay for its harvest quota, its net price of fish is p - m, and it is this net price that 
matters for the vessel’s adaptation of effort. If the landing price of fish is 2.00 €/kg 
and the market price of quota is 0.75 €/kg, the net price of fish for the vessel equals 
1.25 €/kg. When harvest quotas are for free (m = 0), the optimal level of vessel effort, 
e0, is formed, in figure 6.3 panel (a), where the marginal cost of effort curve intersects 
the horizontal marginal revenue line at level pqX. Note that pqX is assumed to be 
constant throughout this analysis, whereas we discussed effects of changes in the 
stock level in figures 6.1 and 6.2. Figure 6.3 panel (b) shows the optimal effort as a 
                                                 
3 With fixed cost, k, quadratic variable cost of effort curve vc(e) = ae2 and total cost tc(e) = ae2 + k, we 
get the linear marginal cost curve mc(e) = 2ae. 
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function of the harvest quota price, including e0 for the zero harvest quota price. Panel 





Figure 6.3. A vessel's demand for harvest quota depends on its cost structure, price of 




derived from panel (b) using the harvest function h = qeX. Catch h follows in a 
straightforward  way when e has been derived, since, by assumption, qX is constant. 
 
In the same way as the optimal effort and the harvest quota were derived for 
the zero quota price, they can be derived for any quota price, including m*. As noted 
above, in this case it is the net price of fish, p - m*, that matters for the fishing firm. 
The harvest quota price mM is the maximum price the vessel portrayed in figure 6.3 
can afford to pay without losing money in the long run. If the harvest quota price is 
greater than mM, the horizontal marginal revenue line will be below the maximum of  
the average total cost of effort curve. Thus in such a case the optimal vessel strategy is 
to stop fishing to avoid losing money through a negative net profit. In the short run, 
however, a vessel with an effort cost structure similar to what is shown in figure 6.3 
panel (a) can operate for a while and earn a positive gross profit even if the harvest 
quota price is greater than mM.4 The combination of positive gross profit and negative 
net profit is most likely to appear for vessels with high fixed costs. This would imply 
a greater difference between average total cost and average variable cost, and a 
gradual phasing out of bankrupt vessels not able to meet their log-run capital 
obligations. On the other hand, capital-intensive vessels may be more efficient than 
other vessels, thus compensating for higher fixed costs with lower variable costs. To 
predict what kind of vessels would be most competitive in a quota market, one would 
need empirical information about fishing firm and vessel costs. 
 
 
6.4  A small-scale fisher’s choice of leisure time and income  
 
We have seen above how a fish harvesting firm adapts effort to maximise profit. The 
effort supply curve is typically upward sloping, implying that a vessel is used more 
intensively the higher the marginal revenue of effort. However empirical studies of 
small-scale fisheries in some cases seem to contradict this result, showing that effort 
may even decrease with increased marginal revenue of effort. Sociologists and 
                                                 
4 Note that with variable cost of effort equal to vc(e) = ae2, average variable cost is avc(e) = ae, which 
is a straight line with half the slope of mc(e) = 2ae shown in figure 6.3. Thus in this particular case 
there is no intersection between mc(e) and avc(e) to act as the short-run brake on vessel operations. 
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anthropologists have attributed this to fishers’ and their families’ social and economic 
needs, which may differ between different people (see e.g. Maurstad, 2000). In 
economics we recognise differences in individual preferences, in particular in the 
theory of the consumer. Some people prefer to buy more apples than pears and some 
prefer to work part time instead of full time. Let us now use and adapt the theory of 
consumer behaviour to analyse how a small-scale fisher may chose to allocate his 
total available time between fishing – to earn income to buy consumer goods – and 
leisure time. In other words this is to analyse the choice between income and leisure. 
Since income – or consumer goods – and leisure are alternative sources of utility, an 
indifference map may represent the fisher’s preference pattern between them, for 
example, such as one of the two shown in figure 6.4. 
 
The following symbols are used 
 
x = quantity of consumer goods 
P = consumer price index 
T = time constraint (total hours available)  
e = fishing effort, in hours of fishing 
z = hours of leisure time 
w = income per hour of fishing 
 
The fisher’s utility is a function of consumer goods and leisure time 
 
(6.10) ),( zxUU = .  
 
The time constraint of the fisher is 
 
(6.11) zeT += .  
 
The fisher’s budget constraint is 
 




since wT is the maximum income he could earn if he spent all his available hours on 
fishing. This is distributed across leisure time, wz, and consumer goods, Px. Thus the 
actual income from fishing is wzwTwe −= . The small scale fisherman wants to 
maximize his utility, we assume, by choosing x and z. This means we should find the 
maximum of the utility function (6.10) given the budget constraint (6.12). This can be 
done by one of two methods. First, by substituting for x from equation (6.12) into 
(6.10), which makes utility a function of only one variable, z, and maximizing utility 
with respect to this variable, leisure time. Second, we can use the Lagrange method 
(see Box 6). The two methods lead to the same result, that the necessary condition for 






















),( .  
 
 
Dear student, you should now do the calculations that lead to equation (6.13). 
 
The interpretation of equation (6.13) is that the marginal value of one dollar 
from fishing should be the same whether spent on leisure time or on consumer goods. 
In other words, at the margin the fisher is indifferent between a small increase in 
consumer goods or in leisure time. 
 
The budget constraint may be rewritten 
 
(6.14)  xwPTz )/(−=   
 










Box 6.1 Using the Lagrange method 
 
This method uses an assisting function, which combines the function we are going to 
maximize (utility) and the constraining function (budget), and has got its name after 
the French mathematician and astronomer Joseph Louis Lagrange (1736-1813). 
 
Maximizing the utility, ),( zxUU = , subject to the linear constraint, wzPxwT += , 
we start by introducing a helping hand, the Langrangian multiplier λ, and formulate 
the Langrangian function 
 
)(),( wTwzPxzxUL −+−= λ . 
 
Note that what is in the parenthesis following λ equals zero. Thus maximizing the L-
function will give the same result as maximising the U-function, but now we can be 
sure that the budget constraint is fulfilled.  
 
The Langrangian theorem states that an optimal choice of (x,z)  must satisfy the 



























U xz = , which is the same as in equation (6.13). 
 
The three equations (B6.1)-(B6.3) can be used to find the three unknown variables x, 
z and λ. However, to find explicit solutions we would have to specify the utility 
function. In microeconomic texts you may find several examples of utility functions, 






Figure 6.4   Two examples of the small-scale fisher’s choice between consumer goods 
and leisure time. 
 
Let us now analyse what happens to the fisherman’s choice between leisure 
time and consumer goods if fishing conditions improve. The preference map in Figure 
6.4 panel (a) is such that the fisherman would like to reduce his leisure time if real 
value of income per hour increases from 
P
w1  to 
P
w2 , and further to 
P
w3 . This implies 
that he increases his fishing time and the consumption of goods. In this case the 
fisher’s labour supply curve – measured by his fishing time – is upward sloping. 
Figure 6.4 panel (b) shows the preference map of a fisher who would like to increase 
his leisure time when real value of income per hour of fishing increases. This fisher 
will decrease time allocated to fishing if the real value of his hourly income increases, 
in other words, his supply curve for labour is downward sloping. 
 
Figure 6.5 shows two possible supply curves for fishing effort for a small-
scale fisher who allocates his time between leisure and fishing – the latter to earn 
income to buy consumer goods. Thus, based on this theory we cannot tell whether a 
small-scale fisher will increase or decrease his fishing effort when the real value of his 
hourly income increases. This real value of hourly income is the fisher’s opportunity 
cost of effort. Note the difference between this inconclusive result regarding the slope 
of a small-scale fisher’s effort supply curve and the fishing firm’s upward sloping 
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effort supply curve derived in the previous section. This difference may also have 
implications for the design of management tools. It is not certain that the same 
management instruments will work efficiently for both industrial (large-scale) 
fisheries and for small-scale fisheries.  
 
 
Figure 6.5.  The effort supply curve in small-scale fisheries may be backward or 
forward bending, depending on the fisher’s preferences for leisure time 






A fishing vessel has harvest function h = qeX (with q and X exogeneously given), 
price of fish p, fixed cost k, variable cost vc(e) = ce + ae2 and unit cost of harvest 
quota m. 
 
1. What is the optimal effort, expressed as a function of other variables and 
parameters? 
 





3. What is the harvest quota demand function (inverse; m as a function of h)? 
 
4. Draw a picture of what you found in question 3 for the following parameter 
values: 
  
Symbol Value   Unit 
p 3000 €/tonne 
 









a 0.045 €/hour2 
k 259 200 €/year 
q 1.2⋅10-6 1/hour 
X 105 tonne 
vc - €/year 
tc - €/year 
 
5. Draw a picture of marginal revenue of effort ((p - m)qX), marginal cost, average 
variable cost and average total cost as functions of effort, using data from 
question 4. What is the optimal vessel effort for m = 0 and m = 1000? For what 





A fishing vessel has harvest function: h = q e X (with q and X exogenously given). 




1)( 23 ++−= eeeetc  
 
a) Find the expression for: mc(e), avc(e) and atc(e) (marginal cost, average 




b) Assume that the marginal revenue (mr) of effort is 
 
2055== pqXmr  
 
 What is the optimal effort? 
 
c) Suppose that stock and/or price reductions give another mr: 
(i) mr = 1255 
(ii) mr = 655 
 What is the optimal effort in these cases? 
 
d) Draw a picture. 
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7.  Extension of the basic bioeconomic model  
 
This chapter demonstrates that even in an open-access fishery rent may be generated 
if vessels are heterogeneous. 
 
7.1  Intra-marginal rent for the most efficient vessels 
 
In this section we will study some management issues related to a fishing fleet of 
heterogeneous vessels. In most fisheries vessels vary with respect to size, engine 
power, gear-type, costs and other technical and economic characteristics. In the 
preceding chapter we have seen examples of how the cost structure of vessels may 
differ. However, when, in Chapters 3 and 4, we discussed open-access and managed 
fisheries, this was done for homogeneous vessels. The reason for this is the wish to 
start with the simplest model that may provide insight in the economics of fishing. 
From this we learned that the potential resource rent is wasted in an open-access 
fishery, but that sole ownership or other management measures can mitigate this and 
create resource rent. Now, what are the results when there are technically and 
economically heterogeneous vessels? 
 
Figure 7.1 shows for each of twelve vessels the standardised effort along the 
horizontal axis and the average cost per unit of standardised effort along the vertical 
axis. The vessels are arranged from the left to the right according to their cost 
efficiency, with vessel no. 1 as the most cost efficient one and vessel no. 12 as the 
least cost efficient. We may choose, for example, vessel no. 9 as the standard vessel 
against which the efforts of the others are measured. Since the width of each vessel 
bar in Figure 7.1 illustrates the standardised effort of each vessel, we notice that, for 
example, vessel no. 3 produces about twice as much effort as the standard vessel, no. 
9. This implies that vessel no. 3 would catch twice as much fish per day as vessel no. 
9, when effort is measured in hours or days of fishing of the standard vessel. Further, 
we notice in Figure 7.1 that the average cost per unit of standardised effort is lowest 
for vessel no. 1, even though this vessel no. 1 produces the same effort as the standard 





Figure 7.1. The increasing marginal cost of effort curve for a fishery is based on 
heterogeneous vessels. The fishing effort of each vessel is measured by the 
width of the bar whereas the height of the bar measures cost per unit of 
effort.  
 
With several vessels in a fishery, we may substitute the cost bars in Figure 7.1 
with a curve enveloping the bars. This curve is called the MC(E) curve and is shown 
in figure 7.2 panel (b). Note that we use the concept Marginal Cost of Effort, MC(E), 
in a particular way, namely at the fishery level, describing the addition to total cost of 
adding one more unit of fishing effort to the fishery. This is somewhat different from 
the concept of marginal cost at the vessel level, discussed in the preceding chapter. 
The total cost of effort, TC(E), in figure 7.2 panel (a) is derived from the MC(E) curve. 
In this case the TC(E) curve is increasing progressively, since the MC(E) curve is 
upward sloping. The TR(E) curve in Figure 7.2 panel (a) is the sustainable long run 
total revenue curve, recalled from previous chapters, and the corresponding average 






Figure 7.2. Equilibrium fishing effort, resource rent and intra-marginal rent under 
open-access and under maximum economic yield management in the case 
of heterogeneous effort. 
 
Open-access equilibrium is found where MC(E) = AR(E), for effort level E∞. 
Under open access, vessels will enter the fishery if the average revenue per unit effort 
is greater than the marginal cost of effort, and exit the fishery if revenue is less than 
cost. The equilibrium of the open-access fishery is demonstrated in figure 7.2 panel 
(b). For the effort level E∞ the total revenue equals the square AGOE∞ and the total 
cost equals the area below the MC(E) curve, namely the quadrilateral ADOE∞. This 
implies that there is an economic surplus in the fishery, equivalent to the area AGD, 
since AGOE∞ > ADOE. This surplus is called intra-marginal rent or producer’s 
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surplus.1  This rent accrues to those vessels that have lower costs than the marginal 
vessels at E∞. Note that in figure 7.2 panel (a) the intra-marginal rent is the line 
segment R. Thus in this case, with a progressively increasing TC(E) curve, the 
equilibrium point is to the left of the intersection between the TR(E) and the TC(E) 
curves, the difference between them being the intra-marginal rent. 
 
The total rent of the fishery is defined as  
 
(7.1) )()()( ETCETREE −=π  .  
 
We discussed at length the maximisation of rent in Chapters 3 and 5, and know that 
figure 7.2 panel (b) is useful to illustrate the solution. The rent maximising effort level, 
EMEY, is found where the upward sloping marginal cost of effort curve, MC(E), 
intersects the downward sloping MR(E) curve. The relationship between revenue, cost 
and rent is as follows: 
 
    Resource rent BHFC 
 + Intra-marginal rent CFD 
 + Total cost CDOEMEY 
 = Total revenue BHOEMEY 
 
The total rent equals the area BHDC, in figure 7.2 panel (b), and this is clearly greater 
than the open-access intra-marginal rent for the open-access fishery, which equals 
AGD. We notice that even though total rent is greater for the effort level EMEY than for 
E∞, the intra-marginal rent is reduced. This may have some implications for 
management. In case of heterogeneous fishing effort, we have seen that the most cost-
efficient vessels do make above-normal profit, called intra-marginal rent. If the 
fishery manager wants to reduce effort from E∞ to EMEY, some vessels that have to 
leave the fishery will lose their part of the intra-marginal rent. This may result in 
objections to change of management objective. However, as demonstrated above, the 
total rent is highest for the EMEY  effort level, and some of this could be used to 
compensate those vessels that may be in danger of losing their previous intra-marginal 
                                                 
1 Producer’s surplus in fisheries was discussed first in Copes (1972). 
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rent. The advice to managers, as a result of this analysis, is to analyse carefully what 
distributional effects may follow a change in the management system. Otherwise it 




Box 7.1 Economic efficiency of some gill-net fishing vessels in Vietnam 
This figure presents an example of heterogeneous cost efficiency of vessels in an offshore 
fishery in a developing country, where some make a good profit and others a loss. Data 
for 2008 was collected to study gill-net vessels in Nha Trang, Vietnam, fishing mainly 
tuna and mackerel in the East Sea (South China Sea). The vessels are about 13-20 m 
long, have a crew of 8-12 men and an average trip lasts for 16 days.  The total cost 
includes fuel, nets, labour, maintenance, depreciation and interest payment on loans, but 
excludes calculated interest on the vessel owner’s capital. The height of the bars measures the 
average total cost per unit of standardized effort for each vessel. The unit of effort is put 
equal to the estimated average effort of the 58 vessels in the sample. The width of a bar 
indicates the relative effort of each vessel and the vessels are numbered arbitrarily from 1 
to 58 (note the difference to the ordering in Figure 7.1). Thus the total effort of all 58 
vessels equals 58.0 on the horizontal axis. The horizontal curves ARws(E) and ARos(E) are 
the average revenue per unit of standardised effort with and without a lump sum subsidy, 
respectively, paid by the Government in 2008 only to compensate for the very high fuel 
costs that year. We see that vessels no.28 and no.49 just break even and that the relative 
effort of the former is much greater than the latter. On average vessels with the highest 
effort, which are usually the biggest ones, are also the most cost efficient ones – the bar 
widths are wider to the left than to the right. However, there are several exceptions, for 
example vessel no.47 (between no.37 and no.31) to the left and vessel no.13 towards the 
right. All in all this figure demonstrates what is quite common in the open access fishing 
industries globally – some vessels and fishermen make good money, others loose. 
 
AR os (E)  = 1044.6
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Average revenue including subsidies per unit effort of 58 vessels, ARws(E)  
 
Figure Box 7.1: The cost-efficiency of 58 vessels. In million VND per vessel per year (1 
USD=16,950VND).  Source: Duy et al., 2010. 
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8.  Growth and yield of year classes 
 
In this chapter we analyse the effects on yield and economic rent of changes in 
technical fisheries regulations by use of a year class model. It is shown that technical 
regulations such as minimum mesh size can realise greater long-term yield and 
economic rent if fishing mortality is controlled simultaneously. Fisheries biologists 
usually use year class models in their stock assessment and advisory work. 
 
8.1  Growth and ageing 
 
In Chapter 2 it was noted that the biological processes that generate bell-formed 
growth curves include individual growth, recruitment and natural mortality. Even 
though a fish stock may consist of several year classes, of which just the older ones 
spawn and ensure recruitment to the stock, and young fish may have a higher growth 
rate than the older ones, bell-shaped growth curves incorporate all such processes. In 
addition, as have been shown in the previous chapters, the growth curves form a good 
foundation for economic analysis of fishing. However, there are at least two reasons 
for also studying fisheries adaptation and management within a year class framework. 
First, a year class model may increase our understanding of the biological and 
economic effects of technical regulations. Second, fishery scientists in actual 
assessment and advisory work extensively use year class models. When working with 
detailed and complex year class models we must be aware that even in such models 
we can find the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and the corresponding stock size, 
though these characteristics are not as apparent as in the aggregated biomass models. 
Fisheries management in many parts of the world is dominated by analysis and 
management advice from biologists and other natural science researchers, who base 
their work mainly on disaggregated models. Such models specify in more or less 
detail the three biological processes – recruitment, growth and mortality – of the year 
classes of the stock. Therefore, let us have a closer look at such population models 
and how they may be used for economic analysis. 
 
A cohort is a group of fish of the same age belonging to the same stock. That 
is why year class models are often called cohort models. In the temperate zones of the 
world fish stocks usually have only one spawning season per year, thus producing one 
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cohort per year. However, fish stocks in tropical areas, where spawning can take place 
throughout the year, may produce two or more cohorts annually.  
 
Fish usually grow throughout their lives, but at a decreasing relative rate both 
with respect to length and weight. This contrasts with humans and many other animals 
whose growth ceases some time after adolescence. The growth of a single fish may 
depend on the available food, water temperature and other biotic and abiotic factors, 
in addition to its basic physiological characteristics. Even though there may be a great 
variation of growth within a cohort, it is useful to describe the average growth of fish 
by use of a graph or an equation. Figure 8.1 shows the estimated age-specific length 
and weight of Northeast Arctic cod, and figure 8.2 shows the estimated age-specific 
length and weight of Pacific mackerel. Note that length increases at a decreasing rate 
for both species throughout the life of the fish, whereas weight increases at an 
increasing rate until the age of around eight years for cod and five years for mackerel. 
Actual data will typically be dotted above and below the growth curve, with the curve 
depicting the average value at each age. That is why fish actually can be longer and 





Figure 8.1. Average length and weight at age of Northeast Arctic cod portrayed by 
use of the von Bertanlanffy growth equation. Parameter values are: k = 
0.12, l∞ = 130 cm, w∞ = 17.00 kg, t0 = 0. Source: Parameter values from 







Figure 8.2.  Average length and weight of Pacific mackerel depicted by use of the von 
Bertanlanffy growth equation. Parameter values are: k = 0.24, l∞ = 44 cm, 
w∞  = 1.00 kg, t0 = 0. Source: Parameter values from Sullivan (1991). 
 
 
There are more than one species of both cod and mackerel, and several stocks, 
in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. Growth rates vary between areas due to 
differences in sea temperature, food availability, and other factors. Mackerel is a 
pelagic species that grows relatively fast at a young age and reaches maturity already 
after two to four years. Cod is a relatively slow growing but long-lived species that 
can reach the age of 20 or 30 years, and it reaches a significant length and weight. 
 
The length at age curves in figures 8.1 and 8.2 are calculated on the basis of 
the von Bertalanffy (1938) length growth equation 
 
(8.1) )1()( )( 0ttkeltl −−∞ −= .  
 
The weight at age curves in figures 8.1 and 8.2 are calculated on the basis of the von 




(8.2) 3)( )1()( 0ttkewtw −−∞ −= .  
 
Each of equations (8.1) and (8.2) describes the growth of individuals by use of three 
parameters. Other functional forms have also been used for curve fitting of fish 
growth, but the von Bertanlanffy equations are the most common (see, for example, 
the FishBase web page). Parameter l∞ is the maximum length of the fish, to be 
reached only at a very advanced age – really at an infinitely high age, mathematically 
speaking. Parameter k, together with l∞ , contributes to the relative growth of fish. 
Note that even though k usually is called the growth parameter, length growth is really 
a function of both k and l∞. The parameter k is usually smaller for big fish, such as 
cod and halibut, than for small fish, such as pilchard and sprat (for lots of examples 
see FishBase at http://www.fishbase.org/search.php). At a very young age, as larvae 
or juvenile, fish may have another growth pattern from that  during the later stages of 
life. Parameter t0 tells the hypothetical age at which the fish would have had length 
zero if growth followed the normal pattern throughout life. (To see that l(t0) = 0, 
substitute t0 for t in equation (8.1).)  Technically, t0 may be positive, negative or zero. 
However, for the growth curves shown in figures 8.1 and 8.2 t0 has been fixed to zero, 
to simplify the estimation process, figures and comparison between species. (For a 
thorough review of estimation methods for parameters in growth functions, and in 
other fisheries equations and models, see Haddon (2001).)   
 
If we follow a cohort of fish throughout time there will typically be a gradual 
reduction in the number of individuals from the birth of the cohort to the point in time 
when the last individual dies. There are great variations between stocks in how fast a 
cohort is reduced in size. Some marine species, for example, seals, have a few 
offspring with a low natural mortality, whereas others, for example, mackerel, have a 
huge number of offspring, with a high natural mortality. The most common cause of 
natural mortality of fish is predation from other fish, sea birds and sea mammals. The 
smaller a fish is the more individuals in the sea are able to eat it, thus implying a high 
rate of mortality from predation. It is not uncommon that mortality due to predation 
on fish eggs and fries exceeds 10–20 per cent per day. For adult fish, however, daily 
rates of mortality may be down to a fraction of one per cent. In addition to predation, 
other natural causes of death of fish include illness, starvation, parasites and poisoning. 
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Such causes often weaken the fish to make it more vulnerable to predation – thus 
fulfilling the saying: one man’s death is the other’s life.   
 
For management purposes it is important to distinguish between natural 
mortality on the one hand and fishing mortality on the other. Fishing means removal 
of fish from the sea, thus adding to the total mortality of the cohort. For managers, an 
important question is how many fish should be removed from the cohort and how 
many should be left in the sea. (We shall come back to this at a later stage). Total 
mortality, denoted Z, consists of the sum of natural mortality, denoted M, and fishing 
mortality, denoted F. First, let us have a closer look at the effects of natural mortality 
on the surviving number of fish. Disregarding the very early stages of the life of a fish, 
natural mortality seems to be a relative constant fraction of the number of fish. This 
means that, disregarding fishing, for example, 20 per cent of the cohort will die from 
natural causes from one year to the next. However, fish typically die every day and 
minute throughout the year, and for this reason it has proved practical to count 
mortality on an instantaneous basis. Recalling Chapter 4 we have seen that, regarding 
discounting, it is rather a question of convenience whether we should use discrete or 
continuous time for the calculation of present value and compound1 interest. The 
same applies to the development of a cohort over time. Fisheries biologists tend to use 
continuous time when calculating natural and fishing mortality in a management 
context. Therefore, we shall use the same approach. 
 
Starting with N0 fish, the number of fish will have decreased to  
 
(8.3) tZeNtN  0  )(
−=   
 
at time t if the total instantaneous mortality rate, Z = M + F, is constant.  
 
For some species, such as salmon, most fish die after spawning, implying that 
M is extremely high during the post-spawning period. However, for most fish species 
of commercial value, natural mortality, M, is in the range of between 0.1 and 0.8. 
                                                 
1 Recall figure 4.1, which shows the discount factor for discrete and continuous time. By adjusting the 





Box 8.1 Fishing mortality in a fish farm 
 
Farming of salmon, and other big fish, is an extreme example of single cohort fishing. 
For each new round of production, farmers usually put some thousands of juveniles of 
the same cohort into the cage. After having fed and tended the fish for a couple of 
years, the stock may be harvested during a very short period of time. Let us have a 
closer look at a numerical example to see how great the fishing mortality F can be in 
the case of fish farming. A cage contains 60 000 salmon at time t, that is N(t) = 60 
000. The harvest takes place during five days, which implies that dN =  60 000 and dt 
= 5 / 365 = 0.0137 when time is measured in years. Neglecting natural mortality this 
implies 
 
(1) . )( / tNFdtdN −=  
 
Based on equation (1) and the data given above we derive F = 73.0. This is an 
extremely high fishing mortality compared with the harvesting of wild fish. However, 
F > 1 is not unknown in commercial fisheries, in particular in the case of fast growing 
short-lived species. Note that F =1 does not imply that the whole cohort is fished in 




Small fish, such as sprat and pilchard, usually have higher M than bigger fish, such as 
cod and halibut. 
 
Multiplying the number of fish in equation (8.3) with the individual weight in 
equation (8.2) gives the biomass at age t 
 
(8.4) )()()( tNtwtB = .  
 
Figure 8.3 shows the development of a mackerel cohort in numbers and total 
weight, or biomass. In this case with a natural mortality M = 0.4 and no fishing (F = 0) 
the number of fish decreases from one billion recruits at time zero to approximately 
200 million at the age of four and 135 million at the age of five. Thus after four years 
there will be only one in five fishes left in the cohort. The natural mortality used in 






Figure 8.3.  The decline in number of fishes and the rise and decline of biomass in a 
given cohort of mackerel, without fishing. Parameters used are N(0) = 1 






Figure 8.4.  The decline in number of fishes and the rise and decline of biomass of a 
cod cohort, without fishing. Parameters used are N(0) = 1 billion, M = 0.2 




Figure 8.4 shows the development of a cohort of cod in number and total 
weight, or biomass. In this case with a natural mortality M = 0.2 and no fishing (F = 0) 
the number of fish decreases from one billion recruits at time zero to approximately  
420 million at the age of four and 200 million at the age of eight. Thus after four years 
there will be just above four in ten fishes left in the cohort and at the age of eight there 
will be two in ten fishes left. The natural mortality used in this example fits the 
Northeast Arctic cod. The number of recruits in figure 8.4 is arbitrarily chosen, but is 
within observed limits for this cod stock. 
 
Multiplying number of fish by the individual weight gives the age-specific 
biomass curve shown in figures 8.3 and 8.4. Thus the total weight, the biomass of a 
cohort, depends on the weight of single fish and the number of fish. Biomass typically 
increases progressively (convex) during the early stage of life, then continues to grow 
but slower and slower (concave) until it reaches its maximum. From this maximum 
the biomass decreases gradually towards zero at the maximum age of the fish. This 
maximum age is usually much higher than the average age of harvested fish. The 
maximum age is the age a fish of a given stock could reach if it were left un-harvested 
by man and predators. The particular biomass curve shown in figures 8.3 and 8.4 are 
based on the weight curves of Pacific mackerel and Northeast Arctic cod, respectively. 
In the case of mackerel the cohort reaches its maximum biomass at the age of four 
years, whereas in the case of cod the cohort reaches its maximum biomass at the age 
of nine, in both cases with the assumption of no fishing. The age that gives biomass 
maximum of a cohort depends on the biological characteristics of the fish stock. 
Higher natural mortality M, ceteris paribus, means a lower age at biomass maximum.  
 
As noted above the age-specific biomass curves shown in figures 8.3 and 8.4 
are based on the absence of fishing. If and when fishing takes place, the biomass 
growth will be slower and the decline will be faster than shown. In actual fisheries the 
gear type in use often determines what sizes of fish are caught and what sizes escape. 
For example, a fisher’s choice of gill-net mesh size usually depends on his targeted 
fish species and size. Small fish have a greater probability than big fish of avoiding 
being entangled in the net. This probability increases the smaller the fish is, since the 
little ones pass through the meshes more easily without being trapped. However, a big 
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fish also has a positive probability of escaping the gill net, because it is not entangled 
or it has the power to free itself from the net. Thus a gill net typically catches most 
medium-sized fish, and this “medium size” depends on the mesh size. On the other 
hand, trawl has the property of keeping few of the small fish, most medium-sized fish 
and all the big ones that encounter the gear. For very small fish, trawl takes none at all. 
For example, bottom trawl used for cod-like fish does not catch shrimp, even if such a 




Figure 8.5. Selectivity curves for three types of fishing gear. 
 
The selectivity pattern varies across gear type and this pattern may be 
described by use of selectivity curves. Figure 8.5 shows three examples of selectivity 
curves, namely size dependent selectivity for gill-net and trawl as well as knife-edge 
selectivity. For analytical purposes it is often convenient to assume knife-edge 
selectivity to focus on the harvest potential of a fish stock. Even though knife-edge 
selectivity is hard to achieve in actual fisheries, bottom trawl with steel or alloy grids 
that substitute parts of the net may come close to this. The grid will stay open with a 
fixed distance between the bars, allowing all or most fish below a certain thickness to 
escape the gear independent of how many fish are in the cod-end of the trawl. Most 
gear has a somewhat more complicated selectivity pattern than knife-edge selectivity, 
for example, like bell-shaped or s-shaped curves. In conventional trawl, the net is 
gradually stretched and the real mesh size reduces as more and more fish accumulate 
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in the trawl, thus effectively decreasing the selectivity properties of the gear. In 
general, the selectivity curve of gill-net is bell-shaped and that of conventional trawl 
is s-shaped. The values of the selectivity parameter vary between zero and one, telling 
the probability of a fish encountered by the gear being trapped as a function of the 
size of the fish. Knife-edge selectivity exists when the selectivity parameter is zero for 
small fish up to a given size and one for all sizes equal to or bigger than this minimum 
catchable size. Most gear types do not catch the very smallest fish. What  “smallest” 
means varies across type of gear and mesh size.  
 
With a direct relationship between fish size and age, as we see in figures 8.1 
and 8.2, the first-age-of-capture, tc, is the age that corresponds to the minimum 
catchable size. In the case of knife-edge selectivity the definition of tc is clear, namely 
the age at which fish reaches its minimum catchable size. However, for practical 
purposes in the case of size variable selectivity of trawl tc must be related to the age 
that gives, for example, s(w) = 0.25 and for gill-net tc may be defined as the lower age 
for which, for example, s(w) = 0.25. Note that in the bell-shaped selectivity curve for 
gill-net there are two weight (age) classes of fish that give for example s(w) = 0.25, 
whereas for trawl there is only one. 
 
 
8.2  Sustainable yield and economic surplus 
 
With knife-edge selectivity and constant fishing mortality throughout each cohort’s 
life the yield from this cohort depends on the mesh size and the fishing mortality.  
 
Figure 8.6 shows the yield curves for cod for three different age-of-first-
capture, tc. In this case we have drawn the picture of total yield (the eumetric yield is 
explained below). A quite similar picture would appear if we divide total yield by the 
number of recruits at t0 and depict yield per recruit. In fact, in the biological literature 
yield per recruit is more common than total yield in this connection.2 Note that the 
                                                 
2 For calculation of yield per recruit, the number of recruits is usually estimated at the age of first 
capture and not at the age of zero. This means that for the cod example shown in figure 8.5, the number 
of recruits would equal N(3) since three-year old cod is about the smallest size to be caught in 
commercial fisheries using the legal minimum mesh size. In the case of Northeast Arctic cod, N(3) = 
605 million is the mean recruitment for 1950–1982 (Jacobsen, 1992). 
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curves for zero and three years of first capture have a distinct maximum whereas the 
curve for nine years does not have such a maximum. This is because the biomass 
maximum of the cohort is reached at the age just below nine, at 8.6, as shown in 
figure 8.4. Any yield curve with tc equal to or greater than the age of natural biomass 
maximum (without fishing) will be without a distinct maximum point. The fishing 
mortality that gives the maximum yield, for a given first age of capture, tc, is called 
Fmax. This is a biological reference point that tells what the fishing mortality should 
be for the fishery to produce maximum yield, given knife-edge selectivity and a 
specific age of first capture. In figure 8.6 we have two values of Fmax, one for age 0 
and one for age 3. Fisheries biologists use Fmax and several other biological reference 





Figure 8.6.  Yield curves of cod for three different age-of-first-capture, namely 0, 3 
and 9 year as well as eumetric yield, based on knife-edge gear selectivity. 
Parameter values of growth are as in figure 8.1, N(0) = 1 billion and M = 
0.2.  
 
Note that the catch will consist of fish at or above the age of first capture tc, as 
long as the fishing mortality is within reasonable limits and the stock consists of 
several year classes. Some fish will survive fishing and reach an age well above tc. A 
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fish stock will typically consist of a higher proportion of old fish the lower the fishing 
pressure has been throughout some period of time. 
 
Figure 8.6 clearly demonstrates that it is the combination of mesh size and 
fishing mortality that determines the possible yield of a cohort. If, for example, fishers 
use an extremely small mesh size, with the age of first capture close to zero, and a 
high fishing mortality, the yield from this cohort will usually be low. However, if the 
fishing mortality is kept low, even with such a small mesh size the yield may be 
significant. Figure 8.6 shows that the combination of age of first capture equal to zero 
and fishing mortality equal to 0.1 would yield almost 400 000 tonnes, which is about 
half of the maximum yield. However, to obtain the maximum yield it is necessary to 
have a high first-age-of-capture, almost nine years, and a high fishing mortality, about 
1.0 or higher. Thus this cohort analysis demonstrates the need for simultaneous mesh 
size and fishing mortality control. So what combination should the manager aim at? 
To answer this question we shall have to include economic issues in the analysis of 
cohort fishing. 
 
For the mackerel cohort shown in figure 8.3 the maximum biomass occurs at 
the age of four and for cod shown in figure 8.4 the maximum occurs at the age of 
almost nine. However, such a maximum can be harvested only by use of an infinitely 
high fishing mortality exactly when the biomass reaches its maximum. Theoretically, 
at this point in time the total cohort is harvested by unlimited use of the knife-edge 
selective gear. However, from an economic point of view it is easy to understand that 
this is not a very useful concept of optimal fishing. Infinitely high fishing mortality 
and effort would imply infinitely high costs. Therefore, for an economic approach to 
cohort fishing we introduce the concept of eumetric yield curve.3 For each value of F 
in figure 8.6 there exists some mesh size that gives the maximum sustained yield. The 
resulting curve through these maxima is the tangent to each of the size selective yield 
curves. We could also say that the eumetric yield curve is the envelopment of the 
individual mesh size conditional curves, as show in figure 8.6. 
 
                                                 
3 This concept was introduced in Beverton and Holt (1957). Dictionaries tell that “eu” is a prefix 
meaning “good”, “well”, occurring chiefly in words of Greek origin. 
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We discussed in chapter 2 how harvest may depend on stock size. One of the 
simplest relationships between stock size and harvest is the case of proportionality. 
For a cohort fishery this means that harvest is proportional also to the number of fish 
 
(8.5) ,FNY =   
 
where Y = catch in number of fish. If fishing mortality is proportional to fishing effort, 
E, we have 
 
(8.6) , qEF =   
 
where q is the catchability coefficient. Combining (8.5) and (8.6) gives the Schaefer 
harvest function in number of fish: 
 
(8.7) , qENY =   
 
in the case of cohort fishing. Since the eumetric yield is the greatest possible yield that 
can be obtained for each level of fishing mortality, F, this holds also for each level of 
fishing effort E = F/q. 
 
Let us use these catch equations for an economic analysis of the cohort fishery, 
recalling that eumetric yield means that both fishing effort and mesh size are 
optimally adapted. If the fishing industry is a small part of the national economy it is 
reasonable to assume that effort can be expanded at a constant cost per unit and that 
fish may be sold at a constant price per unit harvest. Total cost is 
 
(8.8) ,aETC =   
 
where a = cost per unit effort. By combining equations (8.6) and (8.8) it follows easily 
that cost per unit fishing mortality is aF = a/q. The actual value of aF tends to be a 
large number since F is a small number, whereas the value of a depends on the choice 
of unit for measuring fishing effort. Whether effort is measured in, for example, 




Figure 8.7 shows how revenue and costs may increase with fishing effort. In 
this case there are four revenue curves, corresponding to the three age-of-first-capture 
specific and the eumetric yield curves in figure 8.6. With a constant price, p, per unit 
harvest independent of fish size, the revenue curves in figure 8.7 is just a rescaling of 
the yield curves in the figure 8.6. For most types of gear the cost per unit effort varies 
very little with mesh size and selectivity pattern of the gear. This is why there is only 
one total cost curve in figure 8.7. In this case we assume that cost per unit effort and 
total cost are independent of mesh size and age-of-first-capture. Note that the main 
difference between figures 8.7 and 3.1 is that the former displays four possible 
revenue curves whereas the latter has only one. Even though biomass models are 






Figure 8.7. Revenue and cost curves for cohort fisheries, with revenue depending 





Let us now use figure 8.7 to analyse and compare the open access (OA) and 
the maximum economic rent (MEY, where Y denotes yield) fishing regimes. For an 
OA fishery with no technical regulations we would expect fishers to catch any fish of 
commercial value. If even the smallest fish attracts the price p, fishers would choose 
the smallest mesh size available and keep for sale any fish they catch. In figure 8.7 
this means that the OA equilibrium will be at A0 for the rent dissipating effort level 
E000. However, assume the fisheries manager introduces a technical regulation 
demanding all fishers use a mesh size that effectively increases the age of first capture 
to three years. This means that the R3 curve in figure 8.7 will be the actual revenue 
curve for the fishery. OA fishing implies that the equilibrium changes from A0 to A3 
with higher revenue, cost and effort compared to the OA fishery with no technical 
regulation. Technical regulations may contribute to the overall size of the fishery, but 
as the only management tool, no rent will be generated.4 The resource rent is 
maximised for the effort level EMEY, where we find the greatest distance between the 
R and C curves. To realise this optimum the management authority has to limit, 
directly or indirectly, the amount of effort in the fishery, and simultaneously limit the 
mesh size to achieve the eumetric yield. Compared with the economic analysis of the 
biomass fishery in the previous chapters, we now see the need for at least two 
management tools: firstly, a technical regulation to avoid harvest of small fish, and 
secondly, some control to avoid excessive fishing mortality. The latter may be 
achieved by input control or output control, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
The simplicity of figure 8.7 should not lead us to the conclusion that the only 
difference between a cohort model and a biomass model is the introduction of a first 
age of capture or a mesh-size parameter in the former. In fact, a cohort model with 
several year classes and a stock-recruitment relationship may be incredibly complex 
from a dynamic point of view (see Clark, 1990, ch. 9). The above analysis of a cohort 
fishery is based on the assumption of constant recruitment and fixed age-dependent 
individual growth. In other words there are no density-dependent processes that 
reduce recruitment at low stock levels or reduce individual growth at high stock levels. 
For actual fish stocks, recruitment usually depends on both spawning stock size and 
environmental conditions, and growth of individual fish may slow down at high stock 
                                                 
4 When cost per unit effort increases with effort, implying the existence of intra-marginal rent (IMR) in 
the OA fishery, the total IMR may increase as a result of technical regulations only. 
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levels due to competition for food. Fish has to grow for some years to mature and 
reproduce, therefore the number of recruits to the fishable stock depends on the 
spawning stock size one or more years before. The length of this time lag between 
spawning and recruitment varies across species and stocks. Adding multi-cohort, 
stock recruitment and time lag to the cohort analysis above could make the analysis 
too complex for analytical solutions to be found. A common solution to such 
problems is to use numerical model simulations. The need for technical regulations of 
a fishery is likely to become even more prevalent within such a framework. 
 
Groups of year classes of a given fish stock may have different migration 
patterns due to different needs. The spawning cohorts, for example, need suitable 
spawning grounds at a time of the year when the chances of offspring survival is good. 
Juvenile cohorts grow relatively fast (as seen in figures 8.1 and 8.2) and they need a 
large amount of food. Therefore, younger generations of fish tend to migrate across 
season and area to find suitable and plentiful food. Migration of fish for spawning, 
feeding or other biological reasons may imply a need for additional management tools, 
such as area and seasonal restrictions on fishing. However, from an economic point of 
view, it is important to distinguish between management tools that increase the net 
revenue (resource rent) of a fishery and tools that mainly increase harvest costs. An 
example of the latter is when fishers are restricted from harvesting where and when 
the fish is easiest and least costly to catch. However, restricting access to harvesting 
the spawning stock through area and seasonal closure may be economically sound if 
this protects spawners and increases future recruitment. The stock-recruitment 
relationship is important for the long-term yield and the economic performance of the 
fisheries. It is important to stress that technical regulation of, for example, gear 
selectivity, area and seasonal closure, should be designed to increase the long-term 
profitability of the fishery. Unfortunately, in fisheries around the world there are 
several examples of actual regulations that inflict costs on the industry without 







In a cod fishery fishing mortality is proportional to fishing effort (F = qE) and the 
catchability coefficient is 4105.2 −⋅=q  per vessel-year, with unit of time equal to one 
year. The price of fish is constant (across volume and size of fish), p = 2.00 $/kg, and 
cost per vessel-year is a = 0.5 million $. 
 
1. What is F when E = 4000 vessel-years? 
 
2. Use figure 8.5 to sketch the corresponding graphs of eumetric revenue and total 
cost of fishing mortality (tip: see figure 8.6 and use cost per unit F, c = TC/F, to 
draw the total cost of fishing mortality curve, C(F) = cF). 
 




∞F  and FMEY. What are 
the corresponding number of vessels? 
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9.  Multispecies and ecosystem harvesting 
 
This chapter will introduce some important concepts and models being used in economic 
analysis of multispecies and ecosystem harvesting. We shall focus on predator-prey 
interactions that are a key to the understanding of more complex aquatic ecosystems and 
models of such systems. 
 
A classic on multispecies management: 
 
The amount of food for each species of course gives the extreme limit to which 
each can increase; but very frequently it is not the obtaining food, but the 
serving as prey to other animals which determines the average number of a 
species. Thus, there seems to be little doubt that the stock of partridges, grouse 
and hares on any large estate depends chiefly on the destruction of vermin. If 
not one head of game were shot during the next twenty years in England, and, at 
the same time, if no vermin were destroyed, there would, in all probability, be 
less game than at present, although hundreds of thousands of game animals are 




9.1  Multispecies and ecosystem management 
 
The purpose of this section is to introduce the reader to bioeconomic multispecies 
modelling and management. We shall do so by use of simple graphical analysis and 
examples from North Atlantic fisheries. The mathematical tool for deriving one of the key 
graphs is known to most students and will be used in the next section.  
 
Each fish stock is a part of a greater ecosystem, interacting with its prey, 
predator and competitor species, in addition to being affected by other biological as 
well as physical conditions in the sea. A typical fish species targeted by man both 
consumes some species and serves as prey for others. Who eats whom may also vary on 
a temporal and spatial scale. For example, big adult fish may feed even on their own 




Box 9.1 Hippopotamus management in the old Egypt 
 
If we can trust the historic portrayal of the novel River God (Wilbur Smith, 1993) the 
old Egyptians managed actively their aquatic resources nearly 3800 years ago, in the 
1790s BC under the reign of Queen Lostris.  
 
The priests of Hapi had kept a strict count of the number of these great beasts in the 
lagoon, and had given sanction for fifty of them to be slaughtered for the coming 
festival of Osiris. This would leave almost three hundred of the goddess’s flock 
remaining in the temple lagoon, a number that the priests considered ideal to keep the 
waterways free for choking weed, to prevent the papyrus beds from encroaching upon 
the arable lands and to provide a regular supply of meat for the temple. Only the 
priests themselves were allowed to eat the flesh of the hippopotamus outside the ten 
days of the festival of Osiris. 
“River God”, p.9. 
 
 
bigger, individuals change from serving as feed to become predators on the next 
generation of offspring. Such cannibalistic behaviour is also an important part of many 
fish communities, including for cod (Gadus morhua) and herring (Clupea harrengus) in 
the North Atlantic. Marine ecosystems may be more or less complex and the number of 
commercially exploited species varies. In general, tropical systems seem to be richer in 
number of species than ecosystems in the temperate zones. For example, the Mekong 
river ecosystem has around 1400 species of fish and crustaceans whereas the Barents 
Sea ecosystem in the Northeast Atlantic has only a tenth of this.  
 
Co-evolved species adapted to their environment may have complex dynamics 
that are difficult to fully comprehend. For biologists and other natural scientists there is 
hardly any limit to how much research is needed to describe and predict further 
development of each species, commercial or non-commercial, in its ecosystem. 
Nevertheless, for management of any single species or multispecies, objectives setting 
harvest quotas, limiting effort, collecting resource taxes and imposing technical 
restrictions are among the policy means available. A key question when it comes to 
ecosystem management  is how much of the complex dynamics of nature do we have to 
know to manage those species we want to harvest or to protect from harvesting? 
Management costs are not negligible, in particular when it comes to ecosystem or 
multispecies research and management. For actual management, cost-benefit analysis 




9.1.1  Effort and stock levels 
 
The main results of single species bioeconomic analyses are that the optimal level of 
fishing effort is less than the open-access level and that the optimal stock level is higher 
than the open-access level. These general results are valid whether the optimum is derived 
by maximising annual economic rent or the present value of all future rent. For static rent 
maximisation the main results of single species analysis are shown in Figure 9.1. Panels 
(a) and (b) show how the sustainable revenue and the total cost of harvesting vary with 
fishing effort and stock level, respectively. Generally speaking, the optimal level of 
fishing effort, E*ss, is less than the open access level, Eoass, and the optimal stock level, 
X*ss, is higher than the open access level, Xoass. These general results are valid whether 




Figure 9.1. Open access (OA) and optimal (*) effort (E) and stock level (X) in a single 
species (SS) model. Arrows indicate the most likely direction of change of 
optimal E and X if the stock is a prey or a predator, respectively. 
 
 
In single species models, the biological constraint to the optimisation problem is 
the yield-effort or yield-stock curves on which the revenue curves are based. Moving from 
single species to two species models, changes the biological constraint to, for example, the 
maximum sustainable yield frontier (MSF), shown in Figure 9.2. The MSF is derived (see 
the next sub-chapter, 9.2) by maximizing yield of species no.2 for a given yield of species 
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no.1 when there are biological interactions between the two species. Maximising yield 
from each of the two species as if it were independent of the other, gives the combined 
yields at the point S in Figure 9.2. However, this is not a sustainable combination of yields 
since it is outside the MSF. Any point on or inside the MSF would be sustainable (see e.g. 
Flaaten, 1988 and 1991). 
 
What combination of yield should be chosen depends in general on the 
management objective, as well as the price of fish and the harvest cost for each 
species.1 In the biology literature, objectives for managing fish stocks are usually 
related to the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), yield per recruit (Y/R) or some 
related concepts. In cases of two or more biologically interdependent species, 
maximum sustainable yield frontiers (MSF) might replace the single-species MSY 
concept. However, the fallacy of biological management objectives is that they do not 
consider the economic benefits and costs of fisheries. Many fish stocks are deliberately 
not fished due to low market price and/or high catch cost. In the Barents Sea, for 














Figure 9.2. The maximum sustainable yield frontier (MSF) gives the maximum 
possible yield of one species for a given yield of the other. 
 
                                                 





Some international organisations and agreements have established their own 
objectives for fisheries management. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) formulated the following objective (see Box 4.1): 
 
Recognizing that long-term sustainable use of fisheries resources is the 
overriding objective of conservation and management, states and subregional 
or regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements should, inter 
alia, adopt appropriate measures, based on the best scientific evidence 
available, which are designed to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of 
producing maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental 
and economic factors, including the special requirements of developing 
countries. (FAO, 1995.) 
 
Thus, even though the FAO’s Code of Conduct establishes the single-species concept, 
with maximum sustainable yield as the main management objective, it is qualified by 
relevant environmental and economic factors.  
 
Contrary to the management objectives above, economic objectives are strongly 
related to social welfare theory that emphasises the net economic results to society of 
utilising natural resources. “Society” in this context usually means a country, but it 
could also mean a group of indigenous people, a region within a country, or a group of 
countries. The resource rent is the gross catch value minus the harvest costs. If stocks 
are jointly managed, the objective could be to maximise the combined resource rent, or 
the present value of all future rent from them. With respect to the effect that the relative 
net value of harvest has on the optimal combined harvesting, let us use two simplified 
examples to illustrate this. In both cases we assume that there are predator-prey 
interactions between the stocks and that they can be harvested independently of each 
other. 
 
Example 1. Valuable predator and cheap prey 
 
Let species 2 be a predator of high net value per unit harvest and species 1 a low net 
valued prey species. In this case the optimal combined yield is in the vicinity of B in 
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figure 9.2 where the prey is mainly kept in the sea as feed for the predator. In this case 
the effort of the predator fishery does not have to be increased (much) compared with 
its single species effort shown in figure 9.1(a), whereas the effort of the prey fishery 
should be decreased. The effects on the stock levels are opposite to the effects on the 
effort levels. 
 
Example 2. Predator of low net value and prey of high net value 
 
If the predator is of low market value and/or expensive to harvest, its net value per unit 
harvest is low. Likewise, if the prey is of high market value and/or cheap to harvest its 
net value per unit harvest is high. In this case the optimal combined harvest is in the 
vicinity of A in figure 9.2 where the predator stock is fished down to leave more prey to 
be harvested by the fishermen. In some cases it even pays to subsidise the fishermen to 
harvest more predators than they otherwise would have done. In this case the optimal 
effort of the predator fishery should be increased and the stock level of the predator 
reduced compared with the single species case, as indicated by the arrows in figure 9.1.  
 
Non-consumptive values of certain species of a marine ecosystem should also 
be included in a complete analysis, if such values are considered significant. The 
international discourse on, inter alia, whaling, sealing, dolphin by-catch and turtle 
excluder devices demonstrates the importance of integrating non-consumptive issues in 
the management objectives. Further analysis usually reveals the need for a trade-off 
between use (harvest) and non-use (protection) values, even more so when the non-use 
values are connected to top-predators that consume commercially valuable fish. 
 
 
9.1.2  Mixed catch and gear selectivity 
 
In most fisheries catches consist of more than just the main targeted species. Mixed 
catches create other management problems in addition to the ones discussed above. 
This is especially the case when the catch consists of species of different size 
distribution and with different growth properties. The mixed catches of, inter alia, cod, 
haddock and whiting in the North Sea trawl fishery is an example of this. Figure 9.3 
illustrates this problem. One particular type of gear may use either a small or a large 
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mesh size in the net to catch two species simultaneously. The small mesh size gives 














Figure 9.3. The maximum sustainable yield frontier (MSF) in mixed fisheries may 
depend on the mesh size of the nets. A indicates MSF for small mesh size 
and B for big mesh size. 
 
 
Species 1 may consist of plentiful small fish that easily escape gear with big 
meshes. Species 2 has fewer but bigger fish that are fished too young when small 
meshed nets are used. What combination of yield should be chosen depends in general on 
the management objective and on the ratio of cost of effort-price of fish between the two 
stocks. If the stocks are jointly managed, the objective could be to maximise the combined 
resource rent from them. Another solution would be to try to develop selective gear and 
fishing methods to avoid mixed fisheries. 
 
After this brief and simple presentation of some results from bioeconomic 
single and multispecies theory, I will now give a few examples of modelling and 





9.1.3  Examples from the North Atlantic 
 
For many years, biologists and other scientists in the North Atlantic coastal states have 
undertaken research on marine multispecies interactions. There are also examples of 
bioeconomic multispecies analyses of fisheries in these areas (see, e.g., Eide and Flaaten, 
1998). Russian and Norwegian researchers have conducted studies on “who eats whom” 
in the Barents Sea area and have modelled these multispecies interactions (see e.g. 
Rødseth, 1998). Two figures will give an example of why it may be important to also 
include economic aspects in multispecies modelling, instead of relying on biological 
reasoning only. Figure 9.4 shows the Northeast Atlantic cod’s age-dependent average 
annual consumption of some commercially important prey species. Species included are 
shrimp, capelin, herring and cod (cannibalism) above 5, 10, 10 and 20 cm, respectively. 
The figures are in grams of prey per kg of cod, for each age class of cod from 1 to 7+ 
years. Figure 9.4 shows, for example, that 1 kg of two-year-old cod annually consumed 
2000 grams of prey of these four species above the given size, and that about 75 per cent 
of this was capelin. For all age classes, capelin is the main prey among the species and 














Figure 9.4. Arcto-Norwegian cod’s age-dependent average annual consumption of 
some commercially important prey species. Species included are shrimp 
(Pandalus borealis), capelin (Mallotus villosus), herring (Clupea harengus) 
and cod (Gadus morhua) above 5, 10, 10 and 20 cm, respectively. In grams 
of prey per kg of cod, 1984–92. Calculations based on data from The 


















Figure 9.5. Age-dependent average annual opportunity cost of Arcto-Norwegian cod’s 
consumption of some commercially important prey species. Species 
included are shrimp (Pandalus borealis), capelin (Mallotus villosus), herring 
(Clupea harengus) and cod (Gadus morhua) above 5, 10, 10 and 20 cm, 
respectively. In NOK per kg of cod, in 1991-92 prices. Consumption data 
from 1984 to 1992. Sources: Calculations based on biological data from the 
Institute of Marine Research, Bergen, and economic data from The 
Directorate of Fisheries, Bergen. 
 
 
 Taking the net opportunity cost of feed into consideration (see Flaaten and Kolsvik, 
1995, for details) gives the results shown in figure 9.5. The net value of the prey is the net 
contribution that the fish in the sea could have given for the prey harvesters if they had 
less competition from the predator, the cod. The net value per unit of catch was found by 
Flaaten and Kolsvik  (1995) to be 30 per cent of the quay-side price in these fisheries. In 
other words, if a predator eats fish that would have been worth € 1.00 at the quay, the 
fisher’s net loss is only € 0.30 since he would have had to spend € 0.70, including labour 
costs, to catch the fish. Figure 9.5 shows, for example, that two-year-old cod had an 
annual feed cost of NOK 1.50  (€ 0.20) per kg of biomass, and that about 75 per cent of 
this was inflicted on the shrimp fisheries. Except for age class 7+, the opportunity cost of 
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shrimp dominates the economic figures, whereas capelin dominated the biological results 
in figure 9.4. 
 
 The model MULTSPEC from the Institute of Marine Research (IMR), Bergen (see 
Tjelmeland and Bogstad, 1998) is a biological multispecies model for the Barents Sea 
fish/sea-mammal system. The MULTSPEC model includes cod, capelin, herring, minke 
whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata), harp seal (Pagophilus groenlandicus) and species of 
zooplankton. The ECONMULT model (see Eide and Flaaten, 1998) is a bioeconomic 
multifleet model to be used with more aggregated multispecies models than the very 
detailed MULTSPEC. MULTSIMP and AGGMULT are aggregated models (see 
Tjelmeland, 1990 and 1992; Eide and Flaaten, 1998). None of these models include 
shrimp, even though figures 9.4 and 9.5 indicate that shrimp should be included in the 
bioeconomic multispecies analysis of the Barents Sea fisheries. 
 
 
9.1.4  Interactions of fish and sea mammals  
 
Some species of whales and seals are important predators on fish in the North Atlantic. 
Icelandic, Norwegian and other scientists have for many years conducted research on the 
feeding ecology of whales and seals. Sigurjónsson and Vikingsson (1995) give an 
excellent review of much of the work done on whales, dolphins and porpoises in the area 
between Greenland, Iceland, Jan Mayen and the Faroe Islands until the mid 1990s (also 
see Sigurjónsson and Vikingsson, 1997). Their report also gives estimates, using two 
different methods, of annual consumption by these species in different parts of this area. 
On average, the consumption of commercially valuable fish is about 25 per cent of the 
total annual feed of whales. The total fish consumption exceeds 1.2 million tonnes per 
year in Icelandic and adjacent waters (mid 1990s). With regard to the implications for 
management of their results, Sigurjonsson and Vikingsson are careful with their 
conclusion: 
 
The present analysis of consumption .... is just one step towards a better 
understanding of the role of cetaceans in the marine ecosystem in these waters. 
The results show, however, that the amount of food consumed is substantial, while 
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the implications of that conclusion require further study.  (Sigurjónsson and 
Vikingsson, 1995 p. 10). 
 
For the Barents Sea and parts of the Norwegian Sea the paper by Schweder et al. (1998) 
investigates the effects on cod and herring fisheries of changing the target stock level of 
minke whales. Using a scenario modelling approach the biological model includes cod, 
herring, capelin and minke whales – with fish populations age and length distributed and 
minke whales age and sex distributed. The minke whale is an opportunistic forager that 
consumes plankton and other fish in addition to cod, herring and capelin. One of the 
findings is that a reduction of the minke whale stock from 72 per cent of carrying capacity 
to 60 per cent increases the annual catch of cod by some 100 thousand tonnes. This 
corresponds to an increase in the annual catch of cod by approximately 6 tonnes with a 
mean reduction in the whale stock of one animal. For herring no clear main effect was 
found on catch, due to the biological interactions between species and size groups. With 
respect to implications for fisheries management the authors conclude: 
 
 The results concerning the effects on the cod and herring fisheries must be taken 
as tentative since the ecosystem model used could be improved, and so could the 
strategies for managing the fisheries.  (Schweder et al., 1998 p. 77). 
 
When it comes to predators like whales and seals, however, harvesting is often 
controversial, as the following quotation demonstrates: 
 
An early exploration (of multispecies fisheries), May et al. (1979), has proved 
very influential, and now forms the basis for a very controversial piece of work, 
a bioeconomical analysis of the Barents Sea fishery by Flaaten (1988). 
Flaaten's work is controversial because of his conclusion that sea mammals 
should be heavily depleted to increase the surplus production of fish resources 
for man.  (Yodzis, 1994, p. 51.) 
 
Harvesting is, however, not the only utility generated from sea mammals. It has long 
been acknowledged that non-use values included in the objective function may have 




It should, however, be stressed that this result [...that the sea mammals should 
be heavily depleted to increase the surplus production of fish resources for 
man…] may be somewhat modified if the resource is assigned an optional value 
from people's willingness to pay for keeping the stock at higher level. A 
biological argument that also may weaken our result is the eventual existence of 
critical depensation for lower stock levels.  (Flaaten, 1988, p. 114.) 
 
 An alternative to comprehensive multispecies or ecosystem models is partial 
analysis. Flaaten and Stollery (1996) developed methods for the calculation of the net cost 
that predators inflicted upon the prey species fisheries. Applying one of the methods to the 
Northeast Atlantic stock of minke whales2 predation of fish, we estimated the annual 
predation costs per minke whale, at 1991-92 prices,  at between NOK 11,600 and NOK 
15,100. This would amount to between approximately € 1950 and € 2550 per minke whale, 
using 2002 prices and exchange rates. 
 
 
9.1.5  A historical note 
 
The examples I have given on multispecies modelling so far are all from the North 
Atlantic. The reason for this is simple – this is the area where I am working and that I 
know pretty well. There are, however, several examples of especially biological 
multispecies modelling of fisheries in other parts of the world. My final example is from 
the Mediterranean, and this is not just an ordinary example, but one of the most important 
ones in the history of multispecies modelling and management. 
 
 The first ever attempt, as far as I know, at conducting a multispecies analysis of 
fishing was by means of limit cycle models. Empirical studies of the Upper Adriatic Sea 
fisheries before, during and after the First World War found in D’Ancona (1926) were an 
important source of inspiration to the theoretical works by V. Volterra (1928) as 
demonstrated by this quotation: 
 
                                                 
2 This stock comprises the minke whale in the North Sea, Norwegian coast, Norwegian Sea, Barents 
Sea and Spitsbergen area. 
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 Doctor UMBERTO D'ANCONA (D'Ancona, 1926) has many times spoken to me 
about the statistics which he was making in fishery in the period during the war 
and in periods before and after, asking me if it were possible to give a 
mathematical explanation of the results which he was getting in the percentages of 
the various species in these different periods. This request has spurred me to 
formulate the problem and solve it, establishing the laws which are set forth in § 7. 
Both D'Ancona and I working independently were equally satisfied in comparing 
results which were revealed to us separately by calculus and by observation, as 
these results were in accord; showing for instance that man in fisheries, by 
disturbing the natural condition of proportion of two species, one of which feeds 
upon the other, causes diminution in the quantity of the species that eats the other, 
and an increase in the species fed upon. (Volterra, 1928, p. 4). 
 
Based upon his empirical studies of the fisheries of the Upper Adriatic Sea, D’Ancona 
(1926) concluded that the predators of this sea, the sharks, ought to be decreased by 
increased harvest intensity. That would make it possible to increase the yields of more 
valuable prey stocks. 
 
 Hopefully, this section has shown that in some cases, at least, multispecies 
modelling is useful, if not necessary, for improved overall management. This is especially 
so when there are strong predator-prey or competitive biological interactions among 
species that can be harvested independently of each other. A biological multispecies 
model gives the biological restriction on the possible combinations of harvest rates for the 
species in a particular area. In addition, a bioeconomic multispecies model helps to pick 
the optimal combination of harvest rates. Multispecies models may also help 
understanding variations over time in catch and effort composition, as seen in the case of 
the Upper Adriatic Sea before, during and after the First World War. 
 
 
9.2  More on predator-prey modelling 
 
We shall in this section give a review of a two-species predator-prey model and derive its 
maximum sustainable yield frontier (MSF), analysed in May et al. (1979) and Flaaten 
(1986). Suppose there is a prey, W1, on which the existence of a predator, W2, is based. 
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W1 and W2  can be thought of as biomasses. A simple model describing the dynamics of 
such a system is 
 











where r1 and r2 are the intrinsic growth rates of the respective species. K is the carrying 
capacity of the total systems, at which the prey will settle in the case of no predator and no 
harvest. 
 
 The per capita3 growth rate of the prey decreases from r1 for stock levels close to 
zero, to zero for stock levels equal to the carrying capacity in case of no predators. If 
predators exist, the per capita growth rate for the prey becomes zero for a stock level 
lower than its carrying capacity. The presence of predators reduces the per capita growth 
rate in proportion to the biomass of the predator. The predation coefficient, a, tells how 
much the per capita growth rate of the prey reduces per unit of the predator, or to put it 
another way, a tells which share of the prey stock one unit of the predator is consuming 
per unit of time. The total rate of consumption is expressed in the term of aW1W2. Note 
that the predator’s consumption is similar to fishermen’s harvest in the Schaefer harvest 
function discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 The predator’s per capita growth rate decreases from r2 when its own stock level is 
close to zero, to zero for a stock level equal to its own carrying capacity, which is 
proportional to the level of the prey stock. The proportionality coefficient α is the 
equilibrium stock ratio. 
 
 Mathematical stability properties of the model (9.1)-(9.2) will not be discussed 
here. (It can be found in the literature of theoretical ecology, e.g., in Beddington and Cook 
(1982), May (1974) and May (1981), as well in mathematics texts for economists, e.g., 
Sydsæter et al. (2008).) However, it is easy to see, by letting 1
•
W  and 2
•
W  equal to zero in 
                                                 
3 The term “per capita” is used, even though we mean per unit of biomass. 
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(9.1) and (9.2), that if an equilibrium point exists with both species being positive, the 

















KW  , 
 
 
where ν = aαK/r1. 
 
 It should be noticed that the intrinsic growth rate of the predator, r2, does not 
affect the equilibrium values of either of the two species. The equilibrium values of both 
species increase with any increase in r1 or K, ceteris paribus. From (9.3) and (9.4) it 
follows 
 
(9.5) α=12 /WW  .  
 
The equilibrium stock ratio α determines the relative size of the predator stock to that of its 
prey, when there is no harvesting. Outside equilibrium the relative stock size differ from α 
except for along the predator isocline. 
 
 Even though r2 does not affect the equilibrium values of the stocks, it is of 
importance to the behaviour of the system outside equilibrium. Defining the “natural 
return time”, TR, of the species as 
 
(9.6) 21/1 , i           rT i
R
i ==  ,  
 
r2 will affect the time the predator will need to reach equilibrium from a higher or lower 
level. 
 
                                                 




 Suppose that the fish stocks are harvested independently with constant effort per 
unit of time, Fi, scaled such that F1 = 1 corresponds to constant catchability coefficients 
equal to ri . Then the catch rates will be 
 
(9.7) 1111 WFrh =   
 
(9.8) 2222 WFrh =  .  
 
With harvesting introduced this will influence the growth rates in (9.1) and (9.2). 
 
 To simplify notation and the analysis a little we define the dimensionless stock 
levels X1=W1/K and X2=W2/αK. Then rewrite equations (9.1) and (9.2) as 
 
(9.9) )1(/ 211111 XXFXrdtdX ν−−−=   
 
(9.10) )/1(/ 122222 XXFXrdtdX −−=   
 
when harvesting, 1111 XFry =  and 2222 XFry = , is included. Here the dimensionless 
parameter ν is defined as 1/ rKaαν = . 
 
 The equilibrium properties of this ecological system depend only on the fishing 
efforts, F1 and F2, and ν. The dynamics additionally involve r1 and r2. The phase-diagram 
for the system (9.13)-(9.14) is shown in Figure 9.6. The isoclines are found by setting 
dX1/dt = 0 and dX2/dt = 0 in (9.9) and (9.10). This gives 
 
(9.11) )1)(/1( 112 XFX −−= ν  for 0/1 =dtdX    
 
(9.12) 122 )1( XFX −=   for 0/2 =dtdX  .  
 
If positive equilibrium values of X1 and X2 exist simultaneously they are found where the 


































1X  and 2X  both equal 1/(1 + ν) in the absence of fishing, and zero in the case of F1 = 1. 
In addition, 2X  will equal zero if F2 = 1. Thus there is a limit to how intensive fishing can 
be without causing extinction of the stocks. With fishing the relative stock size 




Figure 9.6. Phase diagram for a predator-prey model. 
 
 It is seen from (9.13) that only for F1 < 1 will there exist a positive equilibrium 
value of the prey. If F1 ≥ 1 the prey-stock will be extinct, and so, of course, will be the 
predator, as seen from (9.14). The latter expression shows that only for F2 < 1 and F1 < 1 




 The equilibrium values of both species increase with decreasing fishing pressure 
on the prey, i.e., for reduced F1. More of the prey gives increased carrying capacity for the 
predator which can be kept on a higher level. 
 
 On the other hand, the effects on the prey and the predator from decreased fishing 
pressure on the predator are the opposite of each other. From (9.13) it is seen that the 
equilibrium value of the prey will decrease, and from (9.14) that the predator will increase. 
The increased stock level of the predator means heavier predation on the prey, and thereby 
a reduced equilibrium level for the latter. 
 
 Let us now investigate the MSF for this two-species model. It may be of interest 
from both a biological and an economical efficiency point of view to maximise the 
sustainable yield of one species for a specified constant sustainable yield level of the other. 
This problem is equivalent to that of welfare economics: deriving the production 
possibility frontier by maximising the output of one good for a specified amount of output 
of the other, for a fixed amount of factors of production. In the two-species biological 
system the limited amount of factors of production are embodied in the carrying capacity 
and the intrinsic growth rate of the model. In a marine ecosystem, the limited factor of 
production used for “production” of fish will usually be the zoo-plankton communities. 
 
 The problem of maximising 
 
(9.15) )1( 21111 XXXry ν−−=   
 
subject to the constraint 
 
(9.16) constant )/1( 12222 =−= XXXry ,  
 
can be done by using the Lagrange method, as demonstrated in Beddington and May 
(1980). 
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1 =−+−+− XXXXX νν  ,  
 
which has the following two solutions for X1 for given values of X2: 
 
 
(9.23) [ ] 2/1222222,11 )32(8))4(1(4
1))4(1(
4
1 XXXXX ννν −−−+±−+=  
 
 
For each level of X2 we calculate X1 from (9.23), and the resulting yields, y1 and y2, are 
given by (9.15) and (9.16). The locus combining the yields of the two species is shown in 
figure 9.7 for ν = 2. This is the maximum sustainable yield frontier (MSF), named so to 
emphasise the connections to the concepts used in welfare economics. MSF gives the 
absolute sustainable yield of either population for a specified yield of the other. All 
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combinations of yields on or below this curve are sustainable, whereas yields to the 
northeast of the curve are possible for some period of time, but they are not sustainable. 
The star in the northeast corner corresponds to a combination of the largest possible yield 
of the prey and the largest possible yield of the predator, but such a combination of yields 
is definitely not sustainable. 
 
   
 
Figure 9.7. The maximum sustainable yield frontier (MSF) of a two-species model shows 
sustainable combinations of yield of species 1 (SY1) and species 2 (SY2). 
Parameters used are r1 = 2.0, r2 = 1.15 and ν = 2.0. Source: Flaaten (1988). 
 
 
 From the single species logistic growth model it is known that a given sustainable 
yield less than the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) can be harvested at two different 
stock levels, above or below the MSY level. These two ways of harvesting are called 
biological underexploitation and overexploitation, respectively. From a biological point of 
view the best way of harvesting is to harvest the MSY, whereas the economical optimal 
yield stock level, also depend on product price, harvesting cost and discount rate in 
addition to biological factors. 
 
 Unit harvesting cost is usually assumed to be a decreasing function of stock level, 
leading to the conclusion that the resource should be biologically underexploited to reduce 
costs. On the other hand, a positive discount rate leads to the conclusion that the resource 
should be heavily exploited since a given amount of net revenue “today” is preferred to 
the same amount “tomorrow”. In other words, from an economic point of view, harvesting 
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below, at or above the MSY stock level can all be optimal; it is a question of prices, costs 
and discount rates (see Chapter 4). 
 
 The smallest of the two solutions of equation (9.23) corresponds to a biologically 
inefficient harvest level, either underexploitation of the predator, or overexploitation of the 
prey. In the former case the predator is kept on the highest stock level of two possible ones, 
both giving the same sustainable yield of the predator. A higher predator stock means 
more consumption of the prey, thereby removing a potential prey yield. To achieve the 
highest possible sustainable yield of the prey for a given predator yield it is therefore 
obviously best to underexploit the predator. For similar reasons it is efficient to 
underexploit the prey to give more food to the predator. MSF harvesting thus means that 
the predator shall not be underexploited, and neither shall the prey be overexploited. 
 
 The terminal points of the MSF locus in figure 9.7, A and B, are related to specific 
stock levels of the predator and the prey. At point A the predator is extinct and the prey is 
at its single species biological optimum level: 
 
(9.24) 2/1|1 022 ===X yX  .  
 
 The absolute maximum sustainable yield of the predator, at point B in figure 9.7, 
occurs for an unharvested prey stock above, at or below its single species biological 
optimum, depending on the size of the dimensionless combination of parameters, ν. The 
smaller ν is, the higher will be the prey stock level. In fact it can be shown that  
 




== νX yF .  
 
At point B in Figure 9.7 there is no prey harvest and this entire species is left in the sea as 
natural feed for the predator.  
 
 From the definition of υ we know that it will be smaller the lower the predation 
coefficient a and the equilibrium stock ratio α. In other words, the maximum stock level of 
the prey is greater the lower the predator pressure, which is in accordance with the 




The maximum sustainable yield frontier (MSF) in Figure 9.7 pinpoints a key 
management issue for the case of multispecies harvesting. Should we aim at harvesting 
mainly then predator species and leave the prey in the sea as feed for the predators? Or 
should we mainly aim at harvesting the prey, by fishing down the predators? The latter 
would imply biological overfishing of the predator. Such questions are important in many 
of the world’s fisheries, including the krill-sea mammals system in the Antarctica, the 
fish-fish-sea mammals system in the Northeast Atlantic and the fish-sea mammals system 
in the North Pacific. When it comes to in particular sea mammals the issue of non-
consumptive value of charismatic species brings an additional dimension into 






































a) Formulate a simple predator−prey model (put in missing segments in the 
above equations) with harvesting, and draw the isoclines in a phase plane 
diagram. 
 
b) Explain what happens to stock levels and harvest when the harvest of the 
predator is increased. 
 




10. Recreational fishing 
 
This chapter discusses recreational fishing, where people (consumers) are willing to 
pay to go fishing. The willingness to pay may depend on several environmental and 
resource characteristics. We focus on the demand for fishing days and quality and 
analyse the open- access, the competitive and the social optimal recreational fishery.  
 
10.1 Recreational angling 
 
Recreational fishing is fishing for fun. The view of what is fun in life differs from 
person to person, and some people do not think fishing is fun at all. Thus there are at 
the same time and in the same country some who participate in recreational fishing 
and some who do not. The fun usually depends on several characteristics of the 
fishing itself and on other amenities. The size of individual fish, the size of the catch 
per day fishing, the fishing process itself, the fish species available and the natural 
scenery at the fishing spot are among the characteristics recreational fishermen 
consider when contemplating whether to go fishing or not. Travel time and out-of-
pocket costs matter. Of course income and the cost of fishing also matter for the 
demand for recreational fishing as for other goods and services, and we may, at the 
market level, analyse this good as we do for other goods. However, at the individual 
level the recreational fishing good is often a discrete good that is available only in 
integer units, for example when you have to buy fishing permits only for full days’ 
fishing (e.g. $/day).  
 
Other terms used for recreational fishing include sport fishing and hobby 
fishing. We shall, however, use recreational fishing and distinguish this from the 
commercial fishing and small-scale fishing discussed in the previous parts of this 
book, where the market value of the catch is balanced against the costs of the 
commercial firm or the opportunity costs of the small-scale fisherman. A person who 
takes part in recreational fishing will in this chapter be called an angler, since in most 
cases recreational fishing is conducted by use of hook and line. To fish for fun 
requires that people have earned income in other activities to spend on goods and 
services, including on recreational fishing. In actual cases we may find fishermen who 
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combine recreational fishing with subsistence fishing to gain food for the household 
and/or small-scale commercial fishing to obtain cash. Here, however, we shall focus 
on recreational fishing proper.  
 
From an economic point of view recreational fisheries may be treated as any 
other good that gives utility for the consumers and resource owners. However, the fish 
in the water is a common pool resource implying that any catch of one recreational 
fisherman has an effect on the stock, thereby reducing the harvest potential for the 
other recreational fishermen. In this respect recreational fisheries share the 
externalities characteristic of the commercial fisheries discussed in the previous 
chapters. Consumers choose to buy or not to buy a good, and if they buy they also 
have to decide on the quantity. Thus, for recreational fishing as a consumer good, we 
may ask who the fishermen are, what species and how much they catch, how they 
catch (gear type), where they go fishing and at what time or season. 
 
Why should we from an economic point of view be interested in recreational 
fisheries? Is this not just a minor hobby activity for a few people? Like fisheries 
discussed in the previous chapters, also recreational fisheries demonstrate externalities. 
These require management for at least three reasons. First, recreational fishing is a 
popular activity that gives fun, pleasure and exercise to lots of people. Globally 
recreational fisheries are a big and still increasing part of fisheries. In some countries 
they are even bigger than the commercial fisheries sector if we compare expenditures 
in recreational fisheries with the landing value in the commercial sector (see articles 
in Aas, 2008). In a recent survey of seven developed countries’ recreational fisheries, 
participation rates varied from five (Germany) to fifty-five (Lithuania) per cent of the 
total population. Finland and Sweden both had a participation rate of more than thirty 
per cent (Ditton, 2008). Considering that some people are too young or too old to go 
fishing, these numbers indicate that recreational fishing is a widespread spare-time 
activity. Of course some people fish only once a year, but others fish regularly. 
Second, in some areas there are increasing conflicts between commercial and 
recreational fishing. As the commercial sector is more and more restricted in its 
activities, it is also natural to look into recreational fishing and its effects on resources 
in the commercial sector to minimize conflicts and to increase the total social benefits 
from the natural resource. Third, if a tourist industry develops based on recreational 
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fisheries’ guests we may have a commercial fisheries sector and a tourist sector 
competing for the same fish and fishing grounds. 
 
10.2 Short-run analysis 
 
In the short run we may neglect possible effects on the fish resource from anglers. 
However, in the long run such effects have to be included if the anglers’ catch is of 
some importance compared with the size of the fish stock and its growth potential. Let 
us start with the simplest task – the short-run analysis of recreational fishing. 
 
Assume that the demand for recreational fishing, measured by days of fishing, 
D, depends on:  
 
• The price of the fishing permit (money per day of fishing, $/D) 
• The quality of fishing, defined as the quantity of fish per day of fishing 
(Q=kg/D) 
• The income and prices of alternative goods, assumed to be constant  
• Recreational fishing being a normal good (demand increases with income)  
• Utility maximization of a representative consumer  
• A fish stock that is limited in size and potential yield – in other words, a scarce 
resource 
 
We have a recreational fisheries sector with several resource firms and a 
competitive numeraire sector comprising the remaining economy. All in all there are n 
recreational fishermen (consumers), each with a utility function that is separable and 
linear in the numeraire good. Thus there are no income effects in the recreational 
fisheries and we can perform a partial equilibrium analysis. We shall analyse and 
compare competitive open access with a profit-maximizing resource owner. In some 
recreational fisheries the resource is limited to that of a lake or a river. This entity may 
be unique in the sense that recreational fishers’ willingness to pay for fishing is 
different from for fishing in nearby lakes and rivers. In other cases a lake is a lake and 




The variables we are going to use are shown in Table 10.1. 
 
Table 10.1. Variables in the recreational fishery analysis 
Symbol Definition Unit (*) Value 
(for Exercise 10.1) 
 Exogenous:   
r Maximum (intrinsic) growth rate Year-1 0.5 
K Carrying capacity  Kg 4*103 
q Catchability coefficient of the angler 
fishery 
Kg/day2 4*10-5 
α Constant of the linear demand function $/day 99.0 
β Slope of the linear demand function 
(the marginal willingness to pay for an 
angler day) 
$/day2 3.125*10-3 
γ Quality constant of the linear demand 
function 
(the marginal willingness to pay for 
quality) 
$/kg 6.25 
c Constant marginal cost of issuing permits  $/day 20.0 
 Endogenous:   
X The fish stock level Kg  
H Total catch per year (**)  Kg/year  
D Total number of permits (angler days) per 
year  
Days  
Q Quality of fishing (catch per angler day) Kg/day  
P Price per angler day (price per permit) $/day  
d Number of permits per representative 
consumer 
Days  
n Number of anglers (consumers) Number  
 
(*) One day means one angler day, which is one angler who fishes for one day. 
(**) One year consists of a given number of days’ angling. 
 
 In the previous chapters we have mainly worked with a constant price of fish 
to simplify the analysis, but without loosing track of the main bioeconomic issues. For 
the recreational fishery, however, we shall revert to the downward sloping demand 
curve, so well known from the micro economic theory. In general there are several 
possibilities for demand functions, including linear demand and constant elasticity 
demand. We shall stick to the former1 and derive, from the consumer’s utility-
maximizing behaviour, the following linear inverse demand function:  
                                                 
1 In the case of a quadratic and strictly concave utility function this gives rise to a linear demand 
structure (Singh and Vives, 1984). For the case of two goods the implication is that the demand for 
permits reduces to equation (10.1) when there is no explicit price of the quality.   
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(10.1) ),( QDpp = QD γβα +−= , for Q>Q0  
 
where Q0 is the lowest fishing quality that attracts anglers to this particular fishery. 
The parameters α, β and γ are all positive. The inverse demand for recreational fishing 
is downward sloping in the number of fishing days and is positively affected by an 
increase in the quality of the fishing. Quality by definition depends on the catch rate, 
the catch per angler day. To simplify we now assume that quality equals the catch per 
angler day, which is Q=H/D. In this case γ expresses the marginal willingness to pay 
for catch per angler day and β expresses the marginal willingness to pay for an angler 
day.  
 
Figure 10.1. Demand and supply of angler days, short run 
 
Figure 10.1 shows the downward sloping demand curves for two levels of 
quality, Q1 and Q2 with Q1<Q2. In this case the anglers’ demand curves represent 
inverse demand for daily fishing permits for the given quality levels. With the quality 
of fishing equal to the catch per angler day, for the price p*, the anglers want to 
purchase D* permits if the quality equals Q1, and D** permits if the quality equals Q2. 
For this price p* the consumer surplus corresponds to the triangle CBA for the low 
quality and the triangle CFG for the high quality Q2. There is no producer surplus in 
this case with the horizontal supply curve. Note that the demand curves in Figure 10.1 





The supply curve of angler permits reflects the aggregate marginal cost of 
issuing and handling permits and in Figure 10.1 this is drawn as a horizontal line at p*. 
This means that the total cost of producing permits equals C(D)=cD, where c is the 
cost per permit. The marginal cost of permits is C’(D)=c. In other words the average 
and the marginal costs of issuing permits are the same. In a competitive market for 
fishing permits, as illustrated in this figure, the equilibrium price is limited from the 
cost side since p=c. We now easily derive the competitive number of angler days, 
β
γα cQD −+=* , for quality Q1 and D** for quality Q2, where D*<D**. Thus the 
number of angler days at equilibrium increases with the quality of the recreational 
fishery and decreases with the cost of producing permits. The anglers’ perception of 
quality is reflected in γ, implying that the competitive number of angler days increases 
with their marginal willingness to pay for quality. In this case with a linear demand 
curve there is a limit to how many days the anglers would like to go fishing, to be 
found where the demand curves intersect the horizontal axis, for p=0 in Figure 10.1.  
 
In most countries recreational sea fishing is free of charge, but still the number 
of angler days is not infinitely large (see the case studies in Aas, 2008). To go fishing 
the angler will usually have to travel to the port, have suitable fishing gear and own or 
rent a boat – all costly activities. Thus the private costs of recreational fishing may set 
a limit to how many people actually go fishing, even if the fishery is free. However, as 
we have seen in the previous chapters, the harvest affects the fish stock to a greater or 
lesser extent, depending on the amount of effort targeting the resource. In the case of 
recreational fishing the total effort, equal to D above, equals the number of anglers 
times the average number of fishing days and it may well be that this significantly 
affects the resource. So far we have not included this important issue in the analysis. 
In some fisheries, for example in rivers and creeks, free access could easily cause 
heavy biological overfishing and also the extinction of fish stocks. We shall return to 
the resource issue below.  
 
In the case of inland fisheries, in lakes and rivers, there usually exists some 
kind of private property where fishing rights are owned, or controlled, by landowners, 
farmers or local commons bodies (again, see Aas, 2008). In such cases the rights 
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owner can achieve more than discussed above where the competitive solution did not 
generate any producer surplus, but only consumer surplus. Assuming that there is a 
unique source of fishing the willingness to pay is taken care of by a downward sloping 
demand curve as in Figure 10.1. For a given quality Q the total profit for the resource 
owner is 
 
(10.2) )(),(),( DcDQDpQD −=π cDQDDD −+−= γβα 2 .  
 
Maximizing π  with respect to D, treating the quality, Q, as given, implies that the 
resource owner should strive for a solution where the marginal revenue equals the 
marginal cost, as we know from the theory of the monopoly. With the profit function 
(10.2) this implies that 
 
(10.3) cDQ =−+ βγα 2 ,  
 




cQD M −+=  angler days by selling this number 
of licenses. Note that DM is smaller than the competitive number of angler days, D2, 
discussed above for quality Q2. In fact with linear demand the resource owner should, 
to maximize his profit, aim at only half of the competitive number of angler days 
where anglers pay only the costs of supplying the permits. This is demonstrated in 
Figure 10.2. The consumer surplus is now reduced from the triangle CFN to the 
triangle LMN, whereas the producer surplus is increased from zero to the square 
CNML. This means that the social surplus is reduced by the triangle NFM.  
 
As explained above the analysis related to Figure 10.1 and Figure 10.2 
excludes any effect the anglers’ fishing might have on the resources. Is this a realistic 
analysis? Well, in some cases it may be sufficient not to include the resource in 
discussing recreational fisheries management. For example, if anglers just exploit the 
fringes of a big fish resource, which is mainly utilized by commercial fishermen, and 
they do this in one or a few scenic localities, their demand is really for the joint 
amenities and fish resource. If each locality has something unique to offer anglers, 
who differ in preferences, there may be a separate demand curve for each of them. In 
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such cases the proper quality of the recreational fishery is determined by the 
commercial fishery, through its fishing pressure and effect on the stock. However, 
local communities or landowners may exert some market power and make money 




Figure 10.2. The sole owner’s adaptation 
 
 
10.3 Long-run analysis 
 
How can we include in a simple way the stock and the fishing pressure in the analysis 
of recreational fisheries, knowing that in some actual fisheries this is an issue of 
interest? The demand curves in Figures 10.1 and 10.2 are downward sloping in angler 
days, D, for a given quality of the fishery, measured by Q. The more angler days, the 
more the stock will be negatively affected and the quality of the fishing reduced via 
the average catch per angler day, Q. Thus in the long run the demand curve will shift 
inward, instead of staying constant as we assumed for the short-run analysis in the two 
figures discussed above. This is demonstrated in Figure 10.3 where the uppermost 
curve corresponds to the demand curve for the constant Q2 and the lowermost curve is 
the resource adjusted demand curve that we have to consider in a long-run analysis. 
The latter reflects that for each level of angler days there exists a long-run equilibrium 
level for the fish stock and this stock level determines the catch per angler day, the 
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recreational fishery quality Q. How much the long-run demand curve differs from the 
short-run curve depends on the biological productivity and on the anglers’ efficiency 
and willingness to pay for quality. Let us have a closer look at this by including an 
explicit growth model in the analysis. To make it simple we shall use a familiar 
growth model, the logistic growth used extensively in Chapter 5 in the Gordon–
Schaefer model.2 
 
 The growth function is )1(
K
XrXX −= , with X as the fish stock level, r is the 
intrinsic growth rate and K is the carrying capacity for the stock. The angler harvest 
function is H=qDX, where q is the catchability constant and, recalling the analysis of 
the Gordon–Schaefer model in Chapter 5, we have (see equations 5.2–5.7) that the 







HDQQ −=== , 
 
 
assuming that angling is the only type of fishing occurring.3 The angler harvest 
function in (10.4) corresponds to the long-run harvest function H(E) used extensively 






qqKDDP −=−+−= )1()( γβα , 
 
 
where qKa γα +=  and 
q
r
qKb γβ += . Thus the resource adjusted angler demand 
curve, in (10.5), shown in Figure 10.3, is steeper than the short-run demand curve in 
(10.1), since b>β, but also this curve is linear in the angler days, D. The resource 
adjusted demand curve is corrected for the resource effect of angling, which is the 
                                                 
2 Since most of the salmon die after spawning, Olaussen and Skonhoft (2008) and others use another 
type of biological recruitment model. 
3 We could of course have combined the effects on the stock from angling and commercial fishing, but 
have chosen to stick to the former only to keep the analysis as simple as possible.  
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negative effect angling has on the stock and on the catch per angler day. These effects 
can not be neglected in the “long” run. 
 
The student should now complete exercise 10.1. 
 
In Figure 10.3 the short-run demand curve has the negative slope β and the 
resource adjusted demand curve has the steeper negative slope b. The difference 
between the two slopes increases with the anglers’ willingness to pay for fishing 
quality (measured by γ) and with the angling productivity, which equals the 
catchability constant q. The biological characteristics of the stock, represented by r 
and K, also affect the resource adjusted demand curve, as seen from equation (10.5). 
The willingness to pay for an angling day, P(D), is higher the more productive the 
resource is, measured by r and K. 
 
 
Figure 10.3.  The resource adjusted angler demand curve and the short-run demand 
curve. The latter is shown for Q=qK implying that in this special case 
the intersection point on the vertical axis is the same for all three curves. 
 
What we called the competitive solution in Figure 10.2, for D** with permit 
price P* is not a sustainable solution. It is not a bioeconomic equilibrium since the 
limits of the fish stock production are excluded from the analysis. Thus the resource 
adjusted demand curve implies that DL in Figure 10.3 is the maximum number of 
permits that could be issued at the price P*. For DL there will be equilibrium in both 
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the market for permits and in the sea for the stock. We may call this the competitive 
angling equilibrium.  
 
If the owner of the angling resource maximizes the net value of the fishery, the 
number of angling permits should be reduced to MLD  in Figure 10.3, based on the 
same reasoning as we used in Figure 10.2. With MLD  permits the market price will be 
M
LP , which is considerably higher than P*. Note that the surplus of the resource 
owner, equal to the square CNML in Figure 10.3, is smaller than the corresponding 
surplus in Figure 10.2. The important difference between the two is that only that of 
Figure 10.3 is sustainable. From this we conclude that if the anglers of a recreational 
fishery affect the resource this effect must be taken into account when considering the 
number of permits that should be issued. 
 
We commenced this chapter by defining recreational fishing as fishing for fun, 
and continued by including days of fishing and quality as two major variables in the 
analysis. As the indicator for quality we chose catch per day of fishing and 
demonstrated that this is affected by the activities of the anglers. This way the 
recreational fishery can be analysed within the framework of bioeconomic modelling, 
now well known from the previous chapters. Our analysis includes the basics that 
distinguish recreational fisheries from commercial fisheries. However, recreational 
fisheries around the world vary in the type of natural resources, property and user 
rights and the way these fisheries are governed (many examples are given in Aas, 
2008). Compared with our model above, one type of difference has to do with the 
biology of the targeted fish stock. For example, in salmon fisheries in the North 
Atlantic the majority of fish die after spawning and the stock growth function is 
skewed to the left with the maximum sustainable yield at a lower stock level than half 
of the carrying capacity (see Olaussen and Skonhoft, 2008). Another type of 
difference has to do with the utility function of the anglers. Some consumers may 
prefer tranquillity, with their utility being negatively affected by the number of 
anglers and angler days. If their willingness to pay for this is sufficiently high some 
resource owners, for example of salmon rivers, may find it profitable to market their 
services to the high-paying few rather than to the mass market. This seems in 
particular to be the case if the average size of the fish matters and not just the weight 
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of the catch – the angling market value of fishing a ten kg salmon may be much 
higher than the aggregated value of ten salmon or trout of one kg each. In a survey of 
Norwegian rivers, 92 per cent of sport fishermen reported that the quality of the river 
in terms of the average catch per day was important. In addition, 72 per cent reported 
that the price of fishing permits was important (Fiske and Aas, 2001, quoted from 
Olaussen and Skonhoft, 2008). The issues mentioned here, and several others, have 
been discussed in the literature (see e.g. McConnell and Sutinen, 1979; Bishop and 
Samples, 1980; Anderson, 1983 and 1993; Rudd et al., 2002; not to forget two major 
books, Pitcher and Hollingworth, 2002 and Aas, 2008). 
 
There is a great variation around the world in institutional arrangements regarding 
property rights and governance for the resources in recreational fisheries. This is 
partly reflected in the many ways recreational fisheries are managed. We have 
analysed the case of trade in fishing permits per angler day. Related measures could 
be to combine this with other measures, such as free or inexpensive access for 
members of a local commons and auction to the highest bidder of some fishing days, 
if the river or lake is owned in common by a community. Output control could also be 
used, for example a bag limit on the size of catch per angler per day. In addition to the 
permit price anglers might have to pay a fee per fish or per kg of fish. A more 
controversial way of limiting the catch is to use the catch and release method. If for 
example the stock consists of few big spawners that are necessary for the long-run 
sustainability of the fishery the anglers might have to release such fish into the water 
immediately after catching them. This may be controversial mainly for two reasons: 
first, uncertainty about the survival rate of the released fish; second, some people do 
not like the idea of having fish nearly killed just for the pleasure of man, even though 
hunting and fishing have for thousands of years given pleasure, food and money to 
people. Recreational fisheries management remains to be just as rich and complex, if 
not more, in theory and actual cases to give pleasure and challenges to generations to 







The demand for angler days in a recreational fishery can be described with the linear 
inverse demand function in equation (10.1). This recreational fishery is regulated by 
the use of angler day permits. In the short run the harvest depends on the number of 
angler days and the stock level, and we assume this is according to the Schaefer 
harvest function H=qDX, with the definition of symbols given above in this chapter. 
The growth of the stock follows the logistic growth law (see Chapter 5) and the long 
run equilibrium harvest equals the growth, )1()(
K
XrXXH −= . By use of the 
variables and values in Table 10.1, answer the following questions: 
 
1. Draw a figure of the short-run demand curves for Q1=0.06 and Q2=0.15 (see 
equation (10.1). 
 
2. Derive the long-run average catch per angler day, which is an indicator Q of the 
quality of the fishery (tip: see Chapter 5, equations (5.2)–(5.7), in particular the 
catch per unit of effort equation).  
 
3. Derive the long-run demand function (price as a function of angler days), first 
by use of symbols, then plot this demand curve into your figure with the two 
short-run demand curves. 
 
4. Give a verbal explanation of why there is a difference in the slope of the short-
run and long-run demand curves for angler day permits. 
 
5. Prove and explain why the long-run and short-run demand curves intersect the P 
axis at the same point for Q=qK. 
 
6. What is the competitive(long-run equilibrium) number of permits if the constant 
marginal cost of issuing permits is c=10.0 $/permit?   
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